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The University of Denver College of Law was honored to have Professor
Michael Reisman, Hohfeld Professor of Jurisprudence at Yale University
Law School, as its guest speaker for the seventh annual Myres S. McDougal
Distinguished Lecture. Professor Reisman chose to address the topic of
microlegal systems and their role in the public order, and he notes that his
objective is "to alert and sensitize scholars and the diverse official, as well
as non-official, custodians of the private sphere or civic order, to the fact
that key aspects of individual lives are affected by microlegal arrangements." In his remarks, Professor Reisman discusses the norms of eye communication and draws some generalizations about the law in microsocial
settings. Specifically, he states that "[t]here is a rule and an attendant set
of expectations about proper subjective and objective responses to norm violation, intimating some sort of system for enforcing the norm." In addition
to microlaw which accompanies microsituations, there exist microsanctions
which serve to maintain the norm. Professor Reisman concludes his remarks by stating that although microlegal systems may encounter rejection
by jurisprudential scholars and remain low in visibility, their "significant
effects ... on social order and psychopersonal organization" should not be
ignored.
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van Son 183

To aid the understanding of the European Economic Community's treaty
power, Mr. van Son first gives us a background of the legal documents
which created this power, particularly, the Treaty of Rome. Next, he poses
six hypothetical models in which he discusses how a court would apply the
treaty power to each in light of past court opinions. From this, the author
attempts to contrast the theoretical development of the treaty-making
power with the EEC treaty-making procedure in practice. Mr. van Son illustrates the conflict between the progressive and forward-looking evolution
of the treaty-making power espoused and bestowed on the Community by
the European Court, and the practical application of that power. He contends that this tension continues to be the major problem confronting the
Community with respect to its treaty-making power, and it arises mainly
from the ongoing political struggle between the Commission and the Council.
It is generally agreed that the European Court "is leading both the
Council and, at times, the Commission, toward the practical application of

B.S.B.A., J.D.; The Honorable Joseph R. Quinn, A.B., LL.B.; Stephen C. Rench, B.A.,
J.D.; Paul E. Scott, B.A., M.D., J.D.; Daniel J. Sears, B.S., J.D.; Martin Semple, B.A.,
J.C.B., J.L.L., J.C.D., J.D.; Harley W. Shaver, A.B., J.D.; C. Garold Sims, B.A., J.D.;
Gerald D. Sjaastad, B.S., M.S.C.E., Ph.D., J.D.; James W. Spensley, B.S., J.D.; Harry
M. Sterling, B.S., LL.B.; Peter M. Sussman, B.A., J.D.; Janice R. Tanquary, B.A.,
J.D.; James K. Paupey, B.B.A., J.D.; Cooper Wayman, B.S., M.S., Ph.D., J.D.;
Michael 0. Wirth, B.S., M.A., Ph.D.; Lucius E. Woods, B.S., LL.B.; Brooke Wunnicke, B.A., LL.B.; James R. Young, B.S.C.E., J.D.; Adjunct Lecturers in Judicial Administration: Teri P. Campbell, B.S., B.A., J.D.; Stephen P. Ehrlich, B.S.B.A., J.D.;
Barbara J. Gletne, B.A., M.A.; Maureen M. Solomon, B.A., M.P.A.; Bernard D. Steinberg, B.Mus., J.D.; Daniel R. Vredenburg, B.S., M.S.J.A.

The Denver Journal of International Law and Policy
is an integral part of the University of Denver's International Legal Studies Program.
The purpose of the Program is to prepare students for effective roles in the contemporary interdependent world of business, federal government, and international relations. The faculty includes members of the regular faculty at the University of Denver College of Law, professors from other schools and departments of the University,
and several practicing attorneys. The Director of the Program is Professor Ved P.
Nanda of the College of Law.
In addition to the regular course of study, the International Legal Studies Program
makes special provision for internships, externships, and summer study in the United
States and abroad. Students may also enroll in a joint degree program with the Graduate School of Business and Public Management or the Graduate School of International Studies, leading to the degrees of M.B.A., M.A., or Ph.D., in addition to the
J.D.
Other components of the Program include the Denver International Law Society, the
Myres S. McDougal Distinguished Lecture in International Law and Policy, the annual regional conference of the American Society of International Law, and the Philip
C. Jessup International Law Moot Court Competition.
Please address inquiries concerning the Program to:
Professor Ved P. Nanda, Director
International Legal Studies Program
University of Denver College of Law
200 West 14th Avenue
Denver, Colorado 80204 USA
Telephone (303) 753-3427

a treaty-making power that permits the Community to act as a fully independent international legal personality."
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Alfred P. Rubin 219

Professor Rubin begins by distinguishing the "law of peace" from the "law
of war" and then attempts to clarify the underlying perceptions of the law
of war as they have been growing in regard to "irregular" combatants. Specifically, the author contends that "recognition of 'belligerency' is frequently denied for political reasons, but recognized by implication when the
legal results of recognition are sought by states who simultaneously deny
the overt label. Thus 'terrorists' may be labeled 'criminals' while in fact
treated as 'prisoners of war' when captured by a state denying that the law
of war applies even to that particular outbreak of political violence." Professor Rubin scrutinizes treaties and codifications of the laws of war, including the latest attempt of the international community to address entitlement prisoner of war status, the 1977 Geneva Protocols. He proposes
that these codifications are too narrow, resulting in a pattern of prescription that is "unsatisfactory" and "inconsistent" with the most basic
precepts of humanitarian law. In conclusion, the author contemplates that
the muddled legal categories of soldiers and irregulars are, in practice, becoming irrelevant due to the humanitarian legal protection which nationstates currently afford to common criminals and to participants in armed
conflicts of non-international character.
THE USE OF DISCRETIONARY AUTHORITY BY INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATIONS IN THEIR RELATIONS WITH INTERNATIONAL

CIWL SERVANTS .....................

Bruno Michel de Vuyst

This article reviews the "exercise of discretionary authority by international
organizations with respect to treatment of their staff," and it then examines
"the reactions by some international administrative tribunals to such exercise of discretionary authority as perceived through the judgments of such
tribunals. . . ." Mr. de Vuyst starts by noting that the source of international administrative law is primarily international organizations, rather
than general principles of law. He then turns to the nature and functions of
international organizations and concludes that certain inherent characteristics therein necessitate executive discretionary powers with respect to treatment of a staff, so that flexibility and the ability to act may be preserved.
After lengthy analysis, it is concluded that administrative tribunals have
allowed international organizations a wide berth in exercising their discretionary authority with regard to their staffs so long as the authority is not
wielded deviously or unreasonably. Mr. de Vuyst closes by noting that this
judicial reluctance to override the decisions of an international organization
is correct because the role of an international administrative tribunal is to
adjudicate, rather than to legislate.
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Looking, Staring and Glaring:
Microlegal Systems and Public Order
MICHAEL REISMAN'

I
As I stand in a public place, scanning casually but looking at no face for
more than a moment, I become fascinated by a particular face. Without
quite realizing it, I find that I am studying it intently. Subtly and imperceptibly, looking has modulated to staring. I have no interest in a more
expanded exchange with the person I am looking or staring at, and I do
not want to be looked at or studied in return. My target senses he is being
stared at. (Let us, for the moment, designate the target as masculine to
minimize the sexual element, what Freud characterized as "a component
of the sexual instinct, schaulust or, in its English rendition, scoptophilia,
the instinct of looking;" it is present in all interaction, but as we will see
particularly significant in male-female visual exchanges.) How the target
senses the staring, I cannot say, but he almost always does. He turns and
looks briefly at me. Since his eyes meeting mine are a contact which
would require acknowledgment of each other, I and sometimes both of us
avert our eyes quickly.
If we have averted our eyes, my target almost always looks back, as if
to confirm the sensation he had of being observed. If I am staring back at
him, then my signal may be that I wish an exchange to continue. At this
point, he may avert his eyes to reflect on his next move. If he does not
keep them averted, he has signalled that an exchange can occur, which is
01982 by Michael Reisman.
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an outcome I am not interested in exploring in this context, for it termi-

nates the anterior visual exchanges and transforms the encounter into
more conventional modes, the "looking" having performed an instrumental scouting function. But if he keeps his eyes averted, he has signaled
two things. He has indicated that he does not want an exchange. Second,
and more subtly, he has indicated that he does not want me to continue
to look at him.
At this point, I seem permitted at the most one or two quick looks,
apparently justified as checking to see whether I have read my target's
reaction correctly. And so, like a squirrel stuffing his cheeks with nuts, I
gulp in as much as I can and then stop looking.
Until now, the implicit norms of a "looking" situation have been
complied with. An overly long and intent look at another, not intended to
be noted nor animated by a wish for more contact with the target, has
been interpreted by both in a series of nonverbal moves as an invitation
to establish a broader exchange and has been refused. This is, of course, a
fictitious characterization, since the look was not an invitation; the effect
of the fiction is to disarm a "stare" and to render it socially innocuous.
Without realizing it, our little exchange has affirmed a larger social norm
which balances the need of interacting human beings to gather visual information with the need of the same people to preserve the exosef, the
defensive perimeter of the self, from visual penetration or intervention.
But the exchange may not end here. The original looker may either
continue to look or resume looking. At this point, the entire character of
the exchange modulates, for it is no longer plausible for the target to
characterize the looking as innocuous. It has become an intervention, an
invasion of the exoself of another against his will for the gratification of
the looker. Looking has unquestionably become staring.
A look which has been protested can be rendered innocuous in a
number of ways. A gentleman, in days past, might have lifted his hat to
the lady or gentleman he stared at and then continued on his way. Lifting
one's hat in that context is what we may call a "disarming" communication, akin to saying one is "sorry" when one bumps into another in a
crowd.
Unusual looking situations may have special disarming norms. Tourists, for example, may be expected to pay a certain amount for the privilege not only for photographing but even for staring at an indigene. Indeed, in Khartoum, I witnessed a demand for payment for this
"unauthorized" looking. Two tourists were watching a man ride by
proudly on his donkey. When he saw he was being looked at, he raised his
stick in acknowledgement and proud salute. When the tourists continued
to stare at him, he turned around, dismounted and asked for money.
In some cases, even this sort of staring can be disarmed by either
pre- or post-empting with a verbal explanation, whose veracity is not
tested. For example, "I'm sorry I'm staring; you remind me of so-and-so";
"I'm certain I know you from somewhere" and so on. Excuses such as
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these are not easily available when there is a great divergence in the class
or ethnic background of the parties. And, obviously, they are not available when there is no common language.
The uncodified, reticulate network of norms governing looking and
staring has certain game aspects. Many individuals are uncomfortable
with games, either because of fear of unpredictable outcomes or fear of
the loss of self-esteem following a defeat (a deprivation which can be
viewed as catastrophic by insecure personalities) and so on. A man or
woman who is fearful of encounters with strangers in which the sexual
potential is indeterminate may worry that even initial eye-play looking
will be assigned a sexual content; hence they may focus on the ground
and rely on and become quite skilled in peripheral vision. A female journalist in New York, whose friends must think she loves concrete, writes "I
look at it so much as we all learn to do, to avoid looking into people's
eyes." The response of such persons to being looked at is often a type of
cultivated autism. The person being looked at may affect not to realize
that he is under observation or may be shy and thus intently bury his
nose in a book or study something else.
From both the perspective of an actor in a looking-and-staring encounter, as well as that of an observer studying looking and staring norms
for their utility to social exchange, this response of cultivated autism can
sometimes be viewed as pathological, for it can impede the fulfillment of
one of the basic social functions of the norms: to permit the initial gathering of visual information without necessary commitments to further
interaction.
Thus far, we have teased out of this mundane situation a normative
system which characterizes some visual information gathering as lawful
(we refer to this activity as "looking"), and some visual information gathering as unlawful ("staring"). When an intervention such as staring cannot be disarmed or otherwise rendered innocuous, it creates a crisis for
the microlegal system of looking and staring. It is not that staring technically violates rules about looking. After all, violations may be accomplished in ways that do not impair the pertinent norm and indeed may
even reinforce it. But in the nature of the activity, staring, by openly and
brazenly violating the rule, flouts it, causing that special sense of distress
and anxiety people experience when their normative universe begins to
crumble.
If, accompanying these rules, there are no techniques for characterizing the staring as unlawful and reinstating the sense of order-there are,
in short, no sanctions-then it would be inaccurate to treat looking and
staring norms as a legal system in any save the most metaphorical sense.
One cannot speak of a legal system unless the distinction between licit
and illicit behavior is supported by certain sanctions, i.e., responses sufficiently forceful to clearly characterize offending behavior as unlawful and
to prevent, deter, correct or effect what ever other sanctioning goals there
may be. In microlegal systems, one would expect these sanctions to be
commensurately low-key and often nonverbal. But one must insist they
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be present and operate if we are to speak of law.
There are two species of sanctions for staring offenses in microlegal
settings. The first are what may be called nonverbal sanctions aimed at
terminating the staring with minimum disruption within the microsystern. These involve primarily silent protests by the target. There is a visual communication which sanctions. Let us provisionally refer to such a
response as "glaring" to distinguish it from "looking" and "staring."
Sometimes the grimace or look of distaste a woman being stared at will
flash across her face is enough to stop the staring. As these are relatively
aggressive responses, many may be too timid to resort to them. Where it
is physically possible and socially feasible, the more timid target may
simply turn her back. A woman may turn and seek the arm of her companion, implying that if the staring does not cease, she will invoke her
protector. Or she may say to her protector, "That man is staring at me,"
and he may turn and glare at the starer. Through such means, the target
protests the stare, with the expectation that it will cease.
The sanction may also be verbalized. This is a substantial escalation,
inevitable when the ambiguities of behavior are supplanted by the comparative clarity of words: "Stop staring at me." "Would you please stop
staring at her." An informant recounts a case, apparently something of a
family heirloom, which involved such sanctions. Her grandfather was
traveling by train in the West at the end of the 19th century. Apparently
he had the curious habit of dozing off into a sort of trance, with his eyes
open and fixed on some distant point. The point in this instance was the
nose of the passenger sitting opposite him. After what we can assume
were a few minutes of fruitless glaring at the staring sleeper, the man
being stared at drew his revolver, pointed it at her grandfather's head and
said, "If you don't stop staring at me, I'm going to shoot you."
Verbalization is an escalation because it transforms ambiguous behavior, which is so woven into the situation that the actors themselves are
often unaware of it, into something express and unequivocal. Nonverbal
responses, in contrast, may be so subtle that the parties themselves are
not aware of them at a level of overt consciousness. They permit starer
and target to rearrange their relationship without disruptive embarrassment, indeed often without the overt consciousness in which words are
the coin of most common exchange. Verbalization precludes this silent
settlement. Because words often involve third parties, they increase the
stakes and may increase the embarrassment of starer and target. When
verbalized, micro-legal sanctions are often like destructive and disproportionate reprisals in the law of war: lawful in inception but delictual in
result.
Sanctions "within" the system reinstate the norms about defense of
the self, permitting the pattern of social interaction to continue. In contrast, verbalized sanctions, by virtue of their character and comparative
intensity, are responses "outside" the system. While they often terminate
the offending behavior, they are also likely to disrupt, if not terminate,
the micro-situation itself. If one posits a general community interest in
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maintaining interaction, then verbalized sanctions, though apparently
dramatically effective, may be considered as dysfunctional. But since the
situations we are considering-chance encounters-are quite fungible, no
great social consequence follows from the termination of a single one. In
this respect, external sanctions in micro-situations cannot be analogized
to macrosocial situations where the external sanction may precipitate
great disruption and even widespread deprivation.
II
The curious phenomenon of looking at strangers thus offers some insights into the dynamics of microlegal systems. We now have some sense
of the basic rules about looking at others. Before we generalize about
microlegal systems, it may be useful to make some observations about the
social and psychological dimensions of looking.
A stranger, for purposes of our discussion, may be taken to mean
someone we do not know, someone therefore about whom visual information will be a useful and in some circumstances indispensable preliminary
to decisions about more association. Nothing would seem simpler than
looking at strangers, yet there are, as we have already seen, many cultural
and policy antinomies in this apparently simple and mundane act. We
gain much of our information in face-to-face encounters by looking.
Mayer surmises that modern urban man's sensorium is considerably more
visual than that of his pre-urban counterpart. For McLuhan, of course,
this assumption is a fundamental variable in accounting for changes in
social structure and personality.
Looking is important as a preliminary or pre-engagement "scouting"
activity, a type of intelligence gathering. The looker is able to acquire
information from afar, as it were, without having to engage his target verbally. After verbal exchange, extrication by ignoring the other is more
difficult. In some circumstances, it could be viewed as an insult and engender strife. Looking was almost certainly an important natural selection
feature and continues to have some advantages over other long- and middistance sensory methods. At its most mundane, visual orientation is simple common sense and the folk wisdom is expressed in sayings like "Look
before you leap," "Use your eyes," "Open your eyes," "Are you blind?"
"Why do you think God put eyes in your head?" and so on. But looking is
more than pragmatic. We also gain aesthetic and erotic pleasure from
looking, and many strata in our culture encourage looking at the human
face and figure as objects of beauty.
Where the looker's object is another person, looking becomes an important social activity. For the object also has eyes and knows he is being
observed. This is not a light matter in our culture. "Property," Jhering
observed in his curious and often disturbing essay, "is but the periphery
of my person extended to things." Our exoself, the external image of the
self-system, available to the eyes of others, is but a cultural creation, a
type of psychosocial carapace or integument. One of its functions is pro-
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tective. "Each of us," wrote Buber, "is encased in an armour whose task
is to ward off signs."
Looking is not a "spatial invasion." In many ways, the exoself is proprietary. The property notion is expressed in subtle ways. People may
look, but they are expected to look at those parts that the "owner" of the
exoself wants them to look at, at certain times and following certain procedures. Minimally polite behavior often dictates that others accept, at
least publicly, the exoself as presented by its owner. The politician's wife,
whether she ingratiates aggressively or, as Mrs. Nixon, under relentless
public glare tries desperately to protect a core of integrity behind a fixed
and glazed smile, feels entitled to be taken at "face value." For all people,
there are proper ways of looking at another's exoself. Improper ways may
range from penetration to exploitation. What woman cannot attest to the
difference between a look of respectful admiration and a leer or an ogle?
In curious and complex ways, the exoself, while the private property
of the self, is also a res communis; its specific character and the appropriate normative regime for looking at it will be determined by features of
the particular context. The emotional experience captured in Jhering's
remark is one that most normal people undergo. Beautiful people, whose
psychic makeup does not include sufficient narcissism and exhibitionism,
suffer more, though only the scoptophobic find it unbearable.
Sensitivity to being looked at may be less intense with intimates, but
even then there may be unspoken rules. One of C.S. Lewis' characters
says, "Do you not know how bashful friendship is?
Friends-comrades-do not look at each other. Friendship would be
ashamed." Even lovers, whose tacit compact includes taking and allowing
great delight in each other's physical beings, may resent being looked at
in certain circumstances, in certain ways, or at certain times. And, of
course, relatives, who are even less restrained than strangers, look at children without any restraints; this can be an excruciating experience for
children. Alas, children enjoy no coordinate privilege and cannot effectively protest the intrusion. Even for them, unrestrained gathering of visual information is deemed uncouth. Children, exhibiting a healthy curiosity, often drift into utterly absorbed staring; adults regularly admonish
them not to stare. As children grow older and try to construct for themselves the unexpressed code about gathering visual information, they may
err on the other side and be rebuked for "sneaky" looking and peeping
until they learn the appropriate balance and techniques.
Amy Vanderbilt, whose work is a useful cache of micro-norms, alerts
her readers to sub-cultural variations.
Etiquette, too, is obviously geographically influenced. In cities
thousands of familes live under one roof, yet most never speak to one
another on meeting. In the country not to speak to one's neighbor on
encountering him would be very rude. In some parts of the South girls
are quite accustomed to young men asking for late dates, a
date-usually with an old beau-following one that may end at about

eleven. Elsewhere such behavior might be considered questionable.
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Her observation applies to looking and staring, not only geographically, but in terms of culture and class as well. There are subcultures
where general norms for gathering visual information, such as those considered above, are inverted: long and lingering eye contact is considered
courteous, while aversion of the eyes is characterized as rude. For example, in Cassadaga, Florida, a spiritualist village, increased eye contact is
not delictual. It appears to be bland and noninquisitive looking, passive
rather than aggressive looking. In some encounter groups or environments
that characterized themselves as "consciousness raising," where explicit,
vigorous and sometimes aggressive exploration of the self and others is
the norm, more eye contact will be tolerated, though certain types of focal
restrictions may still operate. In China, in earlier periods, and to an extent even now, the European alien, acculturated to norms restricting
looking and staring, could glare and glare, while the curious Chinese
would simply continue to stare without any sense of wrongdoing. Of
course, this does not mean that the Chinese of that time did not have
norms about looking at each other. It is also possible that, in looking as in
so many other activities, different rules apply to aliens or outsiders.
Sensitivity at being looked at increases with regard to strangers, perhaps because of personal experience, perhaps because our culture teaches
us to be wary of strangers, perhaps because of a persistence of the child's
profound fear of the stranger, perhaps for phylogenic reasons. To some
degree, everyone is sensitive to being looked at. In our civilization, this
may be an aspect of psychopersonal organization which may be integrally
linked to a socio-economic system which encourages individuation. In deference to, or perhaps to encourage, individuation, formal authority may
prohibit certain types of "peeping," i.e. unauthorized looking. It may enjoin photographing people in certain circumstances and may even allow
tort suits against paparazzi for violations of looking restraints.
The special sensitivity of many communities to eye contact arises
from many factors. There is a certain explosive potential to the gathering
of information visually, for eye contact plays an important and distinctive
role in the repertory of communication techniques. Whether or not, in
Leibnitz' lapidary phrase, "the eyes are the windows of the soul," key
phases in sexual invitation and the initiation of courtship are effectuated
in many circles by looks rather than by words. Some social psychologists
assert that there are many gender-based differences regarding looking in
our society. In some stratified societies, looking may signal equality or
dominance; looking away or lowering the eyes may signal deference or
appeasement. The meaning of a refusal to look at someone who is talking
to you may vary with context, some times being deferential, sometimes
being a form of insult.
Depending on the context, eye communication conveys explicit content and also conveys secondary or metacommunicative information. A
stare is paradoxical. It can be a threat, i.e., a repellant; it can be an invitation to social interaction, i.e., an attractant. In routinized situations,
only gross departures from the norms will require fresh interpretation. In
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nonroutinized situations where strangers look at each other, there is considerable possibility for misinterpretation. These considerations can
hardly outweigh the need to gather information visually, but they do introduce special complexities.
Because of these antinomies, the general normative regime for looking and the characterization of certain visual techniques in certain circumstances as unlawful is necessarily complex, for it must balance the
social benefits gained from visual observation against the social benefit of
protection of the self.
III
Our discussion of looking, staring and glaring has brought us to the
point where we may, quite tentatively, essay some generalizations about
the law in microsocial settings.
In a microsituation, a very small group of people, as a result of their
social, if not physical proximity (they may be proximate telephonically or
sequentially by mail) have the opportunity to interact. Physical proximity
is an important though not indispensable variable for these situations, for
it permits multiple nonverbal communications. Like every other social
situation, mundane microsituations-even with only two actors and of the
shortest duration-have the complex and significant normative components that are characteristic of law in it conventional usage. These components are:
(1) Expectations, shared by the people in the situation, that in
that situation, there is a "right" way of acting; (2) Expectations that
defections from that "right" way or norm will lead to a shared subjectivity that the defection was "wrong"; and (3) Expectations that the
injured party is authorized to take certain responses that may hurt or
sanction the offending actor and at the very least must reaffirm the
norm that has been violated.
We may speak of a legal system because, for all its informality, there
is more than those imprecise precations, better captured in the ambiguities of the subjunctive mood. There is a rule and an attendant set of expectations about proper subjective and objective responses to norm violation, intimating some sort of system for enforcing the norm.
Very complex micro-legal systems are found embedded in languages
reflecting and reinforcing policies about relations between classes, castes,
and genders. There are micro-legal systems about looking at people,
touching them accidentally, standing in line, laughing, and so on. Wherever they occur, micro-legal systems are important from sociological, manipulative, and legal perspectives because of their function in micro-situations as well as for their contribution to more general systems of
community order. Amy Vanderbilt may be discounted somewhat for puffing her own product, but her point is pertinent to our discussion.
Who needs a book of etiquette? Everyone does. The simplest
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family, if it hopes to move just a little into a wider world, needs to
know at least the elementary rules. Even the most sophisticated man
or woman used to a great variety of social demands cannot hope to
remember every single aspect of etiquette applying to even one possible social contingency ....
The word "etiquette" for all the things I have tried to discuss is
really inadequate, yet no other will do. It covers much more that
"manners," the way in which we do things. It is considerably more
than a treatise on a code of social behavior. . . we must all learn the
socially acceptable ways of living with others in no matter what society we move. Even in primitive societies there are such rules, some of
them as complex and inexplicable as many of our own. Their original
raison d'etre or purpose is lost, but their acceptance is still
unquestioned.
Alas, no code book can cover every contingency. Moreover, no current etiquette handbook codifies the micro-law of the many different
strata and groups an individual is likely to encounter in a heterogeneous
society. Even equipped with some such vade mecum, some social situations will seem so novel to the actors in them that they will be uncertain
about the appropriate norms and how they are to be applied. Novelty, in
its social significance, should not be confused with trivial notions of the
exotic. Stanley and Livingstone could meet in the bush and interact without introduction as naturally as they might in a club in London, while a
white and a black may cross paths daily in a New York subway station,
but be unable to establish an easy pattern of interaction. Novelty may
derive from the identity, class, culture or language of the other or uncertainties about any of these, from the nature or purpose of the encounter
or uncertainty about it, from its location, and so on.
Where there is uncertainty about norms appropriate for the situation
or the suspicion that there are no norms, the situation will not be disrupted if the parties seek jointly or in parallel fashion to prescribe or
make law. Each party then seeks in his own mind to determine appropriate norms, by tentative analogy from "like" situations, or by a complex
process of claim and deference which accompanies the more manifest exchanges. (There is a certain play or game aspect to these exchanges and,
as we saw earlier, personalities too insecure to risk even the minor losses
of games may find it extremely difficult to interact under these conditions
of increased uncertainty.)
Failure to successfully prescribe norms appropriate for the situation
will result in what is objectively described as anomie, but is subjectively
experienced as "awkwardness." That feeling impedes or clogs interaction,
or presses toward ostensible non-interaction, as when two people pretend
to ignore each other. Both of these outcomes may be deemed socially
pathological, since we may assume a general interest in modern secular
societies in facilitating exchanges. (The present study is not primarily
concerned with the process of prescribing or making micro-norms, but
rather with their application.)
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The distinguishing feature of a norm is not, as is commonly thought,
words in an "ought" formula. Every aspect of life, every flow of communication is full of imprecations. It bears repeating that the feature of a
norm that distinguishes it from all the depreciated "you oughts" and
"you shoulds" of a daily conversation is its sanction, a communication
accompanying the "ought" that indicates that the speaker or the community is willing to invest something of value to see that the norm is followed. The investment can be something to punish or deprive the deviator or something to reward the conformer. Rewards may be no more than
symbolic approval or disapproval or something substantial-money, time,
life-given, withheld, or taken away. Often, sanctions are woven into a
social situation with an instinctive cunning. In the looking context, a glare
is a common sanction. In interviewing, for example, Richardson,
Dohrenwend, and Klein note that some interviewers use social pressure
"directly and forcefully."
One method is to urge the respondent to participate by classifying
him with a group which he respects. This approach is embodied in
such statements as, "I have been interviewing a number of leading
citizens and, to complete my study, I should like to ask you. . ." or
(to a physician respondent) "I am interviewing all members of the
county medical society, and I'd like. . . ." Such an approach exploits
the desire of the respondent to conform to the behavior of others in
the reference group or, conversely, his reluctance to refuse to participate in an activity which the reference group apparently endorses or
approves.
For our purposes, it is important to note that these communications
function as sanctions. Where normative communications are also accompanied by indications of authority, they may properly be called law. But
remember that norms, while an indispensable part of law, are not synonomous with law. The distinguishing feature of a norm is that it is
deemed of sufficient importance for someone to expend personal effort
and social value to secure behavior conforming to it. Note that the effort
need not be sufficient to win full or even partial compliance, but only
enough to sustain a norm as such.
Microsituations are governed by microlaw and microlaw must have
sanctions, though they may be microsanctions. The jurisprudential significance of trivial sanctions will be considered later. At the moment, it is
important to recognize that behavior seemingly embedded in a situation
and stimulated by some sense of irritation may function situationally as a
sanction. If X fails to play by the rules in a two-person game and Y, out
of a sense of indignation, disrupts the game by leaving, Y's behavior has
sanctioned. It has deprived X and, more importantly, affirmed the norm
that has been violated. Conversely, Y's failure to leave, while permitting
the game to continue, might have resulted in termination, erosion, or
modification of the norm.
Motive and consciousness of sanctioner and target are not required
indicia of a sanction. Actors in microlegal systems are usually unaware of
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the legal quality of the experience and particularly oblivious to their own
functional roles as decision-makers or sanctioners. They view their own
behavior, insofar as they are overtly conscious of it, as an expression of
irritation or a matter of personal defense. They would hardly imagine
that they have been deputized pro hac vice to sanction a lawless starer.
Nonetheless, their responses may be sanctions, for here, as in macrolegal
arrangements, it is the systemic effect rather than the motive or even consciousness of the actor that renders his reaction a sanction. In the result,
microlegal norms have micro-enforcers, potentially each and every one of
US.
Routine situations may have distinct though unverbalized norms. If
one is an acculturated member of a group, one knows the norms and even
the norms of norm-making. But the core method is trial and error, and
one may learn the new norm only through what may be to some an exhilarating experiment but to others a series of embarrassing failures. Moreover, it may take time for members of a particular community to establish an appropriate norm.
Time is also a factor for outsiders. When they enter a group with a
distinct microlegal system, it will take time to learn the rules. Until then,
the social transient is like a child, unfortunately without the limited tolerance allowed to children. In cruel correspondence, ignorance of microlaw may interact with a variety of other fears, making it easier for group
members to consider outsiders as crude and barbarous.
In very fleeting, nonroutinized interactions, norms may be established in a tentative manner, but then fade as interaction ends. In more
routinized interactions, the norms are known and to some extent have
been refined by experience. Though the interactions may seem trivial and
the sanctions evanescent, the situations have occurred often enough for
the observer to assume that both the norm and the response are consistent with and expressive of more general social values. Curiosity and further investigation may be warranted if they are not, for components of a
social system which impede the realization of larger social goals should be
viewed, as suggested below, at least prima facie as pathologies.
IV
Research into microlegal systems is perforce different from other legal inquiries. The norms are unwritten, uncodified and often consciously
unperceived. In situations which do not appear to be novel to the actors,
the appropriate norms are known, though often knowing is at a level of
consciousness so deep that the very actors whose behavior is influenced
by those norms are unaware of knowing, acting and reacting to them. But
the norms are there, and it may become painfully apparent to the sensitive traveler that he is ignorant of them, whether he is venturing abroad
or into a different stratum in his own country. In some cases, handbooks
of etiquette, guidebooks or books of folklore may codify and promulgate
some of the micronorms. In others, folklore itself may supply the infor-
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mation. Even if people are aware of the pertinent microlaw, they may not
characterize it as law. Moreover, awareness is often limited to a particular
norm and not to its systemic aspects. Hence the need for a certain importunate and persistent style of inquiry. An investigator must often press
his informant until, with some irritation, one finally says something like
"Well, you're just not supposed to . . . ." It takes considerably more
probing for the informant to dredge up the responses that are functional
sanctions, fleshing out the microlegal system. Once the informant grasps
the object of the inquiry, he may become an investigator himself, with
certain possibilities for enhancing self-knowledge and growth. This happens because infractions of microlaw causing embarassment or other
dysphoria, which are not comprehended by the subject, may have subtle
impacts on his personality and behavior.
Few jurisprudential writers have addressed microlegal systems. Petrazycki, with his essentially psychological approach to law, did some
work, much of which remains unavailable to English language readers.
Ehrlich, given his interest in law not associated with the apparatus of the
state, would have been amenable to micro-normative inquiries. Unfortunately, neither he nor his students at Czernowitz seem to have executed
such studies. A number of anthropological studies have examined
microsituations, but have generally not appraised their consequences to
public order. Moreover, such studies have generally focused on more durable, territorial and nonterritorial communities.
More recent sociological studies have fruitfully explored norm generation in informal situations. A few names stand out. Goffman has been
unparalleled in exposing the reticulate network of norms in microsituations. Berne was able to unpack the intricate and rapid exchanges between people and relate them to psychopersonal issues. The work of Simmel shows great sensitivity to micronormative systems. Ethologists have
examined the norms in the primate kingdom; more than a few have noted
their similarity to our own. From a psychological perspective, Ellsworth
has produced a number of studies concerning norm enforcement via nonverbal communication. Writing from the legal standpoint, Weston has insisted on the legal quality of micronorms. Particularly astute observers
such as Weyrauch have even described the constitutive process and constitutional outcomes in microsituations.
V
What accounts for the jurisprudential resistance to microlaw? Writers who identify law with the apparatus of the state must necessarily dismiss microlaw as law. De minimis non curat praetor,they intone gravely,
without explaining how one determines what is de minimis in the lives of
people. Their rejection must be criticized both for its arbitrariness and
for ignoring the extent to which the "law of the state" is produced, in
non-state procedures, through custom.
At the core of most etatistic theories of law is a hierarchical institu-
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tional assumption: the notion that law requires an institutionally distinct
enforcement agency, a sheriff. This assumption confuses function and institution. While sanctioning and enforcing are indispensable, a particular
institution is not. Many systems are characterized by the development of
specialized enforcers, but in many other systems, as Malinowski observed,
law is enforced coarchically. In the international system, Georges Scelle
characterized this phenomenon as d~doublement fonctionnel: the same
actors would alternatively be claimants and effective deciders. What is
necessary is not a formal enforcer, but an expectation accompanying a
characteristic normative formulation that someone, possibly even the injured party, may authoritatively respond to infractions of a norm. It is
that factor which contributes to sustaining the norm.
The comparative triviality of the sanctions applied in microlegal situations has led some writers to dismiss their importance and not to view
them as law. Thus Austin called them positive morality: "[riules set and
enforced by mere opinion (italics in original), that is, by the opinions or
sentiments held or felt by an indeterminate body of men in regard to
human conduct." Other writers refer to them as etiquette. Degree of severity of a sanction is a tricky criterion for distinguishing law. It is useful,
perhaps inescapable, in statistical descriptions in a mass society, for they
must assign numerical values to the otherwise unmanageably large number of fragments of experience with which they deal. But when it comes
to the design of events that may make people persevere in or change certain behavior, it is wrong and self-defeating to succumb to the arithmetical assumption that more of something good or bad will induce or deter
pro tanto in desired ways. Things are more complicated than that.
Severity of sanction is a meaningful criterion for distinguishing real
from semantic norms only if there is a general correspondence between
the quantum of deprivation entailed in the sanction and the dysphoria it
is supposed to cause to all those who are supposed to be susceptible to it.
Obviously quantum varies with the condition of the target. Deprivations
of respect may be most effective determinants in one stratum and completely without effect in another. A fifty dollar traffic fine may be irritating to a wealthy man, and a $50,000 fine may be a trivial inconvenience to
the corporation that can pass it on to its customers. The same fifty dollar
fine, however, may be devastating to a poor man who earns that much
each week. The bite of a sanction is a function of the phenomenology of
the target and not of the sanctioner; the bite is adequate if it is enough to
maintain the norm. The "trivial sanctions" of Austin's positive morality
may be very effective indeed. The microsanctions of microlegal systems to
which we are actually susceptible may be much more significant determinants of our behavior than conventional macrosanctions which loom
portentously, but in all likelihood will never be applied to us.
In a large, heterogeneous society such as ours, a jurisprudence of
microlegal systems is of more than theoretical interest. Many smaller
groups are durable enough to establish and maintain cultural norms and
to transmit them from generation to generation. Members of different
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groups interact at varying levels of intensity. Interactions can be jeopardized if members of different groups do not develop either an intuitive or
explicit conception of norms which, though perhaps unexpressed in some
conventionally recognizable normative codification, may arouse strong reactions if they are violated. At the very least, they may be expected to
retard interaction.
In a more subtle sense, micronorms and their sanctions may be significant factors in the shaping of personalities in ways that have civic impact and importance, not to speak of effects on an individual's autonomy,
self-assurance, sense of self-worth and capacities to develop affection toward others. Put most generally, microlegal systems may influence our
ability to be happy.
Microlegal systems, like international law in Holland's famous apothegm, may be near "the vanishing point of jurisprudence," but their low
visibility and hitherto disdainful rejection by scholars of the law should
not obscure the significant effects they can have on social order and
psychopersonal organization.
VI
Philosophers and moralists may contemplate with easy conscience
and even admiration what has come to be known as the "Masada Complex": societies that choose to perish rather than depart from fundamental norms expressing key group values. But the policy scientist, particularly one who is sensitive to the psychoanalytic dimensions of behavior,
rejects options of mass suicide. The posited function of normative arrangements at every level is to enhance survival and life.
Where microlaws exist in a larger social situation, the critical evaluation of their social utility is the extent to which they contribute to general
as well as the more specific social goals of that situation. Consider some
examples. The minimally essential rules on a two-person sailboat must
assure the boat's effective operation. That imports a command structure,
a distribution of functions and so on. Similarly, the rules within a sports
team, as distinct from the so-called "rules of the game" are indispensable
for playing. They must include, in addition to the rules about interaction,
expectations about how decisions are to be made: those matters which are
to be decided by the captain and those to be decided by the group.
Imagine that you must design the microlegal system of a space capsule. Obviously, a good deal of attention must be given to mundane rules
for interaction there. The constitutive process-norms about decisionmaking itself-is something less of a problem than it might appear, for
the astronauts are electronically integrated almost constantly with ground
control and thus with a pre-existing command and control system. By the
same token, some of the more obvious features of the spacecraft's system
of public order were certainly transposed, at various levels of consciousness, from the terrestrial order. But what of the less visible rules, the
micronorms about shaping spheres of privacy in the cramped quarters,
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about self-care, about things that, although perceived, were not deemed
to be seen or heard socially? Some of these micronorms might have been
adapted from cognate "enclosed" situations, such as railroad cars, transcontinental carriages, submarines, planes, elevators, and lifeboats, but
none of them would have been quite as enclosed as a space capsule.
Hence even though some micronorms might have been adopted or
adapted, they would still have to be tested to evaluate their appropriateness and efficacy in the new environment.
When called upon to appraise alternative rules for microsituations
such as a space capsule, one of the first questions asked is whether the
proposed norm contributes to the survival and success of the mission.
The necessary preeminence of this question is obvious. The obviousness
should not obscure its possible negative correlation, for survival may entail departing from ethical considerations which would otherwise prevail.
Whatever the degree of conformity of the proposed norm with more general social values, the exigency of survival imposes certain boundaries
within which concern about the ethical content of the proposed norm is a
luxury that cannot be afforded.
Of course, many of the terms within this formula are quite vague:
what is "success," "mundane functioning" or "survival"? Each of these
terms probably covers a spectrum from minimum to optimum. Trade-offs
between the degree of efficiency and the synergizing effect of a micronorm, that which is not maximally efficient, but is popular and yields
greater personal contribution to the enterprise, invite complex calculation
and some flexibility in the ethical content of the norm. But there is a
limit; when it is reached, discipline and external sanctioning must bridge
the gap between voluntary compliance and expected defection from the
norm. Somewhere there is a minimum related to mission achievement
and personal survival. That minimum will be a factor in appraising the
ethical conformity of the proposed micronorm.
Beyond the survival test for micronorms, an effectiveness test would
turn on the degree to which the proposed norm contributed to the mundane functioning of the mission. This evaluation requires complex considerations involving assumptions about the nature of the mission, as well as
about human behavior in general. As speculative as that consideration
may be, it is simple when compared to the appraisal of microlaw in more
mundane social situations. There, the range of consideration must be expanded to include impacts on personality formation and overall social
functioning. With regard to gathering visual information, mundane functioning must be considered in relation to its aggregate effects on personality and desired psychosocial development.
A third test of ethical conformity would relate the congeniality of the
proposed norms to the more general ethical standards of the overall culture. In social systems in which ethical standards are homogeneous or in
which a tight hierarchical structure enjoys exclusive competence in prescribing and applying standards, this can be a fairly simple operation.
But in pluralistic systems or systems undergoing change, there may be
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little or no agreement on appropriate ethical standards. In these latter
circumstances, the ethical conformity test itself becomes prescriptive
rather than applicative. Yet the potential for impact may be enormous
because of the pervasiveness of the situations in which the norm will prevail and the relatively low visibility of microlaw.
It is one thing to design microlaw for innovative situations and another thing to appraise microlegal systems which are integrated and operating in larger contexts. Where micronorms seem dysfunctional, in terms
of the three criteria proposed, the observer may discover that they derive
from other social arrangements which are functional. The factors which
have given rise to these systems may be deeply embedded in personal or
group history. Courtship role assignments and norms may, for example,
have been profoundly shaped by mother-child relations and particularly
by breast-feeding practices and may take on a contextually rational content only when related to all other features of the culture in question.
They may also be shaped by more articulate group norms which will assert that they serve certain purposes, as Bateson's and Mead's study of
Bali suggests. Some micronorms may function to reflect and reinforce
class divisions. In some cases, this may be homeostatic; in others, it may
be viewed as dysfunctional, as for example, the almost caste character of
subordination of nurses to doctors and the effect it has on nurse recruitment, performance, and drop-out.
Thus a satisfactory appraisal of a microlegal system about the gathering of visual information must relate the specific norms and their operation, not only to facilitating contextually appropriate exchanges between
individuals, but also to their consonance with general and deeply held
cultural values. Staring is neither good nor bad per se. Whether staring
contributes to or detracts from useful social interaction depends on the
context. The target's subjective perceptions play an important role in determining whether a look is a stare.
If one cannot make a concordance of looks and stares, one can essay
a concordance of looks and stares that give particular patterns of gazing a
meaning for participants. It is hardly a matter of surprise that the content of looking norms may vary widely among different microsocial situations within a particular community. Perhaps more interesting is that
particular individuals readily adapt to the different looking norms as they
move from situation to situation in the course of a day, such as from
encounters in an elevator, to visual orientation in public transportation
among strangers, to visual orientation in the mundane office setting under
whose assertive bonhomie a complex stratification system that has almost
caste elements operates, to aggressive business encounters marked by
bold eye contact that may be cultivated less for information gathering
and much more as a metacommunication of candor, decisiveness and selfassurance, a look that matches the set of one's jaw much as a tie goes
with one's shirt and jacket, to a cocktail party at a business convention,
where all micro-norms seem crafted to facilitating rapid and superficial
contact with strangers and so on. That an individual knows and can oper-
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ate often in rapid succession with many diverse micronorms about looking is no more cause for comment than the ability of a member of a highly stratified society to use different types of body language to
communicate with peers as well as with people at many different levels of
superordination and subordination.
The extreme variety of the contents of the different norms in these
and hundreds of other distinguishable situations does not per se mean
that some are right and others are dysfunctional. There is no absolute or
platonic content to a looking norm. Looking norms are instrumental. The
basic question is whether their content and systemic operation adequately fulfills the immediate objects of an encounter and are consonant
with some general cultural values. Hence, norms of widely varying content may be appropriate in widely varying contexts, but in other contexts,
they may be dysfunctional and actually impede fulfillment of the exchange and of more general social values.
VII
The fact that some micronorms or microlegal systems are dysfunctional prompts reflection about the traditional jurisprudential response to
microlaw. The traditional jurisprudential focus has been on mass and aggregate behavior and on norm-setting by the apparatus of the state. As a
result of capriciously and inconsistently applied definitions, microlaw has
been dismissed as mere etiquette. Even psychologists have ignored the
legal approach to microsituations. Microlegal systems possess all the desiderata of law, however, even though they are scaled to their microscopic
dimensions. Do they thus possess enough importance to warrant study,
appraisal, and perhaps even intervention and redesign?
The characteristic of "smallness" may be dismissed immediately as
of absolutely no significance. Who would gainsay the importance of
microsurgery because it is small or insist that macrosurgery is more important because it uses saws and axes rather than the technology of the
space age?
With the exception of mobs, including the dispersed audiences of
contemporary mass media, virtually all the rest of social life is a congeries
of micro-social situations. In modern, as opposed to traditional, society, a
substantial proportion of these situations involve strangers. Compliance
with microlaw is prerequisite to interaction with intimates, but as we saw
is more problematic with strangers since neither party may know which
norms are appropriate to the encounter. The importance of microlaw in a
factory where two ethnic, language or racial groups have a propensity for
conflict can be increased or decreased by micro-legal adjustments needs
no illumination. But conflict avoidance is only one of an array of social
concerns. More generally, understanding the dynamics of microlegal systems may be a prerequisite to effective operation in modern social
heterogeneity.
The conscious design of microlegal systems may make many interac-
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tions in the workplace, the school, the family or other latter-day institutions specialized to affection more productive and less bruising to egos.
One needs little imagination to appreciate the importance of appraising
microlegal systems in a space capsule and modulating or terminating
norms that have either developed or have been adapted holus-bolus from
elsewhere where they were contextually effective, but which now undermine the effectiveness of the space mission. Perhaps it is not so obvious
that the self-fulfillment of individuals in many other contexts may be
aided by, if not require, an appropriate microlegal system.
A fundamental tenet of liberal democracy is the effort to maintain a
line between governmental regulation and the so-called private sphere or
civic order. The purpose of this part of our discussion is not to discard
that valuable notion in favor of a totalitarian organization, however benevolent, that penetrates and organizes every cellular aspect of society. I
am not calling for a comprehensive scheme of microlegal statutes. Rather,
the objective is to alert and sensitize scholars and the diverse official, as
well as non-official, custodians of the private sphere or civic order, to the
fact that key aspects of individual lives are affected by microlegal arrangements. Individuals should become aware of them so that, like the
other norms of society, they may be appraised and, where necessary,
changed to increase their contribution to a good life.
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The Treaty Power of the
European Economic Community
PAUL B. VAN SON*
I.

INTRODUCTION

The European Economic Community (EEC)1 has increasingly exercised its power to act on the international scene as an equal with sovereign nation states. This phenomenon is an acknowledgement of the European Community's international personality' and its ability to negotiate
*Paul B. van Son is a Foreign Service Officer with the U.S. Department of State, assigned to the American Embassy in London. B.A. 1971, Eckerd College; J.D. (cum laude)
1979, Stetson University College of Law; L.L.M. in international law, 1981, University of
Miami. Mr. van Son is a member of the Florida and American Bars.
1. The terms European Economic Community, European Community, Community and
EEC will be used interchangeably in this paper. The EEC was established in 1958 by the
Final Act of the Intergovernmental Conference on the Common Market and Euratom, Mar.
25, 1952, 298 U.N.T.S. 3 (effective Jan. 1, 1958) (as amended through 1976) [hereinafter
cited as Rome Treaty, Treaty of Rome or Treaty]. The primary institutions of the Community are: the European Assembly, the Council of Ministers, the European Commission, and
the European Court of Justice. By the conclusion of the Treaty establishing a Single Council
and a Single Commission of the European Communities, done Apr. 8, 1965, [hereinafter
cited as Merger Treaty], the Council and Commission were made a common institution for
all three treaties: EEC, Euratom, and ECSC. The Assembly and Court of Justice had already been made into common institutions by a Convention on Certain Institutions Common to the European Communities, which was included among the annexes to the Treaty of
Rome.
Other important Community organs include the Committee of Permanent Representatives (composed of representatives of the Member States appointed by the Council to serve
as a liaison between Commission and Council) and various management committees.
2. For a discussion of the various theoretical bases for granting the Community international legal personality as well as arguments against that personality, see Feld, The Competences of the European Communities for the Conduct of External Relations, 43 TEx. L.
REV. 891 (1965). For background material, see Rome Treaty, supra note 1, art. 210;
Hohehveldern, The Legal Personality of Internationaland Supranational Organizations,
21 REvuE EGYPrIENE DE DRorr INTERNATIONAL 35 (1965); Seyersted, Objective International
Personality of Intergovernmental Organizations, 34 NORD. TIDSSKRIFr FOR INT'L REL 1
(1964). The view of the European Parliament is stated in Resolution on the Position of the
European Communities in InternationalLaw, O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 239) 16 (1978). Wel-

lenstein, Twenty-Five Years of European Community External Relations, 16 COMMON
MKT. L. REv. 407 (1979) presents a general historical survey of Community external
relations.
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and sign legally binding international contracts with nation states, i.e.,
treaties. This paper will discuss the origin of this treaty-making power in
the legal documents which form the basis of the European Community.
In addition, it will set forth some situational models which outline various
combinations of realistic situations facing a court at tempting to interpret
the treaty-making powers of the EEC. These models will serve as a guide
to understanding the development of the treaty-making power in the case
law of the European Court of Justice (Court, European Court or Court of
Justice) and will provide the framework for the examination of the theoretical development of the treaty-making power by the Court. The paper
will also give an analysis and synthesis of the opinions and judgments of
the Court as well as discuss specific problems created by EEC treatymaking theory and practice vis-a-vis non-Member States. Finally, an attempt will be made to contrast the theoretical development of the treatymaking power with the treaty-making procedure in practice. Future
trends and problems for the EEC treaty-making power shall be examined
in light of this conflict between present theory and practice.
This article shall demonstrate the extent to which the European
Court of Justice has begun to act like a federal constitutional court in its
theoretical development of a Community treaty-making power. This
power permits the EEC to act dynamically and flexibly in concluding
agreements in a changing international environment, but practical application of this theoretical development lags somewhat behind the Court's
decisions.
The integration process of the EEC can be clearly measured by external affairs and treaties. A study of the treaty power is important because it shows the extent to which the Member States have learned to
speak through a single spokesman, and it vividly demonstrates the constitutional problems resulting from the distribution of powers between the
Community and its Member States. The EEC sets examples and illustrates potential problems for other states and economic communities
which contemplate eventual political integration via economic
integration.
II.

THE TREATY POWER IN THE TREATY OF ROME

The Treaty of Rome mentions four main areas of external relations.
These areas are:
a) Commercial Policy: Articles 113, 114 and 116, which apply after
the end of the transitional period, confer on the Community the power to
negotiate and sign commercial treaties. These articles also prescribe voting requirements and procedures for negotiating and signing commercial
agreements with non-Member States.'

3. Rome Treaty, note 1 supra. Article 113 provides:
1. After the transitional period has ended, the common commercial policy
shall be based on uniform principles, particularly in regard to changes in tariff

1983

TREATY POWER

b) Association: Association agreements are trade and aid agreements
with non-European countries which were either colonies or dependent
territories of a Member State at the time the Community was formed.
Developing countries with a "special relation" to a Member State to
whom the Community has decided to give preferential trade status are
also included. While articles 131 to 136 discuss association status for the
above class of countries, article 238, which grants a treaty-making power
and gives procedural guidance for concluding association agreements, includes in its definition of "association" agreements with more than just
the above few categories of states.'

votes, the conclusion of tariff and trade agreements, the achievement of uniformity in measures of liberalisation, export policy and measures to protect
trade such as those to be taken in case of dumping or subsidies.
2. The Commission shall submit proposals to the Council for implementing the common commercial policy.
3. Where agreements with third countries need to be negotiated, the Commission shall make recommendations to the Council, which shall authorise the
Commission to open the necessary negotiations.
The Commission shall conduct these negotiations in consultation with a
special Committee appointed by the Council to assist the Commission in this
task and within the framework of such directives as the Council may issue to
it.
4. In exercising the powers conferred upon it by this Article, the Council
shall act by a qualified majority.
Article 114 provides:
The agreements referred to in Article 111, (2) and in Article 113 shall be
concluded by the Council on behalf of the Community, acting unanimously
during the first two stages and by a qualified majority thereafter.
Article 116 provides:
From the end of the transitional perios onwards, Member States shall, in
respect of all matters of particular interest in regard to the common market,
proceed within the framework of international organisations of an economic
character by common action. To this end, the Commission shall submit to the
Council, which shall act by a qualified majority, proposals concerning the scope
and implementation of such common action.
During the transitional period, Member States shall consult each other for
the purpose of concerting the action they take and adopting as far as possible a
uniform attitute.
4. Rome Treaty, note 1, supra. Article 238 provides:
The Community may conclude with a third State, a union of States or an
international organisation agreements establishing an association embodying
reciprocal rights and obligations, common action and special procedures.
These agreements shall be concluded by the Council, acting unanimously
after consulting the Assembly.
Where such agreements call for amendments to this Treaty, these amendments shall first be adopted in accordance with the procedure laid down in
Article 236.
In Cohen, The Association of Third Countries with the E.E.C. Pursuantto Article 238,
26 U. Prrr L. REv. 521, 527 (1965), the author defines the associative relationship based on
article 238 as:
a bilateral relationship, possibly of permanent duration, between the Community acting as a separate personality and a third state, union of states, or international organization, involving fewer rights and obligations than accession to
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c) International Agreements: Articles 229 to 231 require the Community to maintain good relations and cooperation with the United Nations,
the Council of Europe, and the Organisation of European Economic Cooperation (now OECD). Article 228 establishes the general procedures for
the negotiation and signing of all international agreements to which the
Community is a party. 5
d) Admission of New Member States and Amendments: Both articles
228 and 238 provide that an agreement or association may require an
amendment to the Treaty of Rome. The amendment procedure is in article 236. e The powers of the Community can, of course, be increased at
any time by the procedure in article 235.'
These articles indicate, as one writer has concluded, that the authors
of the Treaty of Rome contemplated a scheme which would develop into

full membership, but involving a higher degree of cooperation with and participation in the structure and methods of the Community, usually in the form of
the eventual establishment of a customs union or free trade area, than an ordinary commercial agreement.
P.J.G. Kapteyn & P. Ver Loren Van Themaat, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNITIES 351 (1973) distinguish three types of association assistance: "[aissociation as a
special form of development assistance, association as a preliminary to membership of the
EEC, and association as a substitute for such a membership."
5. Rome Treaty, supra note 1, art. 228. Article 228 provides:
1. Where this Treaty provides for the conclusion of agreements between
the Community and one or more States or an international organisation, such
agreements shall be negotiated by the Commission. Subject to the powers
vested in the Commission in this field, such agreements shall be concluded by
the Council, after consulting the Assembly where required by this Treaty.
The Council, the Commission or a Member State may obtain beforehand
the opinion of the Court of Justice as to whether an agreement envisaged is
compatible with the provisions of this Treaty. Where an opinion of the Court
of Justice is adverse, the agreement may enter into force only in accordance
with Article 236.
2. Agreements concluded under these conditions shall be binding on the
institutions of the Community and on Member States.
6. Rome Treaty, supra note 1, art. 236. Article 236 provides:
The Government of any Member State or the Commission may submit to
the Council proposals for the amendment of this Treaty.
If the Council, after consulting the Assembly and, where appropriate, the
Commission, delivers an opinion in favour of calling a conference of representatives of the Governments of the Member States, the conference shall be convened by the President of the Council for the purpose of determining by common accord the amendments to be made to this Treaty.
The amendments shall enter into force after being ratified by all the Member States in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements.
7. Rome Treaty, supra note 1, art. 235. Article 235 provides:
If action by the Community should prove necessary to achieve in the
course of the operation of the common market, one of the objectives of the
Community and this Treaty has not provided the necessary powers, the Council shall, acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission and after consulting the Assembly, take the measures.
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a Community foreign relations power.' Even so, some important constitutional restrictions must be emphasized. First, the association agreements
under article 238 require unanimity. This effectively gives each Member
State a blocking veto. The same veto power exists for amendments under
article 236 and for admission of new members under article 237.
In contrast to association agreements, commercial agreements negotiated under article 113 and concluded under article 114 require only a majority vote of the Council for approval. Thus, based on the Treaty of
Rome, the Community can conclude commercial agreements under its
cognizance even in the face of some Member State opposition. This arrangement is a sign of supranationality and it is a step toward an independent foreign policy, at least in the commercial area.
Article 228 establishes the procedures for negotiating and signing all
international agreements. It applies to both articles 113 and 238 unless
specifically changed by those articles. Article 228 gives Parliament a limited consultative role before the agreement is finally approved by the
Council. It gives the Court the opportunity, if requested, to determine the
compatibility of any proposed agreement with the Treaty of Rome prior
to signature. While article 228 provides the broad framework for international agreements, it does not determine whether the Council vote must
be unanimous or by a majority. However, if article 228 is meant to be
applied to a subject area such as commerce, where only a majority of
Council votes is needed for approval, a treaty-making process exists
under which article 228 provides for potential input by all of the organs
of the EEC. Each organ acts independently within its respective area with
the voting requirement determined by the subject area. Similar procedures are involved with association agreements pursuant to article 238.
Unfortunately, the above constitutional type of procedures which envisage a broad grant of treaty-making power have not been followed in
practice. The source of many problems concerning the practice and procedure of the Community's treaty-making powers lies in the political conflict between the European Commission and the Council of Ministers
(hereinafter referred to as Council). As a representative of the national
interests of the Member States, the Council tends to act in a less Community-oriented fashion than the more integrationist Commission.' This attitude causes the Council to favor legal arguments requiring unanimity
for Council votes, except in the most narrowly defined areas. The Council
fears that an independent Community treaty-making power might be
used to expand the powers of the Community in all areas, much as the
U.S. federal government has used the commerce power to expand its au-

8. Leopold, External Relations Power of the EEC in Theory and in Practice, 26 INr'L
& CoMP. L.Q. 54, 58 (1977).
9. Costonis, The Treatymaking Power of the European Economic Community: The
Perspectives of a Decade, 5 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 421, 427-28 (1967-68); Leopold, supra
note 8, at 59-60; Norton, The Treaty-Making Power of the European Economic Community-A Constitutional Crisis Facing the EEC, 7 INr'L LAW. 589, 589-92 (1973).
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thority. Hence, the Council has looked for ways to enforce a rule of unanimity and to keep to it self any discretionary decision-making power
over the compatibility of agreements with the Treaty of Rome, rather
than surrendering such decisions to the Court. Having explored the origin
of the EEC's treaty-making power, it is appropriate to discuss the theoretical legal development of the treaty-making power by the Court of Justice and the implications of this development.
III.

SOME SITUATIONAL MODELS FOR AN ANALYSIS OF THE TREATY

POWER
The purpose of this discussion is to set forth some situational models
which present problems and questions concerning treaty interpretation,
i.e., the scope of treaty powers. There are two objectives to this exercise.
The first is to put aside the political conflict between Commission and
Council and to focus attention on the judicial resolution of these situational models in order to understand better the future development of
Community law. The second objective is to make it easier to understand
the influence of the Court's opinions on the development of the Community's treaty-making powers.
The basic divisions among these models are between internal and external powers of the Community, implied and expressed powers in the
Treaty, and internal powers exercised and internal powers unexercised:
Model #1 1. internal powers: expressed and exercised
2. external powers: expressed
Model #2 1. internal powers: expressed and unexercised
2. external powers: expressed
Model #3 1. internal powers: expressed and exercised
2. external powers: implied
Model #4 1. internal powers: expressed and unexercised
2. external powers: implied
Model #5 1. internal powers: implied and exercised
2. external powers: implied

Model #6 1. internal powers: implied and unexercised
2. external powers: implied
The situation presented by the first two models is exemplified by article 113, where the Community may or may not have exercised an express internal power to enact a uniform tariff rate between Member
States. Article 113 also gives an express power to the Community to become a party to an international tariff agreement.10 The first question
presented to the Court in these begin ning models is whether the Court
must link Community desire to exercise an express external power with
an unexercised or exercised express internal power concerning the same
subject matter. As the power to act externally is expressed in article 113,
the linkage seems unnecessary. The Community appears to have the

10. Rome Treaty, note 1 supra. For text of article 113, see note 3 supra.
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power to harmonize both its internal and external regulations concerning
an article 113 subject. Thus it could enact the common external regulation first by international agreement and then at a later date harmonize
the internal regulations. No linkage seems necessary because both powers
are expressed.
A more difficult problem to resolve is whether the express external
power of the Community in models 1 and 2 should be exclusive to the
Community and denied to the Member States altogether. Because the external power over, for example, article 113 subject matter is expressly
mentioned in the Treaty, the obvious argument is that the Member
States have delegated exclusively to the Community all of their sovereignty over international affairs in article 113 subject matter. Any other
decision would allow the individual Member States to set conflicting national tariff rates. Obviously, the avoidance of this chaotic situation was
the very purpose behind the founding of the Community. Therefore, exclusive possession by the Community of external powers where these
powers are expressed in the Treaty seems a necessity for carrying out the
purpose of the Treaty.
Models 3 and 4 present an entirely new set of questions because external powers are implied from the Treaty rather than expressed. These
models can be examined with reference to article 75,"1 which deals with
transport, or those articles which concern Community agricultural and
fisheries policy. In these articles, powers are expressly granted to the
Community for the purpose of harmonizing internal laws and policies in
these areas. No express mention is made of Community powers to negotiate external agreements concerning these subjects. Once again the same
questions must be asked: Must a linkage be established so as to imply an
external power as necessary and proper to effectuate an express internal
power?; Does it matter if the express internal power has not yet been
exercised?; Finally, in either of these situations is this implied external
power of the Community exclusive for that subject matter?
Considering these problems, we can reflect on what could happen if
an express power is not implied as being necessary and proper to give
effect to a common internal policy. One Member State could ratify an
international agreement with several non-Member States. At that point
in time, the agreement could be in harmony with a common Community
internal policy. Several years later, a majority of the Community could
vote to change the internal policy, thus forcing the Member State either
to break its prior harmonious, but now conflicting, international contract
or to live with disharmonious internal and external Community policies
in an area such as transport, fisheries or agriculture.
This awkward situation can be carried a step further with the result
that several Member States refuse to vote to change or to advance Community internal harmonization because of previously made external

11. Rome Treaty, supra note 1, art. 75.
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agreements that over the years have become extremely advantageous to
their national interests. This situation could result in temporary "freezes"
in the advancement of internal harmonization policies until the benefits
of these prior external agreements were reaped by a few Member States.
In such a case, the external policies of the Member States would be dictating the pace of progress toward intra-Community harmonization. This
is exactly the reverse method of approach sought by the Community's
founders.
The above situation would only be compounded if the internal subject area required unanimity for internal Community harmonization. In
that case, a prior lucrative external agreement of only one Member State
could force a "freeze" in internal development.
This "freezing" can only be avoided if external powers are implied
from express internal powers both where the Community has already enacted a common internal policy, as well as where the Community has not
yet acted. In the situation where the Community has not yet acted, it is
necessary to imply an external power without linkage to an exercised internal power for two reasons. First, a previously made external agreement
of a Member State or States could delay the creation of a common internal policy to which the desired external power must be linked. This would
result in closing out some Community options on the type and method of
both internal and external unification. The Community must be able to
decide for itself whether first to unify its external or internal policies over
subject matter within its cognizance. Second, requiring linkage of an implied external power to an exercised internal power would create a problem if at some future date the internal power is no longer exercised. Does
that mean the external power lapses automatically? Does this result in
voiding international agreements and contracts?
On the exclusivity issue, it is again conceivable to envision concurrent Member State and Community external policies. Nevertheless, while
the external policies may be harmonious at a given point in time, the
same problems of potential future disharmonization result as with models
1 and 2. Once the external policy is implied as covering a given subject
area, the Community external policy must eventually move toward exclusivity or, at the very least, supremacy over conflicting national external
policy.
Models 5 and 6 represent the highest level of legal powers of a consti-

tutional community. In each. case neither in t er-

o etinl

npQo

a specific nature are mentioned in the constitutional document. Yet, any
constitutional court knows that a community must remain dynamic and
responsive to events unanticipated when the founding documents of the
community were drafted. In order for the Community to remain flexible,
the Court may have to look to the purposes, general principles, or objectives sought to be achieved in the creation of the Community. From these
objectives or general principles, the Court can imply a power in the Community in order for the Community to preserve itself as a dynamic international organism capable of achieving the purposes for which it was
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founded. This power also enables the Community to act in a changing
international or national environment.
If a constitutional court is incapable of implying either an internal or
an external power to the Community as in models 5 and 6, it is only a
matter of time before the problems of national interest will conflict with
Community development and "freeze" any further integration. The
changing factors of time and events acting on an inflexible government or
Community constitution will produce these problems of conflict. It may
not even be necessary to come to grips with any Member State nationalism. Chief Justice Marshall, writing in McCullough v. Maryland, addressed the same phenomenon.12
With these situational models in mind, the next part of the article
examines the case law of the European Court of Justice. Since the issues
involved in these cases relate to one or more of the situational models, it
may be easier to analyze the Court's development of Community treatymaking power. Also, the previous discussion may have pointed out some
realistic Community and constitutional dynamics operating beneath the
political conflicts which are obvious on the face of each case.

IV. THE THEORETICAL LEGAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE TREATY POWER
IN THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE

A.

Commission v. Council

Before analyzing the European Court of Justice cases concerning
treaty-making, it should be pointed out that the Council-oriented procedures to be discussed were in use for over a decade. The fact that such a
length of time passed before the Court decided a case in this most sacred
of sovereign state power areas is a significant indication of the Commission's desire to avoid any violent confrontation with the Council. It also
could be argued that this delay illustrated the Court's avoidance of such a
confrontation until the Commission forced the issue.
The issue of the scope of Community treaty-making powers first
reached the Court in 1971. In discussing foreign relations, the Treaty of
Rome specifically mentions only commercial agreements, associations,
and the admission of new members. The major issues in Commission v.
Council's were whether the Community had an implied external affairs

12. In McCullough v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819), Chief Justice Mar-

shall stated:
A constitution, to contain an accurate detail of all the subdivisions of which its
great powers will admit, and of all the means by which they may be carried
into execution, would partake of the prolixity of a legal code, and could
scarcely be embraced by the human mind. It would probably never be understood by the public. Its nature, therefore, requires, that only its great outlines
should be marked, its important objects designated, and the minor ingredients
which compose those objects be deduced from the nature of the objects
themselves.
13. Comm'n of the European Communities v. Council of the Communities, 1971 C. J.

DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y

VOL. 12:2-3

power beyond those external powers specifically expressed in the Treaty
of Rome, and if so, whether the external powers were exclusive to the
Community or concurrent with those of the Member States. Thus, the
case was similar to situational model 3 of part III.
The dispute arose out of negotiations with third countries which
aimed at creating uniform working conditions for crews on trucks engaged
in international transport. The problem had been attacked by the International Labor Bureau, the International Labor Organization, and finally
in 1962, by the Economic Commission for Europe in the United Nations.
In 1962, this latter organization proposed to the governments of the European countries a European Agreement on Working Conditions in Road
Transport (E.R.T.A.)." The agreement was signed by five of the then six
Member States of the Community and several other governments, but did
not come into force due to an insufficient number of ratifications. 6
Meanwhile, the Community drafted its own regulation which was
slightly different from E.R.T.A. This regulation was in effect within the
Community, but the effective date regarding traffic between the Community and non-Member States was postponed because of a Community desire to reconcile the regulation with the continuing dis-cussions over
E.R.T.A. by the U.N. Commission. Finally, the Council compromised by
amending the Community regulation to bring it into alignment with the
new E.R.T.A. At the same time, the Council coordinated the negotiating
positions of the Member States so that each could sign the agreement in
its individual capacity without violating a Community regulation.
The Commission adamantly opposed this procedure. It insisted that
because there was a Community regulation on road haulage, the Community alone, and not the Member States individually, had the right to participate in the continuing E.R.T.A. negotiations and to sign the new
accord.
The Commission argued that article 75, which gave the Community
broad po wers to implement a common transport policy, must apply to
relations with third countries." This power was granted by paragraph
1(c) of article 75, which permitted "any other appropriate provisions" to
be used by the Council acting by qualified majority, after the transition
period, upon a proposal by the Commission to create a common transport
policy. The Commission argued that a common internal transport policy

Comm. E. Rec. 263; 10 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 335, [1971-1973 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT.
Rzp. (CCH) 8134 [hereinafter cited as Commission v. Council]. For discussions on this case
see Collinson, Foreign Relations Powers of the European Communities: A Comment on
Commission v. Council, 23 STA. L. REv. 956 (1971); Malawer, Treaty-Making Competence
of the European Communities, 7 J. WORLD TRANSNAT'L L. 169 (1973); Norton, supra note 9,
at 602-10; Winter, Annotation to Case 22/70, Re ERTA, Commission of the EC v. Council
of the EC, 8 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 550 (1971).
14. Commission v. Council, COMMON MKT. REP. 8134, at 7518.
15. Id. at 7521.
16. Id.
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would be meaningless unless there was a coordinated common transport
policy toward third countries. 7
The Commission argued for a theory of "parallelism." Under this
theory, once the Community has adopted a regulation creating a common
internal policy in a given area, for example, road haulage in the transport
area, the Member States are precluded from dealing with that matter not
only internally, but also in negotiations with third states." Thus, the
competence of the Community would slowly expand externally and become exclusive as common policies in, for example, transport, were created internally. The Commission believed this development would insure
that no conflict existed between internal and external agreements and
that all common policies would be subject to the jurisdiction of the European Court. 9 The "qualified majority" rule in article 75 would also be
preserved.
The Council replied that the only external powers given the Community were those powers specifically expressed in the Treaty of Rome. 0
Article 75 did not imply the powers given in the commercial area of articles 111 and 113. The Council argued that article 75 applied only to intraCommunity measures. On the exclusivity issue, the Council maintained
that Member States were free to negotiate individual external transport
measures as long as no Community regulations were violated.' Even if
article 75 did permit the Community to conclude external transport
agreements, the Council felt the power would at most be concurrent with
that of Member States and that the Council itself would decide in each
case whether an international agreement should be concluded by the
Community, by the Member States, or by both." Naturally, the Commission denied the Council this discretion because such discretion would be
at the mercy of the unanimity rule and would give the Council a function
belonging to the Court.
Basically, the Court sustained the Commission's position. Recognizing that the Treaty did not contain specific provisions relating to the conclusion of external transport agreements, the Court stated that in such
cases it becomes necessary to refer to the general system of Community
law on relations with third countries.' 3 A common transport policy was
one of the principle objectives upon which the Community had been or17. Id. at 7522.

18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 7522-23.
21. Id. at 7523.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 7524-25. The Court interpreted article 210 as follows:
Article 210 provides that 'the Community has legal personality.' This provision, which is the first provision in Part Six of the Treaty, devoted to 'General
and Final Provisions,' means that in external relations the Community has the
power to establish contractual relations with third States in the entire field of
the objectives defined in the first part of the Treaty. . . . (emphasis added).
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ganized and was specifically mentioned in part one, article 3(e) of the
Treaty.2" Under article 75, common transport rules shall be applicable to
"international transport from or to the territory of a Member State or
passing across the territory of one or more Member States."2 5 Since that
provision applies for the part of the transport route to transport to or
from third countries, the Court held that the design for a common transport policy, "presupposes that the Community's competence covers regulations governed by international law and to that extent implies the need
for agreements with the third States concerned."2
In all cases where the Treaty fails to specifically grant external negotiating authority, the Court will decide whether a common objective merits granting such authority by considering substantive and other Treaty
provisions flowing from acts adopted within the framework of those provisions.27 Here the Court accepted the idea that the Community must
necessarily have "implied" and/or "inherent" treaty-making powers,
which flow from both the specific provisions and the general principles of
the Treaty. Even though the transport articles 748 and 7529 did not expressly provide for a Community power to conclude external agreements,
the coming into force of a Community regulation establishing a common
policy internally "necessarily had the effect of giving the Community the
power to conclude with third states any agreements relating to matters
governed by that regulation."8 0
With regard to the exclusivity of these external agreements, once the
agreements are concluded, the Court grants the Community the exclusive
right to regulate external transportation to implement Treaty policy.31

24. Rome Treaty, supra note 1, pt. one, art. 3(e).
25. Rome Treaty, supra note 1, art. 75.
26. Commission v. Council, COMMON MKT. REP. 18134, at 7525.
27. Id. The Court stated:
In order to determine, in a specific case, whether the Community has the
power to conclude international agreements, the organization as well as the
substantive provisions of the Treaty need be considered. This power results
not only from an express attribution in the Treaty-which is the case for Article 113 and 114 dealing with tariff and trade agreements and Article 238 in
association agreements-but can also flow from other Treaty provisions and
from acts adopted within the framework of those provisions by the Community
institutions ....
28. Rome Treaty, note 1 s.upra. Article 74 provides: "The objectives of this Treaty
shall, with regard to the subject covered by this title, be pursued by the Member States
within the framework of a common transport policy."
29. Rome Treaty, supra note 1, art. 75.
30. Commission v. Council, COMMON MKT. REP. T8134, at 7525.
31. Id. The Court said:
Particularly where, in order to implement a common policy set forth in the
Treaty, the Community has taken measures providing for common rules in any
form, the Member States no longer have the right, either individually or collectively, to contract with third States for obligations that impair these rules. As
these common rules are gradually introduced, the Community alone can assume and execute, for the entire field of application of the Community's legal
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Thus, there was to be nonconcurrent power in the area of external transport policy once the common regulation of transport within the Community had been established."s Furthermore, article 5 of the Treaty requires
Member States to abstain from any measures that could jeopardize the
realization of Community goals.38 The Court also interpreted article 5 as
disapproving concurrent external agreements by Member States.3
The Court agreed with the Council on the merits of the case, but
adopted the "implied powers" approach by accepting the parallelism doctrine. The case reflects the cynicism of Marbury v. Madison," which set
forth strong federal constitutional doctrine yet gave the decision to the
party seeking to limit federal power. Pescatore called the judgment a
"prospective ruling."' s
The following rules seem to have been set forth in the European
Court decision.37 First, the Court accepted the idea that the Community
had "implied" and "inherent" powers of treaty making that flow from
both specific Treaty provisions and from the general principles of the
Treaty.88 Second, by accepting the theory of parallelism, the Court held
that the scope of the treaty power depended upon the establishment of
common rules which would implement a common policy envisaged in the
Treaty. As these common rules are established, the Community becomes
competent to have exclusive rights to negotiate internationally in the ar-

system, contractual obligations vis-a-vis third States. It would therefore be impossible, in implementing the Treaty provisions, to separate the rules applicable to intra-Community measures from those applicable to external relations.
32. Id. "Any initiative taken outside the framework of the common institutions is incompatible with the unity of the Common Market and the uniform application of Community law."

33. Rome Treaty, supra note 1, art. 5. Article 5 provides:
Member States shall take all general or particular measures which are appropriate for ensuring the carrying out of the obligations arising out of this
Treaty or resulting from the acts of the institutions of the Community. They
shall facilitate the achievement of the Community's aims. They shall abstain
from any measures likely to jeopardise the attainment of the objectives of this
Treaty.
34. Commission v. Council, COMMON MKT. REP. 8134, at 7523.
35. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
36. Pescatore, External Relations in Case-Law of the Court of Justice of the European
Communities, 16 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 615, 625 (1979).
37. The distinction which common law countries make between dicta and holding is not
made in civil law courts such as the European Court. Even though civil law courts profess
not to give precedential effect to prior decisions, such statements which the European Court
has made on the scope of treaty-making powers become important for future cases because
civil law courts accord to a consistent line to decisions of the highest court a "jurisprudence
constante" which closely resembles common law courts "stare decisis." See generally J.H.
MERRYMAN, THE CIVmL LAW TRADITION 48-49 (1969); E.H. WALL,THE COURT OF JUSTICE OF
THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITmS 811 (1966) (considering the place of the Court in the Community structure as well as the civil law tradition, it is probably fair to give equal weight to

dicta and holdings).
38. Commission v. Council,

COMMON MKT. REP.

8134, at 7533-37.
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eas of these common rules." This exclusivity prohibits any form of coor40
dination of common action by Member States themselves in those areas.
There are several implications to be drawn from these rules which
concern the practice of EEC treaty making. First, there was no legal basis
for the Council's attempts to limit articles 238 and 228.41 Second, use of
the mixed agreement procedure was no longer necessary and was possibly
an illegal breach of the exclusivity rule.42 Third, the Community's external competence could grow according to the principle in foro interno,.in
foro externo. Article 235 also could be used to increase the external powers of the Community. Fourth, the power of the Commission should be
enhanced because article 228 grants the Commission the power to negoti43
ate agreements, usually on the basis of a proposal by the Commission.
Fifth, Community power should be increased because when the Community alone signs an agreement, national parliamentary ratification procedures are avoided and Member States are automatically bound." Sixth,
the transfer of some foreign affairs powers to the Community would create a dynamic "dialogue" within the Community between Commission
and Council and would "augur a substantial weakening of the political
power of the national governments."'4" Naturally, not all the rules derived
from the opinion have been followed, nor have all the implications come
to pass. But the Court has never reversed course in its inter-pretation of
the treaty-making power as this interpretation was first enunciated in
Commission v. Council.
The Court in Commission v. Council recognized the problem which
was illustrated in situational model 3: namely, the problem between a
Community external policy and a Member State external policy'" on the
same topic. However, the resolution of the issue was viewed in terms of
the potential impairment of the achievement of a common internal policy,
rather than of a statement regarding the "freezing" of any future Community development. Also, the Court attempted to find the power to conclude international agreements on transport in the Treaty text itself, using article 75(a), without attaching much relevance to a "necessary and
proper" or an "all other appropriate means" type of clause. 4
B.

No.1/75: Opinion of the Court of Justice
In July 1975, the Commission submitted to the Court of Justice a

39. Id.

40. Id.
41.
42.
ticipate
43.
44.

See Pt. V, infra.
Id. In the mixed agreement procedure, both Community and Member States parin signature and ratification of the agreement.
Rome Treaty, supra note 1, art. 228.
Collinson, supra note 13, at 971.

45. Id. at 970.
46. Commission v. Council,
47. Id. at 7534-35.

COMMON MKT.REP.

8134, at 7535-36.
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request for an opinion pursuant to the second paragraph of article 228(1)
of the Treaty of Rome. ' 8 The object of the request was to obtain the
Court's opinion as to the compatibility to the Treaty of a draft "Understanding on a Local Cost Standard," drawn up under OECD auspices for
the purpose of establishing a pricing standard for governmental credit
financing of export contracts. 4' The request asked the Court to comment
on whether the EEC had the power to conclude such an agreement and if
so, whether the power was exclusive.'"
After accepting jurisdiction, the Court held that the subject matter of
the agreement was within the sphere of the common commercial policy of
articles 113 and 114; therefore, the subject of the agreement was within

the ambit of Community power. The Court proceeded to uphold the
power of the Community to make agreements with third countries, even
where it had not previously possessed common internal rules.5" This holding went beyond Commission v. Council by concluding that common internal rules were not a prerequisite for external power, at least in the
commercial area. In transport and other non-commercial areas, the rule of
parallelism presumably remained. Finally, the Court again remained firm
regarding the issue of exclusivity and denied any right of concurrent
Member State power in the field of export policy."

48. Re the OECD Understanding on a Local Cost Standard (Opinion 1/75), 1975 E.
Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1355, 17 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 85, [1976 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT.
REP. (CCH) 8365 [hereinafter cited as Opinionl/75]. Rome Treaty art. 228(1) provides a
consultative procedure, whereby the Commission, Council, or a Member State may request
an Opinion from the Court as to whether the proposed agreement is compatible with the
Treaty. If the Court decides against compatibility then the procedure in article 236 (amendment) must be used. For a review of the case, see Kapteyn, The Common Commercial Policy of the European Economic Community's Power and the European Court of Justice's
Opinion of November 11, 1975, 11 TEx. INT'L L.J. 485 (1976); Mass, The External Powers of
the EEC with regard to a CommercialPolicy: Comment on Opinion 1/75, 13 COMMON MKT.
L. REv. 379 (1976); Simmonds, External Relations Power of the EECA Recent Ruling of the
European Court, 26 INT'L & CoMP. L.Q. 208 (1977).
49. Opinion 1/75, COMMON MKT. REP. 18365, at 7638.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 7642. The Court said: "A commercial policy is in fact made up by the combination and interaction of internal and external measures, without priority being taken by
one over the others. Sometimes agreements are concluded in execution of a policy fixed in
advance, sometimes that policy is defined by the agreements themselves."
52. Id. at 7643.
It cannot therefore be accepted that, in a field such as that governed by
the Understanding in question, which is covered by export policy and more
generally by the common commercial policy, the Member States should exercise a power concurrent with that of the Community, in the Community sphere
and in the international sphere ....
To accept that the contrary were true would amount to recognizing that,
in relations with third countries, Member States may adopt positions which
differ from those which the Community intends to adopt, and would thereby
distort the institutional framework, call into question the mutual trust within
the Community and prevent the latter from fulfilling its task in the defense of
the common interest.
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When comparing Opinion No. 1/75 to the situational models, the
facts appear to fit model 2. The commercial power is clearly expressed in
articles 113 and 114, but in the facts of the case this internal power remained unexercised. The case followed model 2 in not requiring linkage
to an express exercised internal power before the express external power
could be exercised. Common internal rules were not a prerequisite to external power, at least in the commercial area. After Opinion No. 1/75,
however, the question remained whether common internal rules were still
a prerequisite in other areas.
C.

In re Kramer

In re Kramer6s concerned a referral of a series of questions on external affairs from the Dutch district courts pursuant to article 177." Certain criminal prosecutions had been brought against some Dutch
fishermen for violations of Dutch national laws aimed at ensuring the
conservation of sole and plaice stocks in the northeast Atlantic. The
Dutch laws were enacted pursuant to commitments which had been entered into by the Dutch Government within the framework of a non-EEC
convention designed to conserve fish stocks in the Atlantic.55 Meanwhile
in 1970, and again in 1976, the Council had passed regulations seeking to
establish some common policy on fishing and fish conservation.
The principle issue was whether the Community now had exclusive
authority to enter into such commitments as those that the Netherlands
had previously entered into. In reaching its decision the Court once again
considered the authority of the Community to enter into international
commitments. As in Commission v. Council, the Court found an implied
external affairs power in the Treaty." Having established Community authority to enter into international commitments for the conservation of
sea resources, the Court concluded on the facts of the cases before it that
57
the Community had not yet fully exercised its authority in this area.
Therefore, Community policy was not yet exclusive, nor was there any
existing conflict between the Community policy and national commitments by the Dutch Government. However, the Court pointed out that
while the Community power was not yet exclusive, the authority of the
Member States in this area was in transition and Member States concerned were "now bound by Community obligations in their negotiations
within the framework of the Convention and of other comparable agree-

53. In re Kramer, 1976 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1279, 18 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 440, [1976
Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 18372.
54. Rome Treaty, supra note 1, art. 177.
55. North East Atlantic Fisheries Convention, Jan. 24, 1959, 486 U.N.T.S. 7078 (entered into force June 25, 1963). The Convention was signed by seven non-EEC countries as
well as members of the EEC, saving only Italy and Luxembourg.
56. In re Kramer, COMMON MKT. REP. 8372, at 7741.
57. Id. at 7742.
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ments."s5 Reference was made, as in Commission v. Council, to articles 5
and 116 of the Treaty.6"
The case added little to the principles that had been set forth in
Commission v. Council. The facts of the case fit neatly into situational
models 3 and 4. The case points out that there is a sliding scale for determining when subject matter has come under Community cognizance during periods of transition. 0 At one end of the scale the Member States are
free to enter international agreements. As Community policies are enacted, the Member States must harmonize their external acts with Community policy, and coordinate policies between themselves. Eventually,

the other end of the scale will be reached.
All Member State initiative on
61
an international level will be forbidden.

The question remains: What specific common internal policies create
an external power requiring a prohibition of individual Member State external action? Advocate-General Trabucchi argued in In re Kramer that a
functional relationship between activity taking place outside the Community's geographical area and activity arising within that area is an essential condition for recognition of the exclusively Community nature of external power. 62 If no "functional relationship" exists whereby internal
rules are affected by external policy, and vice versa, then presumably the
Community could not have an implied external treaty-making power in
that area even though common internal rules existed. The Court did not
comment upon this attempt by the Advocate-General to answer questions

58. Id.
59. Rome Treaty, supra note 1, arts. 5, 116. Article 5 of the Treaty of Rome has been a
favorite of the Court for requiring Member States to fall in line behind Community policy
and for the Court to justify the exclusive power of the Community in external matters under
its cognizance. Article 5 reads: "Member States shall take all appropriate measures, whether
general or particular, to ensure fulfillment of the obligations arising out of this Treaty or
resulting from action taken by institutions of the Community ...
and . . . shall facilitate
the achievement of the Community's tasks."
60. Commission v. Council, COMMON MKT. REP. 8134.
61. In re Kramer, COMMON MKT. REP. 8372, at 7748. Advocate General Alberto
Trabucchi expressed this very clearly:
[T]he mere existence of Community legislative powers in a particular field does
not suffice to deprive the States of power to negotiate internationally in that
field. On the other hand . . . there must have been an exercise of this power
and to this end Community rules must have been actually applied in this field:
only, in this way can the international jurisdiction of the States be fully replaced by that of the Community.
Id.
Within the fisheries area, the Council had to act to create a common conservation policy
before the end of the transition period; see article 210 of the Act of Accession. For more on
how this point created problems in the Court's reasoning, see Koers, The External Authority of the EEC in Regard to Marine Fisheries, 14 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 269, 294-98 (1977).
62. "An essential condition for recognition of the exclusively Community nature of external powers is the existence of a functional relationship between activity taking place
outside the Community's geographical area properly so-called, which is the subject of international rules, and the common rules governing activity arising within that area." In re

Kramer,

COMMON MET.

REP. 8372, at 7746.
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raised by critics of the Commission v. Council decision on how to determine which internal rules create external Community powers. In practice,
however the "functional relationship" test would probably not make
much difference. The Court of Justice would have to determine whether a
"functional relationship" existed, in the same manner in which the Supreme Court of the United States decides whether interstate commerce is
affected. The Court's support of Community goals would probably be a
more crucial factor in deciding close cases than would facts attempting to
prove that a "functional relationship" existed.
On the other hand, if the "functional relationship" test was adopted
as the test for determining implied external powers, the question would
be: What happens when that relationship ceases to exist? For example,
there may be a clear "functional relationship" between internal and external policy at point A in time. If five years later at point B the relationship no longer exists, does the Community automatically lose its legitimacy to act externally? The "functional relationship" test seems to raise
almost as many questions as it resolves. If the test is adopted, it must be
accepted in such a way that the Community's ability to change over time
remains unimpaired.
D.

No. 1/76: Opinion of the Court of Justice

The fourth important comment on external affairs was delivered by
the Court in April 1977 in another opinion on a proposed agreement.6 3
The Commission requested the Court's opinion as to whether a draft
agreement establishing a laying-up fund for surplus inland waterway vessels in the Rhine and Moselle basins was compatible with the Treaty. The
agreement involved both a new and an old issue for the Court.6 First, the
essence of the agreement was the establishment of the "Fund," which was
to be an international public institution having legal capacity and personality. Therefore, the Court had to decide whether the Community could
delegate certain of its decisional and judicial powers to bodies independent of EEC institutions. Second, as most Member States were already
parties to two previous conventions on river traffic which would require
amendment, the Court was asked to approve a multilateral agreement to
which not only the Community and the third state, Switzerland, would be
parties, but to which EEC Member States who were signatory to the Conventions on the navigation of the Rhine and the Moselle also would be
On the first issue, the Commission said that "once external powers

63. Re the Draft Agreement Establishing a European Laying-Up Fund for Inland Waterway Vessels (Opinion 1/76), 1977 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 741, 20 Common Mkt. L.R. 279,
[1977-1978 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. RaP. (CCH) 8405, at 7291.
64. Id. A third issue concerned the organization and powers of a tribunal that was to
interpret and apply the agreement. The Court went on to hold that the proposed Fund
Tribunal was too closely interwoven with the European Court to be able to avoid a conflict
of interest.
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are given by the Treaty to the Community the latter must necessarily be
entitled to exercise those powers in the same conditions and according to
rules which are as extensive as those governing the external powers of the
Member States from which they have been withdrawn ....
The only
limitation on this grant would be that the Community could not surrender powers given by the Treaty to the common institutions of the Community." The grant must also be compatible with the common interests
of the Community. e7 The Council of course argued that a transfer of powers from Community institutions, rather than a delegation of limited
managerial functions, was in fact what the agreement envisaged."
*"

The Court opined that article 75(1)(c), which empowered the Council
to lay down "any other appropriate provisions" for the establishment of a
common transport policy, entitled the Community to cooperate with a
third country in setting up a public international institution." This conclusion increased the scope of the implied powers of the Community. It is
significant that the Treaty article used was the transport article 75(1)(c),
which was involved in Commission v. Council, and not the more specific
commercial trade articles 111 and 113 of the Treaty, which contain spe70
cific grants of power.
On the second issue concerning the mixed agreement process, the
Commission noted that there were no common internal rules presently in
existence within the Community on river transport laying-up. Again raising the question that had been left unanswered in Opinion No. 1/75, the
Commission argued that, as with the commercial policy agreements in
Opinion No. 1/75, transport and other agreements could be made with
third countries even where the Community had not previously had common internal rules. 71 The Commission argued for the ability to choose
between either setting forth common rules internally and then negotiating an agreement, or introducing both the common internal policy and

65. Id. at 7296.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 7298.
69. Id. at 7301.
70. The Court went on to disapprove the agreement because the proposed Fund supervisory body gave Member States certain individual votes in an area of common Community
policy that should have resulted in a single Community vote. There were other arrange•ments that the Court considered incompatible with the "requirements of unity and solidarity" expressed in Commission v. Council.
71. Opinion No. 1/76, COMMON MKT. REP. 78405, at 7297.
[T]he Commission considers that it is possible to infer that such power exists
once the Treaty provides for an internal power even if the latter has not yet
been the subject of developments of secondary legislation. Thus, there is nothing to prevent the Community, as in the present case, from concluding the
agreement with the third state and adopting the necessary internal measures
at the same time. The procedure in two stages which was the hypothesis in the
AETR Case (Commission v. Council) is not therefore mandatory as the only
one applicable.

DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y

VOL. 12:2-3

the international agreement at the same time, when implementing a common policy involving an agreement with a third county.
Looking at the situational models, one sees that Opinion No. 1/75
resembles model 2. The Opinion states that the external powers of the
Community in the commercial area flow directly from Treaty articles 113
and 114. They do not depend on the parallelism theory for their legal
justification. A common external policy can be enacted at the same time,
before or after common internal commercial rules are enacted.
On the other hand, when models 3 and 4 are applicable as in Commission v. Council, In re Kramer, and Opinion No. 1/76, the parallelism
theory would not permit expansion of external power prior to the enactment of common internal rules. While the parallelism theory does not
suggest that external power flows from common internal regulations,
under the parallelism theory external power at the very least is controlled
by the extent to which common internal policies have been established,
i.e., "in foro interno, in foro externo." Therefore, while at first sight the
arguments made by the Commission in Opinion No.1/76 appear to come
close to opinions in the commercial area, there may in fact still be some
legal distinction between external commercial agreements of a model 2
nature and agreements made in model 3 and 4 situations (noncommercial) which are justified on the parallelism theory.
Procedurally, the parallelism theory would permit transport policy to
be established at the same time that common internal regulations had
been established, or afterwards. However, to argue that an external transport agreement could be signed before an internal common regulation
had been enacted would be to go beyond the strict theory of parallelism.
To substantively argue that Community powers in external affairs flow
directly from article 75, for example in the transport area, and are neither
controlled nor limited by the enactment of a common internal policy
would also serve to extend the theory of parallelism. It would be the same
as arguing that article 75 alone supports an external power just as does
article 113.
In its opinion on the second issue concerning the argument over the
necessity of a mixed agreement process, the Court finally broke free from
the constraints of the parallelism theory and decided squarely on the side
of the Commission. The implications of this decision, therefore, carry the
'curt byod.......;
the.
f prllism.
Th Pxt .rnal treaty-making
power of the Community was held to be derived from and limited, if at
all, by the implied powers of the Treaty. The external powers are not to
be limited by the extent to which a common internal policy has been
72
established.

72. Id. at 7301. The Court said:
The Court has concluded, inter alia, that whenever Community law has created for the institutions of the Community powers within its internal system
for the purpose of attaining a specific objective, the Community has authority
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With regard to the mixed agreement nature of the agreement, the
Court made clear that that arrangement was due only to the uniqueness
of having two previous arrangements in existence that would permit
Member States also to participate as signatories in their capacities as parties to those previous conventions. Their signatures were not necessary to
lend legitimacy to the Community's signature."3
In conclusion, Opinion No. 1/76 once again takes Community treatymaking powers forward from Commission v. Council. The Community
can now delegate certain of its managerial powers to international bodies
created to implement common policy objectives of the Treaty. It is not
bound to use the mixed agreement procedure unless special circumstances dictate, and most important, its external powers in all areas of
common Community objectives derive from the Treaty by implication,
regardless of the extent to which these common objectives have been
achieved internally. The Court has permitted the Community to act flexibly and dynamically in model 4 type situations without the theoretical
legal constraints of parallelism.
E. No. 1/78: Opinion of the Court of Justice Concerning the
Incompatability of InternationalAgreements with the Treaty
The most recent opinion concerning the treaty-making powers of the
Community was delivered in October 1979.7' The Commission asked the
Court whether a draft agreement on natural rubber negotiated under the
auspices of UNCTAD was within the exclusive competence of the Community to sign. The main feature of the agreement was the establishment
of a buffer stock designed to stabilize world natural rubber prices. Two
negotiating sessions were completed, and the UNCTAD negotiating conference planned to adopt the final text of the agreement at its next
conference.
The Commission argued that the envisaged agreement came entirely

to enter into the international commitments necessary for the attainment of
that objective even in the absence of an express provision in that connection.
4. This is particularly so in all cases in which internal power has already
been used in order to adopt measures which come within the attainment of
common politice. It is, however, not limited to that eventuality. [Tihe power
to bind the Community vis-a-vis third countries .

.

. flows by implication

from the the provisions of the Treaty creating the internal power ....
(emphasis added).
73. Id. at 7302.
The participation of these States in the Agreement must be ... solely for this
purpose and not as necessary for the attainment of other features of the system ....

[T]he legal effects of the Agreement ...

result, in accordance with

Article 228(2) of the Treaty, exclusively from the conclusion of the latter by
the Community.
74. Re the Int'l Agreement on Natural Rubber (Opinion 1/78), 1979 E. Comm. Ct. J.
Rep. 2871, 26 Common Mkt. L. R. 629, [1978-1979 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP.
(CCH) 18600, at 8755.
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within the context of article 113 relating to common commercial policy."
Hence, the Community alone was entitled to negotiate and conclude the
agreement on the basis of its exclusive powers. While stating that the
purpose of the request for an opinion from the Court was strictly limited
to the instant facts, the Commission urged the Court to clarify the general question of the interpretation of article 113 of the Treaty.7 6 The
Commission stated that "the field of commercial policy cannot . . .be
restricted to the non-exhaustive assertions of article 113" and that the
Court itself had pointed out in Opinion No. 1/75 that "the concept of
commercial policy has the same content whether it is applied in the context of the international action of a State or to that of the Community." 77
For the Commission, a measure of commercial policy must be assessed
"primarily by reference to its specific character as an instrument regulat7' 8
ing international trade.
The Council argued that the subject matter of the agreement fell
partly outside article 113 and required the common coordination of Member States within international economic bodies mentioned in article 116.
Therefore, a division of powers between the Community and the Member
States was called for, requiring that the agreement be concluded by the
mixed agreement process.70 The Council believed there was such close interrelation between the Community's powers and the Member State's
powers that the commercial interests of the Community were inseparable
from the international political interests which rightfully belonged to the
Member States.80
With regard to the general interpretation of article 113, the Council
argued that the Commission was asking the Court to take a fixed position
on article 113 for all future international commodity agreements, and to
adopt a position against the mixed agreement procedure used in previous
commodity agreements. According to the Council, this was a misuse of
article 228.81 In any event, the Council stressed that the definition of a
commercial policy measure falling within the meaning of article 113 must
depend upon whether the intent behind the measure is to influence the
volume or flow of trade, not on the instrumental criterion of the
82
Commission.
The Court, in affirming both its own and the Community's power,
faced all of the above arguments squarely. First, with respect to the
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 8760.
at 8762.
at 8764.
at 8772.

80. Id.
81. Id. at 8762. The Commission acknowledged that no Community position existed as
of that time. It asked the Court "to rule on the difference of opinion between it and the
Council on the interpretation of Article 113 and, in addition, to adopt a position of principle
against the practice of 'mixed-type' agreements .
82. Id. at 8772.
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Council's argument that article 228 procedure does not lend itself to the
settling of questions relating to the division of powers in matters of external relations or with regard to the general interpretation of article 113
and the mixed agreement procedure, the Court affirmed its own competence to act under article 228. 88 Where doubt arises regarding the division
of powers in the matter of negotiation and conclusion of international
agreements, past established practice was not to prevent the Council, the
Commission or the Member States from resorting to the procedures in
article 228.8 '
Second, the Court again dismissed any argument that the request for
an opinion was premature. This time the Court emphasized that when a
question of powers is at issue, it is of concern not only to Member States
but also to non-Member countries that such a question be clarified as
soon as negotiations are commenced."s This statement revealed the
Court's sensitivity to the increasingly complex problem of third-country

negotiations with the EEC.
Third, the Court addressed the central issue of whether the proposed
agreement came totally within article 113. Here the Court considered the
political ramifications of the developmental problems associated with a
commercial policy toward third world producers of rubber, and then proceeded to set forth its expansive interpretation of what article 113 included.8s The Court emphasized that the Community must have the ver-

83. Id. at 8778. The Court said: "[Uinder the procedure of Article 228, like that of
Article 103 of the EAEC Treaty, it is possible to deal with all questions which concern the
compatibility with the provisions of the Treaty of an agreement envisaged. . . ." Referring
to its previous case law, the Court held: "[A] judgment on the compatibility of an agreement
with the Treaty may depend not only on provisions of substantive law but also on those
concerning the powers, procedure or organization of the institutions of the Community."
84. Id. at 8778.
85. Id..
86. Id. at 8780. The Court stated as follows:
Following the impluse given by UNCTAD to the development of this type
of control it seems that it would no longer be possible to carry on any worthwhile common commercial policy if the Community were not in a position to
avail itself also of more elaborate means devised with a view to furthering the
development of international trade. It is therefore not possible to lay down, for
Article 113 of the EEC Treaty, an interpretation the effect of which would be
to restrict the common commercial policy to the use of instruments intended
to have an effect only on the traditional aspects of external trade to the exclusion of more highly developed mechanisms such as appear in the agreement
envisaged ....
Although it may be thought that at the time when the Treaty
was drafted liberalization of trade was the dominant idea, the Treaty nevertheless does not form a barrier to the possibility of the Community's developing a
commercial policy aiming at a regulation of the world market for certain products rather than a mere liberalization of trade.
[T]he enumeration in Article 113 of the subjects covered by commercial
policy ...
is conceived as a nonexhaustive enumeration which, must not, as
such, close the door to the application in a Community context of any other
process intended to regulate external trade.
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satility to regulate external trade and the power to effect more highly
developed mechanisms of international trade. The Court applied both
definitions urged by the Commission and by the Council in order to find
the proposed agreement one of commercial policy. The Court, however,
did not want to limit the scope of article 113 by any a priori technical
legal definition of commercial trade."'
Finally, the Court held that participation in the agreement with the
Community would be permitted only if the financing arrangements of the
final agreement provided for financing by the Member States in their individual capacities, rather than by Community financing through Member State contributions to the Community." A further exception was
made for the French and British Governments, which could participate
individually, but only in their capacities as the legal representatives of
dependent territories which were not members of the Community and
which had been called upon to participate in the international rubber
convention."
Opinion No. 1/78 is a refinement and consolidation of the broad view
regarding what constitutes Community commercial policy under article
113. The Court first established this view in Commission v. Council and
again in Opinion No. 1/75. In the earlier opinions the Court included in
article 113 matters which were not specifically mentioned in the article, so
long as the purpose of the agreement was to implement one of the objectives upon which the Community had been founded and which was stated
in the Treaty. In the instant opinion, the Court further refined the definition of commercial policy by holding that matters, such as financing and
the non-commercial effects of an international agreement, may also be
covered by article 113, so long as those matters are subsidiary to the overall commercial objective of the agreement and the agreement is a "characteristic measure" for trade regulation. This conclusion, the Court stated,
must naturally flow from the complex interaction of trade and politics in
today's world, and from the impact of a consolidated then nine-nation
economic unit at world trade negotiations.90 The Court's realistic view of

87. Id. at 8779. The Court stated: "Having regard to the fact that the essential object of
the agreement envisaged is to stabilize prices for natural rubber, this appears to be a characteristic measure for regulating external trade and thus an instrument of commerical policy." (emphases added). See Steenbergen, The Common Commercial Policy, 17 COMMON
cepted the Council's definition of article 113 while leaving the door open to use the Commission's criterion as well. Actually, it appears that in one sentence the Court accepted both the
Council's criterion and the Commission's.
88. Opinion 1/78, COMMON MKT. REP. 8600, at 8783.

89. Id.
90. Id. at 8782-83.
The Court takes the view that the fact that the agreement may cover subjects
such as technological assistance, research programs, labour conditions in the
industry concerned or consultations relating to national tax policies which may
have an effect on the price of rubber cannot modify the description of the
agreement which must be assessed having regard to its essential objective
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the changing nature of the measures used to control world trade and of
the problem of non-tariff barriers is demonstrated by its holding that
"mere liberalization of trade was not the only commercial purpose behind
the foundation of the Community nor the only instrument of achieving
the Community's commercial objectives.""
With this opinion the Court has brought the Community forward
into the realm of situational models 5 and 6. Internal powers that are not
expressed, but ancillary to or implied from the expressed objectives of the
Treaty can be enacted as well as can their implied external counterparts.
The case stands as the farthest reaching construction of the Community's
ability to act externally with a treaty-making power. In the interpretation
of this power, both with regard to the implication of its existence and the
limits on its use, the Court acted in the finest tradition of a constitutional
court. It attempts to give the Community the flexibility necessary to
achieve its objectives by means adapted to a changing international
environment. 91
Finally, the Court followed Opinion No. 1/75 regarding the issue of
delineation between articles 113 and 116 when the EEC is involved in
international economic negotiations. When the EEC negotiates an agreement that will have binding force in international law and the EEC is
recognized as an entity subject to international law, article 116 procedure
will not apply to those negotiations. 9
Also, the Court restated its previous stand on Member State participation in international agreements. Once the subject matter of the proposed agreement is found to be within the scope of the Community's
power, this power to act externally is exclusive."
V.

A

SUMMARY OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE

CASE LAW ON

EEC TREATY MAKING

The following list is a summary of the major points of law resulting
from the European Court's interpretation of the Community's external
power:
1. The power of the Community to bind itself under international law
flows from the implied and inherent powers of the Community as created
by the Treaty of Rome;
rather than in terms of individual clauses of an altogether subsidiary or ancillary nature.
91. Id. at 8781.
92. For example, if concurrent external powers were permitted and one of the Member
States failed to become a signatory to the international buffer stock agreement, that country
could easily defeat the purpose of the agreement by importing the goods cheaply through its
national ports and then redistributing the same goods to other Member States at cut-rate
prices. Since no intra-Community customs barriers exist, one state could force the prices
down below the internationally agreed stability price.
93. Id. at 8782.
94. Id. at 8783.
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2. The scope of this external power is not limited by the fact that no
internal rules on that subject matter have been adopted or that no specific grant of external power was mentioned in the Treaty;
3. Community powers in external matters are exclusive, and Member
States may participate in an agreement via a mixed procedure only if
there are unique circumstances;
4. The Community can delegate certain of its managerial powers to
international bodies to the same degree a Member State may do so;
5. Whenever a binding international agreement is involved and the
Community negotiates with an international economic organization as a
recognized legal entity, article 113 rather than article 116 applies;
6. Both the objective of a proposed agreement and the character of
the agreement as an instrument for regulating international trade are factors in deciding whether the agreement falls within the scope of commercial policy under article 113. The objectives and methods of such an
agreement need not concern traditional trade liberalization to fall within
the scope of article 113;
7. Noncommercial measures may be included in proposed commercial
agreements if they are subsidiary or ancillary to the objective of the proposed agreement;
8. Resort to the Court through article 228 is the correct method for
determining the exclusive power of the Community, under the Treaty, to
ratify a proposed agreement as well as to decide questions of power, procedure, and organization of Community institutions;
9. The Court's competence under article 228 is not limited by the
fact that a proposed agreement is still in the negotiating stage as long as
the final agreement will be binding. This is especially true in the case of
Community powers involving a relationship with non-Member countries.
A primary issue that remains unresolved is exactly how far the Court
has expanded the scope of the Community's power beyond the subsidiary
and ancillary non-commercial measures permitted in Opinion No. 1/78.
The question also remains whether subsidiary and ancillary measures will
be permitted in transport and other areas.
As noted previously, the Court has gone beyond the "in foro interno,
in foro externo" adage as a limitation on the scope of Community power.
Nevertheless, it has been pointed out that the rationale behind the Commission's argument for an expanded definition of commercial policy continues to be the need to avoid exercise of extensive national powers by
Member States that will lead to conflicts between internal and external
policy.' 5

95. Steenbergen, supra note 87, at 234-35. Steenbergen points out the problem of interpreting external economic relations as belonging to the field of Community powers alone:
"[N]either Treaty provisions nor the case-law of the Court justifies such as extreme construction of Community power beyond the scope of a commercial policy ...." Further-
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The opinions of the Court taken as a whole, however, do not seem to
limit themselves to the above narrow legal interpretation of the possible
scope of external Community power. There is a definite and much wider
interpretation which includes exclusive Community power over all external economic relations of Member States regardless of the present stage
of development of intra-Community matters. It appears from the case law
that the Court has moved toward the creation of a legal basis for external
agreements that are not limited by the development of intra-Community
policy. The legal basis for such external power is to be found in the general principles and objectives upon which the Community was founded as
well as in the Community's international legal personality.
The tenor of the Court's opinions in this area reflects the Court's
desire to create an atmosphere for the growth of an external policy that
will permit a wide variety of external agreements. This growth is not to
be limited by failing to mention the subject matter of the agreement
within the Treaty or by theories of parallelism and "in foro interno, in
foro externo." When it has been possible to use these latter theories to
expand the external powers of the Community, the Court has made reference to them, but it has also pointed out that they were not to be a limitation on the scope of Community power.
Practical political necessity being what it is, it is likely that the Commission will have to present its argument to increase the scope of the
Community power in terms that avoid internal v. external policy conflicts.
There are also the political problems that must be solved internally
before agreement can be reached on any coordinated common external
policy. Thus, practical politics may force the Commission to wait until
common internal rules are agreed upon before negotiating an external
agreement. All of this, of course, evokes memories of the "functionalism"
theory of the Advocate-General in In re Kramer. Nevertheless, it is unfair
to dismiss the wider interpretation of the Court's opinions when the
Court presently has clearly placed no limits on the scope of Community
power over external affairs provided the subject matter of any proposed
agreement clearly reflects an attempt to achieve a treaty objective."
VI.

THE TREATY-MAKING PROCEDURE IN PRACTICE

As mentioned in Section II, the Council has constantly attempted to
enforce a unanimity rule and to keep to itself any discretionary decision
making over the compatibility of international agreements with the
Treaty of Rome. The main legal arguments used by the Council have cen-

more, the phrase "in foro interno, in foro externo," coined by Judge Pescatore, can be interpreted to extend the power of the Community, under article 113, "as far as, but not beyond
the Community powers as defined according to the rules applied to the implied powers."
96. For the Commission's view on the external powers of the Community as a result of
the cases and opinions of the European Court, see Supplementary Answer to Written Question No. 173/77 on the Community's External Powers and Activities, 21 O.J. EuR. COMM.
(No. C 72) 1 (1978).
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tered on articles 238, 228 and 113. The Council has defined the substantive coverage of article 238 very narrowly. Rather than considering that
article 238 gives the Community power to conclude broad agreements encompassing all subjects over which the Treaty of Rome gives the Community internal competence, the Council has considered "association" agreements to be the same as the trade and tariff agreements of articles 111
and 113. Article 238 is also considered as containing the only procedure
for implementing those agreements. The effect of this interpretation has
been an attempt by the Council to subject all agreements, except the
most narrowly defined trade and tariff agreements, to the unanimous voting requirements of article 238, without referring them beforehand to the
Court of Justice, as envisaged in article 228. It permits the Council to
decide when an agreement might exceed Community treaty-making
power and when to resort to article 236.
The problem with this approach by the Council is that it becomes
necessary to explain away the fact that article 113 has a majority voting
procedure, whereas article 238, setting forth the amendment process, is
unanimous and requires Parliamentary consultation. 97 Why would the
provisions of article 238 have greater safeguards than article 113 if the
scope of the types of agreements covered by both articles is considered
coextensive? The answer the Council provides permits the use of majority
voting only for the most narrow trade and tariff provisions. Any wider
provisions even in the commercial area are voted on by the Council
through article 238's unanimous procedure.9"
The Council further limits the Community's power by often insisting,
when resorting to article 238, that parts of a proposed agreement exceed
the powers of the Community." In effect, the Council avoids article 238
entirely and acts as the Court of Justice should under article 228(1). The
Council engages in a legal interpretation of the Treaty of Rome and decides upon the compatibility of the agreement with the Treaty. Once it
decides that the Community is powerless under the Treaty to conclude a
given part of the proposed agreement, the Council resorts to the amendment process in article 236.
According to the Council the power to conclude an agreement which
exceeds Community power is acquired by the use of the "mixed procedure."10 0 Under this procedure both Member States and Community participate in the signing and ratification of the agreement. Once the Council
determines that parts of a proposed agreement exceed t.e competence of
the Community institutions, the Member States must sign and ratify the
97. Costonis, supra note 9, at 444-49. Costonis describes the legislative history of article
238 and concludes that powers well beyond articles 111 and 113 were intended for article
238.
98. Rome Treaty, supra note 1, art. 238.
99. Costonis, supra note 9, at 443-48.
100. Costonis, supra note 9, at 449-50; Leopold, supra note 8, at 62-65; Norton, supra
note 9, at 594-97.
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agreement according to their respective national procedures. The Council
approves the agreement when all Member States have ratified it. The
Council asserts that this procedure satisfies the requirements of articles
228 and 236 for amending the Treaty. In other words, the Council considers each association agreement to be an amendment of the Treaty for the
purposes of that association agreement only.
The most serious problem with this mixed procedure is the failure of
the Council to identify which parts of a proposed agreement exceed the
Community powers. This permits the Member States to consider all parts
of the proposed agreement according to their national procedures during
ratification, thus possibly vetoing a proposed agreement when the objectionable provisions are actually those of Community competence only. If
the Court decided which parts of a proposed agreement exceeded Community power, then the procedure of article 235 could be resorted to in
order to increase Community power for that particular agreement, or article 236 could be resorted to for an amendment that would cover all future
agreements in that area. The latter procedure would be more in line with
a true amendment process.
The above techniques have been used by the Council to undermine
Community power and have evoked considerable comment."'1 The Political Committee of the European Assembly insists that the meaning of "association" under article 238 includes substantive arrangements beyond
mere tariff and trade agreements.'
Since the Council apparently does not want to permit the Community to sign a "pure" Community agreement unless that agreement is limited strictly to the subject matter of article 113, the development of the
mixed procedure can be said to reflect the political realities of power
within the Community.0 " It also provides a somewhat practical solution
until those political problems limiting further movement toward suprana-

101. Norton, supra note 9, at 595-96. Norton says:
Great difficulties inevitably arise in trying to make some legal sense out of the
'mixed procedure' system. . . . By use of the 'mixed procedure' the Council of
Ministers has by passed the intended role of the Court of Justice, a violation of
the Treaty of Rome which the Commission has been reluctant to press before
the Court of Justice.
102. Id. at 597-98, quoting from the Birkelbach Report and P. Pescatore, Les Relations
Exterieures des Communautgs Europ~ennes, 103 RECUEIL DES COURT DE L'ACADEMIE DE
Daorr INTERNATIONAL 1 (1961).
103. The mixed procedure has been used on the International Coffee Agreement of
1976 ([19761 19 J.O. COMM. EUR. L 309/28); the International Cocoa Agreement of 1975
([1976] 19 J.O. COMM. EUR. L 321/29); Fifth International Tin Agreement, 1975 ([1976] 19
J.O. COMM. EUR. L 222/1); the International Cocoa Agreement of 1973 ([1973] 16 J.O. COMM.
EUR. L 324/20); Fourth International Tin Agreement, 1971 ([1972] 15 J.O. COMM. EUR. L 90/
2); International Wheat Agreement of 1971, 22 U.S.T. 821, T.I.A.S. No. 7144; and the Long
Term Arrangement for Cotton Textiles ([1970] 13 J.O. CoMm. EUR. 1225/29). As of 1977, all
association agreements except those with Tunisia and Morocco in 1969, Malta in 1970, and
Cyprus in 1972, were concluded by the mixed procedure. These non-mixed procedure agreements, however, dealt solely with matters falling with in article 113.
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tionality can be resolved.
The ultimate elimination of the mixed procedure system in practice
as well as in theory is necessary if the Community will ever truly possess
competence as a distinct international entity capable of concluding international contracts on its own. Under the "pure" Community agreement
procedure the Member States are automatically bound. Therefore, even
though it may seem there is little difference in practical effect between
resort to individual Member State ratification and an approval by the
same state's ministers on the Council, the legal distinction is enormous.
Bypassing Member State ratification and making Community agreements
automatically binding within the Member States is a step toward
supranationality.
Finally, the Council has used two procedural techniques to further
restrict Community autonomy. First, under articles 238 and 228, the
Council issues a negotiating mandate for the Commission.", The Commission should then conduct the negotiations independently and present
its final proposal for Council approval or rejection. In practice, the Council has insisted upon the presence of "national observers" in the negotiating stage of association agreements.'0 5 Some coordination between the
Council and the Commission was envisaged in article 113 for trade and
tariff negotiations, but not for other agreements. 06 The Council transposed controls written into article 113 over to article 238. Since article
238 already modifies the general treaty-making procedures of article 228
by requiring Parliamentary consultation as well as unanimous voting,
these additional controls are hardly necessary. The national observers
may help gain later Council approval for an agreement, but that is hardly
justification for their interference in the negotiating process. In truth, the
presence of "national observers" indicates the Council's unwillingness to
07
lose control over any aspect of the treaty-making process.1
Second, the Council has ignored the consultative rights of the European Parliament as required by article 238 association agreements.10 8 In
the past, the Council consulted the Parliament after the Council had already signed the proposed agreement. Thus, any productive suggestions
for change that might have been made by the Parliament could not have
been implemented without the Council changing what had already be-

ret,
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2.3,
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105. For a general discussion, see Bot, Negotiating Community Agreements: Procedure
and Practice, 7 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 286 (1970); Costonis, supra note 9, at 429-39; Hallstein, The EEC Commission: A New Factor in InternationalLife, 14 INT'L & COMP. L.Q.
727, 739 (1965); Leopold, supra note 8, at 65-66.
106. Bot, supra note 105, at 306; Hallstein, supra note 108, at 739.
107. Bot, supra note 105, at 309; Hallstein, supra note 108, at 739.
108. Rome Treaty, supra note 1, arts. 228(1), 113, 238. Article 228(1) states that Parliamentary consultation is necessary only where required by the Treaty. Article 113 agreements do not require Parliamentary consultation. Article 238 associations require Parliamentary consultation. See generally Costonis, supra note 9, at 438-42, and Leopold, supra
note 8, at 66-67.

1983

TREATY POWER

come an international contract. While the Parliament is now informed of
the contents of proposed agreements before they are signed, formal consultation with the Parliament still takes place after Council signature
under the "Luns" procedure." 9 The merits of an extensive prior consultation with the Parliament might be argued, but the fact remains that the
present procedures are another indication of Council control over the
treaty-making process.
As demonstrated by this article, all the above procedural methods
have resulted in some substantive changes in the guidelines announced by
the European Court regarding the treaty-making process. Of course, the
factors motivating these procedural changes are political. Like the common law process, when the substantive changes cannot be made because
of political reasons, the procedures are adjusted or distorted in order to
permit the system to function. Hopefully, political solutions will be
reached soon so that treaty-making procedures will be in harmony with
the Court's decisions. Otherwise, a long-term distortion of the procedural
process may result in permanent institutional change. A current study of
treaty-making procedures is needed in order to assess the impact of the
more recent opinions of the Court of Justice.
VII.

PROBLEMS WITH THE PRESENT STATUS OF
TREATY MAKING FOR NON-MEMBER STATES

EEC

Other than the obvious intra-Community struggle between the Commission and the Council which is reflected in the differences between the
theory of treaty making as viewed by the European Court and its actual
practice, there are some serious problem areas with the present status of
the EEC treaty power vis-a-vis non-Member countries. For example, what
happens in a mixed procedure agreement if a Member State decides to
denounce its obligations? Obviously, it is still bound to fulfill its Community obligations if the Community is a legally bound contracting party,
but who determines which obligations are those of the Community and
which obligations are those of the individual Member States? If this latter question is not resolved when the agreement is negotiated, then the
non-Member State may find the agreement being submitted to the European Court for such a determination. As noted in Opinion No. 1/78, the
European Court mentioned that it was aware of the problem for a nonMember State or a third party when they become involved in a mixed
procedure agreement with the Community. Justice Pescatore has written
that even though the Court has shown sensitivity towards allowing third
parties to negotiate agreements with the Community, no third state
would be allowed to intervene in the internal affairs of the Community or
in the delicate relationship between the Community and its Member

109. Bersani Report, FURO. PA^L. SER. 226, Manu. 1967. See also 1972-1973 EUR. PARL.
Doc. (No. 226) 5 (1972) & (No. 300) 5 (1972) for resolutions by Parliament calling for
greater consultation rights.
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States.'" Thus, to avoid involvement in a European Court dispute, the
third party to an agreement must have these questions of delineation between Community responsibility and Member State responsibility determined initially in the agreement itself.
Delineating responsibilities has posed a major drafting and negotiating problem for non-Member States. When a non-Member State attempts
to draft an international agreement in which both the Community and its
Member States have areas of responsibility, two problems become apparent. First, it is impossible to list all of the powers and responsibilities of
the Community. Second, it is often difficult to outline the relationship
between the Community and Member States. The Community is a dynamic, evolving, and growing organization. An increase in its internal
powers will certainly result in a shifting of external responsibilities within
an international agreement from the signatory Member States to the signatory Community. The European Court has discussed this shift of responsibility within the context of an international agreement and organization with reference to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(G.A.T.'T.). The Court has concluded that since the Community has assumed the powers in the area governed by the G.A.T.T. which were previously exercised by the Member States, the provisions of the agreement
bind the Community."' Only the European Court of Justice can determine whether the Community or Member State is bound at any given
time by a specific obligation." 2

110. Pescatore, supra note 36, at 627. The Justice states:
[I]t may be said that, on the one hand, the Court has shown itself to be sensitive toward the legitimate interests of third parties involved in the process of
negotiating agreements with the Community.- But at the same time, it would
not allow any intervention by Third States in internal matters of the Community, and, more particularly, in the determination of the very complex and delicate relationship between the Community and its own Member States.
111. International Fruit Company NV v. Produktschap voor groenten en fruit, 1972 E.
Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1219, 2 Common Mkt. L. R. 1 (1972), [1974 Transfer Binder] COMMON
MKT. REP. (CCH) 8194 (1975) (Eur. Ct. of Justice, Joined Cases Nos. 21 to 24/72). See also
Kapteyn, The Domestic Law Effect of Rules of International Law Within the European
Community System of Law and the Question of the Self-Executing Character of GATT
Rules, 8 INT'L L. 74 (1974); Riesenfeld, The Doctrineof Self-Executing Treaties and Community Law: A Pioneer Decision of the Court of Justice, 67 AM. J. INT'L L. 504 (1973);
Waelbroeck, Effect of GATT Within the Legal Order of the EEC, 8 J. WORLD TRANSNAT'L
Lu.614tA
..........j -1,uCurL tate
Since the entry into force of the EEC Treaty and more particularly, since the
setting up of the common external tariff, the transfer of powers which has occurred in the relations between Member States and the Community has been
put into concrete form in different ways within the framework of the General
Agreement and has been recognized by the other Contracting Parties. . . . [I]t
therefore appears that, insofar as under the EEC Treaty the Community has
assumed the powers previously exercised by Member States in the area governed by the General Agreement, the provisions of that agreement have the
effect of binding the Community.
112. The United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) is perhaps a
good practical case for examination of the drafting problem. The draft assimilation clause
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Perhaps the best a third-party state signatory can hope for in a
mixed procedure agreement with the Community, is a listing in the agreement of those areas of responsibility which European case law has up to
that point clearly established as belonging exclusively to the Community.
In addition, a provision for Community notification to signatories when it
has clearly accepted responsibility for new areas could be added. This
latter proposal might encounter resistance in areas which, for internal political reasons, both the Community and Member States would prefer
that responsibilities between themselves be kept nebulous."'
VIII.

CONCLUSION

The major problem confronting the Community with respect to its
treaty-making power continues to be the conflict between the progressive
and forward-looking evolution of the treaty-making power as espoused by
the European Court, and the practical application of that power. This
conflict is the result of the continuing political struggle between Commission and Council. Increasingly, the advancement of Community policies is
dependent upon the resolution of intra-Community political disagreements. This trend became inevitable once the purely economic issues

were coordinated and resolved. The issues left to be resolved are not
nearly so divisible into "pure" economic or "pure" political categories.
The multi-lateralization of trade and the growth of economic organizations and coordinating committees has not made the Community's
problems any easier. As the intra-Community political climate approaches the European Court's interpretation of the treaty-making
power, the effects of the Court's decisions will begin to be felt in all areas,
not just in commerce or transport.

for the EEC reads as follows:
Customs unions, communities or other regional economic integration groupings
referred to in paragraph 1, shall, upon deposit of their instruments of approval
or accession, become Contracting Parties with the same rights and obligations
as State Parties under the provisions of the Convention to the extent that
these rights and obligations relate to an area where powers have been given to
them by their Member States. (emphasis added).
While the above proposed clause permits the dynamic growth of the Community to
proceed unimpaired by a multilateral agreement, the position of the non-Member signatory
state has not changed. In the new Law of the Sea Treaty, some subject areas are under the
control of Member States and some matters belong to the Community. Since the responsibility for many subject areas is in transition, simple divisions of responsibility along territorial lines will not work. UN Doc. A/Conf. 62/L. 32 (Sept. 14, 1978). For discussions on the
EEC and the UNCLOS problem, see Koers, Participationof the European Economic Community in a New Law of the Sea Convention, 73 Am. J. INT'L L. 426 (1979); Oxman, Third
United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea: The Eighth Session, 74 Am. J. INT'L L.
1, 40-42 (1980); Vignes, The EEC and the Law of the Sea, reprinted in 3 NEW DmECTIoNs
IN THE LAW OF THE SEA 335, 339 (1973).
113. An example of tlis type of approach might be seen in the U.S.S.R.'s informal proposal at the UNCLOS conference. Conf. Doc. FC/3 (July 30, 1979), discussed in Oxman,
supra note 112, at 40 n.148.
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The case law of the Court indicates that the Court is bestowing on
the Community an increased treaty-making power. Writers disagree as to
whether the Court's cases should be interpreted narrowly or broadly, but
they agree that the Court is leading both the Council and, at times, the
Commission, toward the practical application of a treaty-making power
that permits the Community to act as a fully independent international
legal personality. The Court's judgments have at times been "prospective," as in Commission v. Council and Kramer, but the law established
in these cases is being followed gradually. The exclusive nature of the
Community's power under article 113 is no longer challenged. Instead,
arguments have shifted to whether the proposed agreement falls within
article 113. Also, the Council must seek to justify a mixed procedure
agreement on the grounds that some of the responsibilities to be undertaken in the proposal still belong to the Member States. Concurrent powers are recognized as non-existent for both Community and Member
States.
Nevertheless, the Commission and Council continue to use the powers given to them by the Court with restraint, although for different reasons. A new survey of treaty making in practice, much like the interviews
conducted by Mr. Costonis in the 1960's and discussed partially in part
VI of this paper, needs to be undertaken to see how many tactics used by
the Council to control the treaty-making practice are still in effect. This
writer suspects that most of the tactics are still used, and that while a
purely Community agreement may no longer be signed by a mixed procedure process, the use of "national observers" at the negotiating table has
continued to give the Council a powerful handle by which to control the
treaty-making process.
Since so much of the future of the integration process in Western
Europe is becoming dependent upon the resolution of intra-Community
political disputes, the future of the process and hence the possibilities for
the Community to exercise its treaty-making powers to their fullest potential will depend on the political climate. Traditionally, the stimulus to
centralize power has come from an external threat such as invasion and
the corresponding need for a centralized defense. This stimulus has been
lacking in Western Europe, but there are signs that this situation may be
changing.
Second, a favorable political climate is expected to develop in the
foreign policy area. The Report on European Union by Leo Tindemans1 4
urged the Community to create a united foreign policy front based on a
common policy rather than on simple inter-governmental coordination.
Any movement away from consensus opinions and toward majority voting
in the foreign policy area should be watched as auguring a potential for
increased use of the treaty-making power in new fields."'

114. Bull., EC Suppl. 1/76.
115. See Resolution of the European Parliament on European Political Cooperation, 21
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A third area with potential for creating the political climate necessary for full use of the treaty-making power is the commercial area itself.
The Japanese are increasingly invading traditional Western European industrial areas such as automobile, watch, shipbuilding, steel and textile
interests. The Member States may find that the only effective way to
counter this invasion will be through action on the Community level.
Their eagerness to avoid the internal social changes resulting from Japanese competition may prove to outweigh any reluctance to argue over increased exercise of centralized Community powers in external affairs.
While these areas favor the creation of the political climate and stimulus necessary for the Community to expand its treaty-making practice to
the fullest extent envisaged by the European Court, it is important not to
be overly optimistic. Political climates are no more predictable and
maybe even less predictable than the meteorological climate. However,
the political sensitivity of external affairs and treaties will continue to
make the evolution of Community treaty-making power an area in which
the Community integration process can be measured both theoretically
and practically.

O.J. EuR. COMM. (No. C 36) 32 (1978). For a positive comment on the progress toward European political cooperation Pnd foreign policy coordination, see Gablentz, Luxembourg Revisited or the Importance of European PoliticalCooperation, 16 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 685
(1979).

Terrorism and the
Laws of War©
ALFRED
I.

P. RUBIN'

INTRODUCTION

In days when the world seemed simpler, international law was neatly
divided into the law of peace and the law of war.1 Even Grotius' great
work is so divided. Modern perceptions seem to have been solidified by
the common practice of scholars to follow Grotius's example.' But the
neat classifications of lawyers have never meshed with reality, and reality
has always been victorious in the end.
The Roman religious practice of declaring war to mark the shift from
the law of peace to the law of war has always appealed to lawyers more

01983 by Alfred P. Rubin
*M. Litt, University of Cambridge; J.D., Columbia University; Charles H. Stockton Professor of International Law, Naval War College, Newport, R.I., 1981-1982; Professor of International Law, The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy; Chairman-Rapporteur, Committee on International Terrorism, International Law Association. This paper was originally
delivered at a conference on the Laws of War held at the Naval War College. The views of
Professor Rubin are not necessarily shared by the U.S. Navy or the U.S. Government.
1. Inter bellum et pacem nihil est medium ("between war and peace there is no other
category.") GROTIus, DE JuRE BELLI AC PACIS III, xxi, 1 (1625). This dictum was taken from
Cicero's 8th Philippic Against Anthony. It was not intended to mean that the law of war
applied only when war had been legally declared against a recognized enemy. Cf. id. at iii, 6,
where it is made clear that war can begin without declaration since an attack is equivalent
in the law of nature to a declaration under international law. In fact, Cicero's assertion
relates to Roman religious practice and moral imperatives, not to the legal regime of the law
of war at all. Cf. CICERO, DE OFFICIS, I, xi, 36-37 (44 B.C.). The details of the religious
practice are set out in I Livy, THE EARLY HiSTORY OF RoME 32, 69-71 (ca. 27 B.C., de Selincourt trans. 1960). The religious practice was more or less abandoned by the end of the
first century A.D. Dio CHRYSOSTOM, DiscounsEs 67 (Discourse 38, To the Nicomedians, c. 97
A.D.) (Loeb Classical Library 1956): "while peace is proclaimed by heralds, wars for the
most part take place unheralded." There can be little doubt that the law of war was conceived to apply in both Roman and Grotian days by operation of the law of nature whenever
there was an armed contention between pretenders to public authority deriving from some
such authority a license to kill people and destroy property. Publicists' attempts to restrict
the application of the law of war to armed contentions between recognized "states" or some
other narrow class of acceptable opponents uniformly failed to have practical effect; and
failed also to have legal effect outside the legal system of the law-asserting authority. For a
more recent example of such a failed attempt, see the American Civil War cases cited in
note 25 infra.
2. The two volumes of Lauterpacht's last versions of L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL
LAW, are titled, respectively, PE.ACE (8th ed. 1955) and DisPuTEs, WAR AND NEuTRALrrv (7th
ed. 1952); John Westlake's precursor text to Oppenheim is also in two volumes, PEACE
(1904) and WAR (1907).
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than to military men or statesmen.3 It has been repeatedly suggested in
modern times that the supposed sharp theoretical distinction between the
law of peace and the law of war, with all its complex exceptions, is more
deceptive than helpful in analyzing international law, which grows from
state practice and diplomatic correspondence.' The importance of reanalyzing the relationship between the law of war and the law of peace
has provoked the most resistance from those who perceive virtues in rigid
classification of the law when discussing "terrorism."'
Attaching the label "terrorist" or "soldier" to an individual engaged
in violence for what he considers to be a public purpose is in the first
instance a political as well as a legal act. As has been the case with regard
to recognition of statehood or governments, recognition of "belligerency"
is frequently denied for political reasons, but recognized by implication
when the legal results of recognition are sought by states who simultaneously deny the overt label.' Thus, "terrorists" may be labeled "criminals"
while in fact treated as "prisoners of war" when captured by a state denying that the law of war applies even to that particular outbreak of political violence.
It is the purpose of this paper to examine the evolution of the current law relating to "irregular" combatants, particularly their entitlement
or lack of entitlement to treatment as "prisoners of war" under the law of
war. The discussion to follow is an attempt to clarify the underlying perceptions of law as they appear to have been growing, in disregard of the
dicta of Cicero, by analyzing the refusals to label some irregulars as lawful
combatants and the treatment actually accorded to them in several cases.

II. FORMAL POW STATUS; RULES
There has been a peculiar twist in the formal designation of persons
who should be treated as prisoners of war since the earliest days of the
movement towards codification of the laws of war. In the Lieber Code,7

3. America's first formal war was fought against France from 1798-1800 without any
declarations but with the belligerent law of "prize" being applied by American courts at
Congress's direction in order to make "legal" the capture of French ships by American privateers. See Statute of 9 July, 1798, ch. 68, 1 Stat. 578, §§ 1, 2 & 5.
4. F. GROB, Ti RELATivrrY OF WAR AND PEACE (1949); Jessup, Should Inter-national
Law Recognize an Intermediate Status between War and Peace? 48 AM. J. INT'L L. 98
k19541;)
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L. 58 (1968); Rubin, Sunken Soviet Submarines and Central Intelligence;Laws of Property
and the Agency, 69 AM. J. INT'L L. 855 (1975); Norton, Between the Ideology and The
Reality: The Shadow of the Law of Neutrality, 17 HARv. INr'L L.J. 249 (1976).
5. See, e.g., remarks of Professor William O'Brien in 74 PRoc. AM. Soc'y INT'L L. 206
(1980) and Reply by Professor Rubin, id. at 209; Dissent by L.C. Green and J.J. LadorLederer, 4th Interim Report, INr'L LAw A. COMM. ON INT'L TERRORiSM 8-11 (1982).
6. This was done by the United States with regard to the undoubted government of the
People's Republic of China in Beijing from 1949 until President Nixon made a formal state
visit in 1972. The legal and political threads are definitively disentangled in Kelsen, Recognition in InternationalLaw, 35 AM. J. INT'L L. 604 (1941).
7. Promulgated as General Orders No. 100 issued by President Lincoln to the Union
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articles 49-518 define those persons who should be given prisoner of war
status. Generally, the status should apply to soldiers, civilians accompanying the forces, such as newsmen and contractor personnel, and civilians
who are part of a levee en masses in a section of the country not subject
to military occupation. All others are mere brigands. Under article 82,
squads of men who "commit hostilities ... without commission, without
being part and portion of the organized hostile army, and without sharing
continuously in the war" are to be given motivation. 10 The fundamental
distinction is between full-time soldiers and those integrally involved in
their operations on the one side, and full-time civilians on the other.
Those seeking to occupy an intermediate position blur the distinction and
need not be accorded soldiers' privileges under the Lieber Code.
The Brussels Declaration of 187411 maintained the same distinction
and added two more qualifications which further restrict the definition of
those captives to be treated as honorable prisoners of war. Article 9 extends soldiers' privileges to "militia and volunteer corps," and although it
does not expressly require that members of such corps be full-time
soldiers, it does require that those considered for soldiers' privileges
"carry arms openly" and that "they conduct their operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war." Article 10 extends the same
privileges to members of lev~es en masse "if they respect the laws and
customs of war."! 12 Since "respect" for the laws and customs of war seems

Army of the United States, Apr. 24, 1863 [hereinafter cited as the Lieber Code], reprinted
in D. SCHINDLER & J. TOMAN, THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS, 3-23 (2d rev. & comp. ed.
1981). Formally issued as Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in
the Field, the code of 157 articles was drafted by Professor Francis Lieber of Columbia
University and revised by an Army board chaired by General Halleck, a respected international legal scholar as well as Army Chief of Staff. See Root, Francis Lieber, 7 Am.J. INr'L
L. 453 (1913).
8. Lieber Code, supra note 7, acts 49-51.
9. Levkes en masse are groups of civilians authorized by their government to assume
the duties of soldiers and who act as such without the formal status of army membership.
The protected status of levbes en masse has been recognized in European practice of the
eighteenth century and later. A particularly famous instance involved the citizen army of
France repelling the general European onslaught of 1793. See W.E. HALL, A TREATISE ON
INTERNATIONAL LAW 535-42 (4th ed. 1895). On the French call to arms of August 23, 1793,

see II T.

CARLYLE, THE FRENCH REVOLUTION,

Ch. VI, 296-97 (1837) (American ed. by Bel-

ford, Clarke & Co., n.d.). The legal position of the Massachusetts Minutemen of 1775 might
properly be classified as a response to a similar call from the "shadow government" headed
by John Hancock, Samuel Adams, and their friends.
10. Lieber Code, art. 82; reprinted in D. SCHINDLER & J. ToMAN, supra note 7, at 14.
11. The Brussels Declaration of 1874 was contained in a Russian draft submitted by
Czar Alexander to a European conference of fifteen states, which adopted the draft with
minor alterations. It was never adopted formally, but was an important intellectual link
between the Lieber Code, which had been adopted as municipal law in the United States
only, and the Hague Regulations of 1899 and 1907. See also D. SCHINDLER & J. ToMAw,
supra note 7, at 25, for a description and text; W.E. HALL, supra note 9, at 544-46 describes
some of the negotiations at Brussels pertinent to this subject.
12. Brussels Declaration of 1874, arts. 9-10, reprinted in D. SCHINDLER & J. ToMAN,
supra note 8, at 27-29.
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to require less than conducting "operations in accordance with" the laws
and customs of war, and the requirement of carrying arms openly appears
in article 9 but not in article 10, it appears that a door was opened in
1874 to the possibility that some partisans might be considered entitled
to soldiers' privileges and that the rigid 1863 distinction between soldiers
and civilians was being eroded.
Hall summarizes the results of the Brussels discussions on this point
as follows:
The possession of belligerent privilege ... hinges upon subordination to a responsible person, who by his local prominence, coupled
with the fact that he is obeyed by a large force, shows that he can
cause the laws of war to be observed, and that he can punish isolated
infractions of them if necessary. 13
The Brussels formulations were incorporated more or less verbatim
in articles 1 and 2 of the Hague Regulations of 1899 and 1907.' The one
significant change is that the 1907 text of article 2, relating to lev~es en
masse, reintroduces the requirement that arms be carried openly, thus
closing to some degree the door that the Brussels Declaration of 1874 had
opened in favor of some partisans."' Article 1 of the 1929 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War' s incorporates the
1907 Hague provisions by simple reference.
Article 4 of the 1949 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment
of Prisoners of War (1949 Geneva POW Convention) reorganizes the
Hague formulation and expands it considerably. It grants soldiers' privileges, including prisoner of war status, to members of regular armed
forces even when they "profess allegiance to a government or an authority
not recognized by the Detaining Power,' 1 7 regardless of whether those
forces carry out their operations in accordance with the laws and customs
of war. The provisions regarding "carrying arms openly" and "conducting

13. W.E. HALL, supra note 9, at 546.
14. Regulations Annexed to the Conventions With Respect to the Laws and Customs of
War on Land, July 29, 1899, 32 Stat. 1803, T.S. No. 403; and Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 227, T.S.
No. 539 [hereinafter cited respectively as 1899 and 1907 Hague Regulations], reprinted in
D. SCHINDLER & J. TOMAN, supra note 7, at 69.

15. Article 2 reads in pertinent part:
The population of a territory which has not been occupied, who, on the
enemy's approach, spontaneously take up arms to resist the invading troops
without having time to organize themselves in accordance with article 1, shall
be regarded as belligerents[,] if they carry arms openly and if they respect the
laws and customs of war.
1907 Hague Regulations, supra note 8, art. 2. The italicized portions were added in 1907,
and the comma in brackets was deleted.
16. Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, July 27, 1929, art. 1, 47
Stat. 2021, T.S. No. 846, 118 L.N.T.S. 343 (entered into force June 19, 1931).
17. Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, art.
4(A)(3), 6 U.S.T. 316, T.I.A.S. No. 3364, 75 U.N.T.S. 135, [hereinafter cited as 1949 Geneva
POW Convention].
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operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war" are retained
for members of militias and other volunteer corps. Levees en masse remain within the conception of soldiers for purposes of prisoner of war
status, subject only to the 1907 Hague Regulations restrictions regarding
carrying arms openly and "respect" for the laws and customs of war.1'
Since article 4 of the Convention applies only to international armed conflicts (and not to "armed conflicts not of an international character"), 1'
the extension of prisoner of war status to rebels is not normally considered to be encompassed by the extension of that status to members of the
regular armed forces of unrecognized authorities.
It is ironic that a captured member of a regular armed force is accorded prisoner of war status regardless of crimes committed by the captive, either as an individual or as a matter of policy by his commanders
(such as engaging in prohibited chemical warfare), while captured partisans, "freedom fighters" or "terrorists" engaged in a domestic conflict,
or armed conflict not of an international character, are denied prisoner of
war status no matter how scrupulously they as individuals and as an organized force adhere to the humanitarian laws and customs of war.
To fit the most legally troublesome, current sort of political violence
into the pattern of the 1949 Geneva Conventions it would seem that the
key step would be the Detaining Power's (typically, the defending government's) acceptance of the conflict as an armed conflict of international
character. If that were done, individual liability for war crimes and "grave
breaches" of the 1949 Geneva Conventions 0 would be applied to prison-

18. Id.
19. Id. Article 2 states that the Convention "shall apply in all cases of declared war or
of any other armed conflict which may arise between two or more of the High Contracting
Parties ...." which, under article 139, may include "any Power" acceding to it. Under
general international law, a party to a multilateral convention may refuse to recognize the
legal efficacy of a purported accession by a "Power" it does not recognize. The closest to an
incisive discussion of this conclusion, which rests primarily on a perception of the function
of recognition and consent in the international legal order, is found in the advisory opinion
of the International Court of Justice on Reservations to the Convention on Genocide, 1951
I.C.J. 15 (Advisory Opinion of May 28, 1951) (Dissenting Opinion of Vice-President Guerrero and Judges McNair, Read, Hsu Mo at 20).
Article 3 provides some minimal humanitarian obligations, not including prisoner of
war treatment, for Parties to the Convention detaining surrendered combatants in the case
of "armed conflict not of an international character occurring in the territory of one of the
High Contracting Parties." The basis for distinguishing in 1949 between international and
noninternational armed conflicts for the purpose of determining humanitarian rules of law
appropriate to any armed conflict is not self-evident and has been increasingly criticized.
See INT'L L. Ass'N (American Branch), Proceedings and Committee Reports 1979-1980, Report of the Committee on Armed Conflict 38 (1980).
20. Each of the four 1949 Geneva Conventions contains provisions defining some egregious acts as so far beyond the scope of soldiers' privileges that they can be called "grave
breaches" of the Conventions themselves. These acts trigger obligations in the Parties to
search for persons alleged to have committed such grave breaches, then to try or extradite
them for trial to another concerned party. Articles 129 and 130 of the 1949 Geneva POW
Convention list some "grave breaches" against prisoners of war-
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ers, while honorable partisans, "freedom fighters" and "terrorists", who
observe the laws and customs of war would be given the treatment provided for prisoners of war under the 1949 Geneva POW Convention. That
was surely the intention of those drafting the Convention in providing for
that status regardless of the Detaining Power's refusal to "recognize" the
government or authority to which the prisoners profess allegiance.
The pattern for applying the law of war to internal armed conflicts
while withholding recognition of the governmental authority of the rebel
leadership traces back in modern times to the earliest codification and to
the American Civil War.21 The dividing line, however, is frequently unclear between rebel leadership so highly organized that it borders on bad
faith not to accept its legal capacity to engage in belligerency, and rebel
leadership that is merely a cabal of malcontents attempting to redistribute wealth by robbing banks and keeping the spoils.22 In these circumstances, the defending government cannot be faulted for using the tools
the law makes available to it by withholding that recognition.2"
There are some inhibitions on abuse of this discretion. For example,
if the defending government wants to exercise belligerent rights against
willful killing, torture or inhuman treatment, including biological experiments,
willfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health, compelling
a prisoner of war to serve in the forces of the hostile Power, or willfully depriving a prisoner of war the rights of fair and regular trial prescribed in this
Convention.
"Grave breaches" do not exhaust the list of war crimes. Any soldier exceeding his privileges may be guilty of a war crime and subject to arrest, trial or extradition and punishment
under general international law and other treaties even if his acts do not amount to a grave
breach of any of the 1949 Geneva Conventions.
The four 1949 Geneva Conventions are: I. Convention For the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114,
T.I.A.S. No. 3362, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; II. Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of
the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6
U.S.T. 3217, T.I.A.S. No. 3363, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; III. 1949 Geneva POW Convention, note 17
supra; IV. Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug.
12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, T.I.A.S. No. 3365, 75 U.N.T.S. 287.
21. The Lieber Code, supra note 7, art. 152, refers to the time "when humanity induces
the adoption of the rules of regular war toward rebels" and denies that such adoption implies a recognition of any governmental status in the rebel leadership. Article 154 of the
Lieber Code envisages trying the rebel leaders for treason. In practice, the U.S. military
asserted the belligerent right of blockade in 1861 before Congress had legislated the
equivalent of a declaration of war, and the Supreme Court narrowly upheld the legal power
of the Executive Branch to do so, primarily on the ground that facts determined true legal
relationships, not the forms of law. See The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 632 (1862). This
is not the place to repeat the Court's analysis nor to subject it to criticism.
22. This is not to suggest that the legal status of the armed conflict should be determined by the military prowess and degree of central organization in the belligerent parties.
Many other factors might be legally significant, such as the depth of political feeling involved and the degree to which it makes political sense to apply any other regime of law to
the situation.
23. A more elaborate legal argument leading to this conclusion may be found in Rubin,
The Status of Rebels Under the Geneva Convention of 1949, 21 Ir'L & Comp. L.Q. 472
(1972).
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neutrals, such as the right to interdict contraband in a neutral vessel on
the high seas, it must concede a status of belligerency to its enemy in
order to claim belligerent rights for itself. This was one of the reasons
why the federal government of the United States conceded belligerent
status to the Confederate States' armies and navies in the earliest days of
the American Civil War. The neutral involved was Great Britain and diplomatic correspondence between the U.S. federal authorities and the leaders of the British Government held great political as well as legal significance to the United States. 2' Another example is the diplomatic isolation
and the practical difficulties of negotiating an end to the hostilities with
an "unrecognized" enemy when it is perceived that absolute victory is
unattainable.

III. FORMAL POW STATUS; MODERN PRACTICE
But those situations are rare today. Once a state has denied belligerent status to armed "terrorists" who obey the laws and customs of war, it
becomes difficult, from a political perspective, to later reverse that classification. To do so implies that the "terrorists" have achieved a degree of
success warranting a change in legal classification. Whatever may be the
truth of that perception to a neutral observer, it is likely to be a truth
that must be denied by the defending government for internal political
and morale reasons. The result in practice is the adamant insistence by
governments upon a system of labeling which makes it impossible to cross
the threshold between noninternational and international armed conflicts.
This is so regardless of the degree to which the rebels might have
achieved control over territory once part of the state ruled by the defending government, and regardless of the rebels' adherence to the laws and
customs of war in their operations. This political labeling process results
in the defending government being permitted to deny soldiers' privileges
to the "terrorists," while asserting special "police" privileges (but not
soldiers' privileges under "martial law") to its own military forces. By denying the applicability of international law, and asserting the exclusive
applicability of its own internal law, adjusted with 'emergency' provisions
and special tribunals and prisons, an assymetry of legal status is
achieved.25 The resulting situation may be analogized to a military force
composed entirely of a posse of ad hoc deputy sheriffs chasing criminals.
"Terrorists" are tried for "murder" instead of the war crime of killing
civilians outside the reach of the soldier's privilege, and are imprisoned
for an arbitrary number of years as members of an "illegal organization,"
instead of being detained for the duration of the conflict because of their

24. J. MOORE, A

DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

626-30, 768-69 (1906).

25. "Symmetry," in this context, refers to the two or more parties to the conflict being
equal before the law. "Assymetry" is the situation in which one side or another asserts that
its legal system dominates the situation; for example, one's forces are entitled to the privileges of belligerents while the forces on the other side are criminals under municipal law,
subject to extradition if they reach third countries.
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participation." The legal status of defending government forces and "terrorists" is thus asymmetrical. The status of "international armed conflict", which is the threshold at which a symmetry of legal status is
achieved and all combatants are treated alike under the law, is reached, if
it is reached at all, too late to affect the tactics of the struggle.
That, in turn, must encourage the irregulars to ignore the laws and
customs of war, and to go to any extreme to escape capture. Further, in
reprisal, captured regulars of the defending forces may be symmetrically
treated as mere brigands regardless of how well-motivated and respectful
of the laws and customs of war their actions may have been.
These results are clearly inconsistent with the underlying evenhanded, humanitarian philosophy of the law of armed conflict and, in
practice, have been avoided by defending governments through various
expedients. During the Vietnam conflict, captured Viet Cong were given
prisoner of war treatment without regard to technical questions of status.
Arguably, prisoner of war status could have been denied these prisoners
on the basis of a strict application, with some modification, of the terms
of the 1949 Geneva POW Convention. Captured Viet Cong soldiers, otherwise personally conforming to the laws and customs of war in the operation in which they were captured, were not considered responsible for the
violations of the laws and customs of war which appeared to the United
27
States to be part of the general mode of operation of the Viet Cong.
The same pattern appears in the British grant of "political prisoner"
treatment to captured Irish Republican Army (I.R.A.) "terrorists" in
Northern Ireland despite the adamant British refusal to accord that status.2 8 This pattern also supports the I.R.A. contention that some special

26. In The Prize Cases, note 1 supra,Justice Grier for a 5-4 majority denied the validity of the analogous labeling system that had been adopted by the federal authorities of the
United States during the Civil War, saying that soldiers of the United States on the battlefield are not "executioners" killing criminals convicted of "treason." Id. at 673. Instead, he
argued that belligerent rights are being exercised on both sides. Id. at 669, 673-74. It was
only thirteen years after the Civil War had ended that the Supreme Court managed to reconcile the labeling system adopted by the federal government with the facts, concluding
that "belligerent rights" were "conceded" to the Confederate forces by the Union "in the
interest of humanity, and to prevent the cruelties of reprisals and retaliation". Ford v.
Surget, 97 U.S. 594, 605 (1878).
27. Bond, Protectionof Non-Combatants in Guerrilla Wars, 12 WM. & MARY L. REv.
77 (1971); thu UffICUI1 A.Uerican dire-uctive, Mity 'niste
ComnwUId, Vietiami Directive 381-446: Criteria For Classification And Disposition of Detainees (Dec. 27, 1967), is
located at id. at 798 n.23.
28. Ireland v. United Kingdom, 1976 Y.B. EUR. CONY. ON HUMAN RIGHTS 512 (Eur. Ct.).
The arrest and detention arrangements are outlined at 590, but the whole report of the
European Commission of Human Rights is worth reading for the strained attempt by the
United Kingdom to picture its emergency regulations as simply a special part of the normal
criminal law. The Judgment of the European Court of Human Rights (Jan. 18, 1978) outlines the interrogation and detention practices of the United Kingdom as if they were
merely emergency additions to the normal criminal law, and holds them to be in violation of
article 3 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, Sept. 3, 1953, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter cited as European Convention],
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political prisoner treatment is legally required, and that such treatment is
not a mere matter of grace by the British defenders of the status quo, but
rather a matter of the general application of humanitarian international

law. The utilization of special tribunals and detention facilities, and the
special treatment accorded to captured Palestinian "terrorists" by
Israel,2" and to Italy's "Red Brigade,"8 0 is further evidence of an underlying humanitarian law. It would appear that many defending governments
confronted with "terrorism" feel the humanitarian tugs of the law of
armed conflict and the practical policy reasons that support that law
more strongly than they are willing, for political reasons, to admit."1
Arguably, the behavior of states and defending governments reflects,
as part of the lawmaking process, a series of political evaluations developing parallel to the 1949 Geneva Conventions. These evaluations may be
better suited to the realities of modern armed conflict than the legal categories established by the Conventions. The treatment accorded to captured "terrorists" in practice more closely conforms to the underlying
principles of humanitarian law than the Geneva formulation would require, and may spring from the same humanitarian roots as the formulation. The formulation, however, remains unmodified, possibly reflecting
the statesmen's desire to reserve to themselves the legal discretion
asymetrically advantageous to defending governments under the present
treaty formulation.
Under the present formulation, the treatment accorded captured
"terrorists" is entirely a matter of the municipal law of the capturing
state as interpreted by the defending government, and if that government

decides to treat its captives below the minimum standards which the
Conventions would fix, that government merely denies the applicability of
the Conventions and the legal interest (standing) of any other state to
which states, "No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment." 1978 Y.B. EUR. CoNy. ON HUMAN RIGHTS 602 (Eur. Ct.).
It is hard to see how the humanitarian treatment required by article 3 of the 1949
Geneva POW Convention would in any way be a higher standard than that already provided
to common criminals under the European Convention, and except for details regarding correspondence and protecting power or Red Cross visitations, it is hard to find significant
differences between the European Court of Human Rights' interpretation of article 3 of the
European Convention and the elaborate protections for prisoners of war in international
armed conflicts under the 1949 Geneva POW Convention.
29. In the recent case involving Ziyad Abu Eain, the Government of Israel classified
Abu Eain as a common criminal and undertook to treat him as such in Israel if the United
States would extradite him to stand trial for a politically motivated bombing in Israel. This
departs from the normal Israeli practice with regard to accused "terrorists." See Eain v.
Wilkes, 641 F.2d 504 (7th Cir. 1981); Department of State, Memorandum of Decision in the
Case of the Request by the State of Israel for the Extradition of Ziyad Abu Eain (Dec. 12,
1981) (furnished to the author by the Office of Sen. Dan Quayle); Rubin, Extradition of
Terrorists, 15 INT'L PRACTITIONER's NOTEBOOK 15 (1981).

30. S.Conti, Treatment of Terrorists in Italy (unpublished M.A.L.D. thesis, the Fletcher School of Law & Diplomacy) (in the files of the author, Florence, Italy).
31. Cf. R. TRINQUIER, MODERN WARFARE 20-25 (1964) (discussing the practical policy
arguments of the law).
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express a view. It can also deny that international law is in any way relevant, thus rejecting the disinterested interposition of humanitarian organizations, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross. Such
organizations may have purview over the application of the Conventions,
but none over the application of municipal criminal law to matters essentially within the reservation of legal discretion. This discretion to treat
political "freedom fighters" or "terrorists" as if they were common
criminals is itself inconsistent with the fundamental object of the law itself: to minimize the impact of armed conflict on the helpless, whether or
not the conflict is of an international character.

IV.

THE LATEST ATTEMPT AT CODIFICATION

From this standpoint, it is interesting to look at the 1977 Geneva
Protocols"2 as the latest expression of the international community which
formally addresses entitlement to prisoner of war status. Protocol I,
which addresses international armed conflicts, preserves the protection of
general international law outside of the conventional framework as it
might apply to captured irregulars. Article 1(2) states: "In cases not covered by this Protocol or by other international agreements, civilians and
combatants remain under the protection and authority of the principles
of international law derived from established custom, from the principles

of humanity and from the dictates of public conscience."
To those who have followed the application of this language from its
inception as the so-called "de Martens clause" of the 1899 Hague Convention"3 to the present, it is apparent that its direct effects are small.

32. Protocol Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts,
opened for signature Dec. 12, 1977, U.N. Doc. A/32/44 (1977) (entered into force Dec. 7,
1978) [hereinafter cited as Protocol IJ, reprinted in 16 I.L.M. 1391 (1977), and D. ScHINDLER & J. TOMAN, supra note 7, at 535; Protocol Relating to the Protection of Victims of
Non-International Armed Conflicts, opened for signature Dec. 12, 1977, U.N. Doc.A/32/144
(1977) [hereinafter cited as Protocol II], reprinted in 16 I.L.M. 1442 (1977), and D. SCHINDLER & J. TOMAN, supra note 7, at 619. Protocol I relates to the provisions of the 1949
Geneva Conventions applicable to international armed conflicts (so-called "Article 2 Conflicts"). Protocol II relates only to armed conflicts not of an international character (socalled "Article 3 Conflicts"). The articles relate to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, all four of
which make the same distinctions. See note 19 supra. Article 1(2) of Protocol II specifically
excludes from its material field of application "situations of internal disturbances and tensions. such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence and other acts of a similar nature,
as not being armed conflicts," thus leaving the asymmetrical regime of armed conflict not of
an international character essentially only to the nonisolated, nonsporadic violence in civil
wars that before 1949 was considered properly regulated by the symmetrical law of war. See
INT'L L. Ass'N (American Branch), note 19 supra.
33. 1899 and 1907 Hague Conventions, supra note 14, preambular para. 9 (1899) &
para. 8 (1907). De Martens was the Russian official usually considered responsible for the
language first appearing in the 1899 Hague Convention making it clear that the rules codified in its appended Regulations did not exhaust the field. The precise words of the "de
Martens clause" are:
. Until a more complete code of the laws of war is issued, the High Contracting Parties think it right to declare that in cases not included in the Regu-

1983

THE LAWS OF WAR

But it does leave open the possibility that the treatment of Viet Cong
guerrillas, I.R.A. "soldiers," P.L.O. "terrorists," "Red Brigade" members
and some other "freedom fighters" is part of the overall legal regulation
of armed conflict, and not mere political concessions by the defending
governments in anticipation of equivalent, merely political, concessions
by the guerrilla units capturing their own soldiers.
More directly, Protocol I addresses the legal asymmetry between defending government forces and "terrorists" in its article 1(4), under which
the symmetrical rules of "armed conflict" should be applied in principle
to the following:
[a]rmed conflicts in which peoples are fighting against colonial
domination and alien occupation and against racist regimes in the exercise of their right of self-determination, as enshrined in the Charter
of the United Nations and the Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-Operation Among
States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations."
This language, if unmodified, would appear to rectify to some extent
the asymmetry of the formal Geneva approach favoring the defending
forces by making it more difficult for the defending forces to avoid a legal
responsibility to give captive enemies, whose personal conduct conforms
to the humanitarian laws of war, prisoner of war treatment on the basis of
violations of the rules and customs of war by others. A very persuasive
argument can be made that this provision of Protocol I, coupled with the
Protocol's expanded specification of "grave breaches" in articles 11 and
85, would create a legal framework for the treatment of "freedom-fighting" guerrillas. The framework would provide the needed symmetry of
legal rights and obligations and would satisfy the practical object of assuring maximum legal protection for the innocent victims of a conflict
(both as prisoners and as the object of attack-such attacks now being
defined themselves as "grave breaches" under article 85(3) of the
Protocol).
But the problem of auto-interpretation, of each party to the conflict
using the legal classification system to its own political advantage by simply asserting or denying the "colonial" or "racist" nature of the struggle,
would remain. The framers of Protocol I sought a further step to solve
that possibly unsolvable problem in an ingenious but equivalently asymmetrical way. Article 96(2) provides that parties to the Protocol are
bound to its terms in an armed conflict "in relation to each of the Parties

lations adopted by them, populations and belligerents remain under the protection and empire of the principles of international law, as they result from
the usages established between civilized nations, from the laws of humanity,
and the requirements of the public conscience.
See Minch, Die Marten'sche Klausel und die Grundlagen des Valker-rechts, 36 ZMrSCHRIFT FOR AUSLXNDISCHES OFrENTLcIHEs RECHT UND VOLKERRECHT 345 (1976).

34. Protocol I, supra note 32, art. 1(4).

DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y

VOL. 12:2-3

[to the conflict] which are not bound by it [the Protocol], if the latter
[i.e., a Party to the conflict which is not bound by the Protocol] accepts
and applies the provisions thereof." 3' (emphasis added). The emphasized
phrase, "and applies," seems to be the reflection of the older formulations restricting the entitlement to prisoner of war treatment to "members of" those organizations (however defined) which "conduct their operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war.""' But it is here
that it is possible to see most clearly the inequities of the attempt at
symmetry. The symmetry is sought to be applied to organizations rather
than to individuals of honorable temper engaged in political violence.
Moreover, it is uncertain whether guerrillas, once their movement has
achieved the degree of success that brings into play the very notion of
applying the law of armed conflict to their struggle, will necessarily have
the control of territory and the infrastructure necessary to assure prisoner
of war treatment to captured defenders. To refuse to apply the laws of
armed conflict to participants in their movement until they do so is, in
the context of the Geneva framework, to withhold humanitarian protection from some more or less innocent victims of armed conflicts.
To argue that soldiers in a movement that is not yet sufficiently successful to warrant the application of the law of armed conflict deserve no
treatment other than the humanitarian treatment which international law
prescribes for criminals, is to argue that well-motivated and honorable
individuals acting in conformity with the laws and customs of war may be
treated as ordinary criminals. The treatment prescribed for criminals is
essentially all that flows from classifying the conflict as one "not of an
international character" under article 3 common to the four 1949 Geneva
Conventions and Protocol II. It does not seem significantly different from
the legal protection owing to foreign soldiers in an armed conflict not
reaching the level of an article 2 conflict,37 or ordinary criminals under
various human rights rules of international law. It is difficult to understand how such a system of classification supports respect for the laws
and customs of war, responds to social needs, or protects the individual
victims of armed conflict.
Article 96(3) of Protocol I states: "The authority representing a people engaged against a High Contracting Party in an armed conflict of the
type referred to in Article I, paragraph 4, may undertake to apply the
Conventions and this Protocol in relation to that conflict
by means of a
u i"Atera declaration addresed to the depositary."'
This language would seem to replace the existing auto-interpretation
pattern of international law that gives each actor in the international
35. Protocol I, supra note 32, art. 96(2).
36. 1874 Brussels Declaration, supra note 11, art. 9. See also 1899 and 1907 Hague
Regulations, supra note 11, art.1; 1949 Geneva POW Convention, supra note 20, art.
4(A)(2)(d).
37. See note 19 supra.
38. Protocol I, supra note 32, art. 96(3).
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scene the power to determine in the first instance what legal labels ought
to be attached to any situation, with a special power in the leaders of
"self-determination" struggles to determine what legal regime should
apply to them. Since that legal power is not given to the equally successful
leaders of identical struggles that lack the self-determination motive and,
indeed, is not given to defending governments even in a self-determination struggle, the normal identity of rights among all parties to an armed
conflict, referred to in this discussion as "symmetry," is replaced with
special rights for the pure of heart. Of course, the leaders of anti-colonial
or anti-racist guerrilla organizations can be expected to exercise whatever
discretion the law allows them in ways designed to improve their political
or military position regardless of the facts as perceived by others. Thus it
would appear that the asymmetry of the 1949 Geneva approach favoring
existing governments is replaced in Protocol I by a double asymmetry
favoring some (but not all) guerrilla organizations. It is hard to see how
symmetry can be restored to the law when an asymmetry is replaced by a
more complicated reverse asymmetry.
If it were possible to suppress all guerrilla movements with minimal
disruption to the higher interests of the affected communities, or if all
guerrilla movements whose purported aim was to eliminate colonialism or
racism were fundamentally humane or capable of replacing an unjust regime with one more just, then this legal manipulation giving one side an
advantage over the other might be desirable. Unfortunately, experience
has shown the contrary to be true. Some guerrilla movements express a
sense of national grievance that cannot be squelched. Some are ephemeral. To stack the rules of armed conflict in such a way that the defending
forces appear justified in treating all captive guerrillas as mere criminals
brings the law into contempt and fails to protect some victims of the conflict who, by all our rhetoric, deserve protection. Indeed, treating even the
deluded members of the ephemeral, so-called "national liberation" or
"justice" movements that are politically isolated, hopeless and merely anarchistic, as criminals in the same sense as the leaders and members who
order or commit war crimes or "grave breaches," cannot be justified.
Furthermore, this confusion between politically motivated violence
and normal criminality is not only illogical, but also unnecessary to defend the political order. Even accepting the law of war as applicable to
the lowest levels of political violence, the leaders and soldiers who commit
"grave breaches," (including the "grave breach" of targeting civilian
populations as such), can legally be subjected to condign punishment regardless of their status or lack of status as prisoners of war. In fact, their
apprehension and punishment is easier if it is conceded that they are acting in a general armed conflict subject to the Geneva system, rather than
if they are conceived as mere politically motivated criminals. The Geneva
system includes obligations on the High Contracting Parties to search for
and either bring before their own courts, or hand over to another concerned party for trial, persons alleged to have committed such "grave
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breaches."'" Thus, where a "normal" criminal may escape from extradition under the terms of an extradition treaty that exempts "political offenders," a soldier who commits a "grave breach" of the laws and customs
of war pursuant to the 1949 Geneva Conventions and Protocol 1, enjoys no
such exemption.
The technical approach of the 1949 Conventions and the 1977 Protocols to the codification of the laws and customs of war as applied to guerrillas leads to these anomalous results, and thus seems ripe for reconsideration. If a more realistic solution cannot be had through a multilateral
conference than through the slower but more sure route of state practices,
the assertion of law through international correspondence, public statements, learned discussion and before national tribunals as envisaged in
article 45(2) of Protocol I should be used to develop the law of international armed conflict.
V.

SUMMARY

It may be seen from this brief survey of the Geneva system as applied in theory and practice to guerrilla-type "freedom-fighter" or "terrorist" situations, that the current codifications and hopes for future
codifications of the law, in the short term, lead to a pattern of prescription that is unsatisfactory from any point of view. If the codifications are
read technically as covering the entire field, treatment as a common criminal is proper for even well-motivated and honorable guerrilla fighters,
and pleas for better treatment of defending soldiers are unlikely to be
persuasive. This situation seems inconsistent with the basic idea of humanitarian law: protecting the victims of armed conflict. As exemplified
by the American, British, Israeli and Italian treatment of captured "terrorists," the Geneva system also seems too narrow to describe the real
apprehensions of law. It is, at least, too narrow to describe the policies
that enlightened and humane states in general are likely to conclude
would be wise in the interests of humanity, eventual reconciliation and
peace, and reciprocity. The growth of this practice is part of the law-making process of the international legal order and should be encouraged by
highlighting its legal underpinnings and law-making implications.
This plea for a broader conception of the laws of armed conflict as
applied
"national
liberation freedom fighter" situations rather than the
tech"Ich toir1~~
t-rpretations
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--.-eas,-y plicit in part of Protocol I. Article 44(3) of that Protocol recognizes that
there are situations in armed conflicts where, "owing to the nature of the
hostilities an armed combatant cannot so distinguish himself [from the
civilian population], he shall retain his status as a combatant provided
that. .. he carries his arms openly. . . during each military engagement,
and . . . during such time as he is visible to the adversary while he is

39. 1949 Geneva POW Convention, supra note 20, art. 129.
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engaged in a military deployment . ...',o Indeed, even combatants who
fail to meet these requirements, although deprived of prisoner of war status by article 44(4), are by the same article, "given protections equivalent
in all respects to those accorded to prisoners of war . .
Surely these
provisions are evidence of the irreconcilable conflict between those who
would lower the threshold of prisoner of war entitlement to admit all politically motivated "soldiers" and those who would treat all irregulars as
bandits until the armed conflict took on more nearly, the form of European wars of the nineteenth century.
In drafting Protocol I, the twentieth-century humanitarians obviously won, as treatment as prisoners of war is the essence of the prescription, subject to an expanded "grave breaches" conception and the removal of soldiers' privileges from guerrillas who masquerade as civilians
during deployment. The result is to authorize the capturing power to condemn as common criminals, rather than as war criminals, those guerrillas
who target civilians or masquerade during deployment. Nevertheless, the
Protocol treats as legitimate soldiers those combatants who, by disguising
themselves as civilians at other times, lead the defending forces to target
people who appear to be civilians. But even this strange victory for humanitarians is eviscerated by the provisions discussed above, by which
the best contemporary classifying minds have made these prescriptions
inoperative in their entirety until the "freedom-fighting" or "terrorist"
organization decides it is in its own interest to have them apply. Rather
than attempt further to disentangle the skein, it is best at this point to
indicate simply that article 44(3), and possibly article 44(4), appear to be
steps towards codifying a more humane and logical approach. They also
constitute further evidence that the Geneva system for bringing into play
the conception of prisoner of war treatment for "freedom fighters" is incomplete and does not fully take account of the realities or perceptions of
wise legal policy, or even what is arguably already existing international
law.
It was noted above that U. S. tribunals in practice already apply
something like the terms of article 45(2) of Protocol I in permitting an
accused criminal to allege his entitlement to prisoner of war status and to
hear argument on the merits of the allegation. An attempt to use that
practice was made by William Guillermo Morales, whose argument was
rejected by Eugene H. Nickerson, District Judge for the Southern District
of New York, in U.S. v. Morales.4 2 Morales claimed that as an associate of
the Armed Forces of the Puerto Rican National Liberation (FALN) he
was entitled, when captured after nearly killing himself making explosives, to be treated as a prisoner of war. It appears he believed that such a
plea, if accepted by the court, would result in his being turned over to
U.S. military authorities for detention until he could be removed to a
"..,

40. Protocol I, supra note 32, art. 44(3).
41. Id. art. 44(4).
42. U.S. v. Morales, 464 F. Supp. 325 (E.D.N.Y. 1979).
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neutral country for the duration of the conflict. Judge Nickerson did not
address that patently erroneous legal conclusion, but held that the defendant had not clearly alleged his own membership in the FALN, thus denying the claim on the preliminary question of pleading.
The case is interesting for two reasons. First, it reveals the patent
misconception that some lawyers and self-styled "freedom-fighters" seem
to have as to the privileges of soldiers (the FALN as an organization
seems to have ordered "grave breaches" to be committed), and the legal
results of acquiring prisoner of war status. Second, it raises the question
of eventual release.
In the language of the 1949 Geneva POW Convention, "[pirisoners of
war shall be released and repatriated without delay after the cessation of
active hostilities.""' It is ancient practice to allow a prisoner of war his
liberty on "parole" if he undertakes to avoid further involvement in the
conflict." But ordinary criminals presumably serve a fixed time reduced

by parole or other considerations independent of national or international
politics. Thus, the internment of a prisoner of war may be longer or
shorter than that of the same person labeled a mere criminal. The factors
that determine the length of the incarceration are wholly different. In the
Morales case, would the interests of society in having Morales removed
from a political struggle in which he has been taking an active and violent
role be better served by classifying his status as a "prisoner of war" or as
a "criminal"? Would his release after three years as an unauthorized possessor of dangerous weapons meet the needs of society to remove him
from our midst while he is fanatically convinced of the virtues of his political position? Would twenty years be appropriate, when the armed
struggle could collapse within two years by the acceptance of FALN participation in a Puerto Rican Government and the redirection of FALN
energies, assuming that Morales is in fact no danger to society outside of
the FALN political context?
VI.

CONCLUSIONS

It would seem that a basic conception of the modern codification of
the laws of war was the sharp distinction between organized soldiery and
civilians, with an exception made for leves en masse, to be entitled to
soldiers' privileges. With the legitimation of underground and partisan
guerrilla warfare during the Second World War, the 1949 Geneva Conventions replaced that sharp distinction with a much more elaborate set Of
rules. The application of these rules, however, is withheld until the parties concerned classify the conflict as "international." In retrospect it appears to have been the intention of the statesmen involved to give
soldiers' privileges to partisan remnants of defeated national armies, but
withhold those privileges from guerrillas engaged in struggles against co43. 1949 Geneva POW Convention, supra note 17, art. 118.
44. See Lieber Code, supra note 7, arts. 119-30.
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lonial regimes. The asymmetries that resulted have been ameliorated to a
considerable extent by the practice of states extending to guerrillas in
noninternational armed conflicts something quite close to the special
treatment that they would be entitled to if the conflict were international.
There is a question as to whether that special treatment is given as of
grace through the normal criminal law system of the defending government, as all defending governments claim for their own position, or as a
manifestation of an underlying opinio juris that well-motivated and honorable guerrillas individually observing the laws and customs of war are
entitled to soldiers' privileges.
Attempts to bring the Conventions' regime closer to current reality in
1977 ended by increasing the elaboration and asymmetries inherent in the
1949 regime. It may be suggested that the elaboration of humanitarian
legal protection for common criminals and for participants in armed conflicts not of an international character is slowly making irrelevant the legal categories negotiated by statesmen in disregard of principle and
45
reality.

45. Some of these ideas are explored further in Rubin, Terrorism, "Grave Breaches"
and the 1977 Geneva Protocols, 74 PROC. AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. 192-96, 209-10 (1980-1981).
During the discussion that followed the reading of the papers, the question was posed as to

just how low a threshold should be taken as the point at which the law of armed conflict
might usefully be applied to political violence. This author responded that there was no
clear ultimate limit. More recently, while expounding the same idea at Washington and Lee
School of Law, the author was asked if the law of armed conflict should be applied to Ku
Klux Klan members killing Communist Worker's Party demonstrators. In light of the jury
verdict of not guilty in an extreme case in Greensboro, North Carolina, on November 17,
1980 (N.Y. Times, Nov. 18, 1980, at 1, col. 2), this author had no difficulty in answering in
the affirmative. Under the law of armed conflict, the "soldiers" of the Klan would have been
imprisoned as "prisoners of war" until they conceded the end of the hostilities, presumably
for life, and might well have been tried by court martial for the war crimes involved in their
shooting an "enemy" that was not obstructing their achieving any rational military goal.
Even releasing them on parole would have been more sensible and realistic than trying them
for murder and acquitting them.

The Use of Discretionary Authority by

International Organizations in their
Relations with International
Civil Servants
BRUNO MICHEL DE VUYST*

The purpose of this article is to review both the exercise of discretionary authority by international organizations with respect to treatment
of their staff, and the reactions by some international administrative
tribunals to such exercise of discretionary authority as perceived through
the judgments of such tribunals, particularly those of the United Nations
Administrative Tribunal (UNAT), the International Labor Organization
Administrative Tribunal (ILOAT), and the World Bank Administrative
Tribunal (WBAT).
I.

INTERNATIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

It falls beyond the scope of this article to deal with the legal-theoretical problems of what constitutes "international administrative law" (i.e.,
the internal law of an international organization, including the law governing the relationship between an international organization and its
staff) as part of and as a wholly separate branch of public international
law. It is sufficient to state for the purposes of this article that the domestic law of international organizations, sometimes called "infra-international law," is recognized in doctrine as an autonomous legal branch of
public international law.'
This international administrative law is, however, not a well-defined
nor all-encompassing body of law. C.W. Jenks stated:
[A]s international administrative law developes further, it will be
necessary to resolve the series of dilemmas already brought into focus
in the preliminary stages of its development. They will not necessarily
be resolved in a clear-cut and uniform manner.
At its present stage of development international administrative
*Counsel, The World Bank, Legal Department. Lic. R., 1975 (U.I.A.); LL.M., Columbia
University, 1976; C.R.B. Fellow of the Belgian American Educational Foundation 1975-1976.
The opinions set forth in this article are those of the author and not necessarily those of the

World Bank.
1. Effects of Awards of Compensation Made by the United Nations Administrative Tribunal, 1954 I.C.J. Pleadings 343; A. VERDROSS, ON THE CONCEPT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 493

(1949); Bastid, Have the United Nations Administrative Tribunals Contributed to the Development of InternationalLaw?, in W. FRIEDMAN, TRANSNATIONAL LAW IN A CHANGING SoctETr 307 (1972); S. BASDEVANT (BASTID), Les fonctionnaires internationaux, thesis 68-69,

283 (1931). See also, Oral Statements to the International Court of Justice (June 11, 1954).
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law is primarily a law governing the international public service and
the administration of international public funds; as it developes further it may well be increasingly concerned with the exercise of administrative powers directly affecting third-party interests.
If these varied dilemmas are to be successfully resolved, the further development of international administrative law must be nourished by a wide and deep understanding of administrative law generally, and disciplined by a full and instinctive awareness of the
practical realities of international administration.'
As K.S. Carlston put it, analysis of international administrative law
must start with an analysis of the employing organizations themselves.
Pointing to the goals outlined for this autonomous branch of law, Carl-

ston stated:
[I]nternational administrative law, as all law, is directed to ensuring the preservation and fullest expression of an idea in action. When
that idea is expressed in the complex and permanent system of action
which we call an organization, law is concerned with preserving the
integrity of the organization as an expression of its essential idea. It is
concerned with preserving those ways of action which are necessary to
enable the fullest expression of the idea which is at the heart of the
organization. Its control of conduct flows from the necessity of maintaining the integrity of those patterns of action to which the system
must adhere, if it is to maintain itself and be vigorous. International
administrative law is, accordingly, more than an individual necessity
in the functioning of the secretariat as a system of authority. It is an
Ultimately, the rules of international
organizational necessity ....
administrative law represent a compromise between the values of the
organization and the values of the individual participant in the dayto-day functioning of the secretariat. The organizational values of
flexibility and discretion in the exercise of authority often clash with
individual values of stability and security.
International administrative law discharges its functions when it
harmonizes these conflicting values upon a viable basis, assuring to
the administration a reasonable degree of authority and flexibility for
the accomplishment of administrative goals and to individuals a reasonable degree of protection against abuse of authority ....

II. THE SOURCES OF LAW
The sources of the relationship between international organizations
and their staff are to be found primarily in legal instruments constituting
or emanating from international organizations: international administrative law is primarily a law made by and for international organizations.

2. C.W. JENKS, THE PROPER LAW OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 128-29 (1962).
3. Carlston, InternationalAdministrative Law: A Venture in Legal Theory, J. PuB. L.
334, 337 (1959).

1983

THE USE OF DISCRETIONARY AUTHORITY

Its first decision, de Merode v. The World Bank,' gave the WBAT
the opportunity to survey the sources of the legal relationship between
the World Bank and its staff. It found as possible sources of such relationship contractual documents (letters offering and accepting appointment), 5 provisions in the constituent instruments of the organizations,'
and staff regulations or, in their absence, instruments such as manuals,
circulars, notes or statements that include undertakings which form part
of the conditions of employment of international organizations' staffs.7
The WBAT also stated that, in certain circumstances, the organization's regular practice may become part of the conditions of employment,8

and further:
[O]bviously, the organization would be discouraged from taking measures favorable to its employees on an ad hoc basis if each time it did
so it had to take the risk of initiating a practice which might become
legally binding upon it. The integration of practice into the conditions
of employment must therefore be limited to that of which there is
evidence that it is followed by the organization in the conviction that
it reflects a legal obligation, as was recognized by the International
Court of Justice in its Advisory Opinion on Judgments of the Administrative Tribunal of the ILO.'
The WBAT also found that "[tihe specific circumstances of each case
may also have some bearing on the legal relationship between the Bank

and the individual member of the staff, particularly the actual conditions
in which the appointment has been made.'"
The International Court of Justice had stated in its 1956 Advisory
Opinion that "it is necessary to consider these contracts not only by reference to their letter but also in relation to the actual conditions in which
they are entered into and the place which they occupy in the Organiza-

tion."1 The UNAT acknowledged the above-mentioned opinion, and de4. World Bank Administrative Tribunal (hereinafter cited as WBAT or World Bank
Admin. Trib.) Decision No. 1, World Bank Admin. Trib. Rep. (1981), Decisions 1-4, at 1.
5. Id. at 9, para. 17.
6. Id. at 9-10, paras. 18-19.
7. Id. at 11, para. 22. See Haghou v. International Centre for Advanced Technical and
Vocational Training, Judgements I.L.O. Admin. Trib. No. 421 (Dec. 11, 1980), for the impact of an information. See Powell v. Secretary-General, Judgements U.N. Admin. Trib. No.
237 (Feb. 13, 1979), for the impact of a circulaire. See Smargiassi-Steinman v. Food and
Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, Judgements I.L.O. Admin. Trib. No. 319
(Nov. 21, 1977), for the notion of an "informative" v. a "normative" text. See De Bonel v.
Secretary-General, Judgements U.N. Admin. Trib. No. 145 (Apr. 18, 1971), for the notion of
"aiqe-m~moire." See also, Advisory Opinion on Application for Review of Judgement No.
273 of the United Nations Administrative Tribunal, 1982 I.C.J. 359, at 518 (Schwebel, S.,
dissenting, with regard to the status of personnel action forms).
8. de Merode v. The World Bank, WBAT Decision No. 1, World Bank Admin. Trib.
Rep. 12, para. 23.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 12, para. 24.
11. Judgements of the Administrative Tribunal of the International Labor Organisation
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clared that "[t]he terms and conditions of employment of a staff member
of the United Nations may be expressed or implied and may be gathered
from correspondence and surrounding facts and circumstances."12 The
WBAT confirmed further that "certain general principles of law, the applicability of which has in fact been acknowledged by the Bank in its
written and oral pleadings,"' s formed another source of the rights and
duties of staff.
It may appear necessary, however, to make some reservation with regard to the application of principles of law. While Alain Plantey", lists
general principles of law as a source of international administrative law,
he confirms that such principles do not prevail over a clear and written
provision, citing Lacher5 as support. One may conclude, following
Plantey, that if general principles of law are a source of international administrative law, they essentially serve as a guide to the interpretation or
application of express provisions, possibly completing them where they
are not fully developed.16 Thus, it may be that, in the words of
Akehurst,17 "[T]he relevance of traditional international law [in determining legal relations between organizations and their staffs] is startlingly
limited."' 8
The WBAT has treated with caution the question of whether the
conditions of employment of staff include the rights and duties defined in
relation to other international organizations by other administrative
tribunals, i.e., whether there exists a corpus juris shared by all international officials. It should be recalled that, in Chadsey,9 in Irani0 and in
Teixeira,"' the respective administrative tribunals spoke of "general prin-

upon complaints made against the U.N.E.S.C.O., 1956 I.C.J. 76, (Advisory Opinion of Oct.
23, 1956), cited in de Merode, WBAT Decision No. 1, World Bank Admin. Trib. Rep. 12,
para. 23.
12. Bhattacharyya v. Secretary-General, Judgements U.N. Admin. Trib. No. 142 (Apr.
14, 1971), and Sikand v. Secretary-General, Judgements U.N. Admin. Trib. No. 95 (Sept. 29,

1965).
13. de Merode, WBAT Decision No. 1, World Bank Admin. Trib. Rep. 12, para. 25. See
also Zihler v. European Organization for Nuclear Research, Judgements I.L.O. Admin. Trib.
No. 435 (Dec. 11, 1980), and Angelopoulos, O.E.C.D. Appeals Comm. Decision No. 71 (Apr.
6, 1979).
14. A. PLANTEY, THE INTERNATIONAL CIVIL SERVICE, an updated English version of

(1977).
15. Lather, O.E.C.D. Appals Comm. Decsio;o qn53 (May 2. 1975).

DROIT ETrPRATIQUE DE LA FONCTION PUBLIQUE INTERNATIONALE

16. A.

PLANTEY, DROIT ET PRATIQUE DE LA FONCTION PUBLIQUE INTERNATIONALE
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(1977); see Bastid, Les Tribunaux Administratifs Internationauxet Leur Jurisprudence,in
92 II RECUEIL DES Couss 369 (1957); Wolf, Le Tribunal Administratifde l'O.I.T., in ETUDES
Er DOCUMENTS DU CONSEIL D'ETAT 33, 56 (1969).
17. M.B. AKEHURST, THE LAW GOVERNING EMPLOYMENT IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS (1967).
18. Id. at 98.
19. Chadsey v. Universal Postal Union, Judgements I.L.O. Admin. Trib. No. 122 (Oct.
15, 1968).
20. Irani v. Secretary-General, Judgements U.N. Admin. Trib. No. 150 (Oct. 6, 1971).
21. Teixeira v. Secretary-General, Judgements U.N. Admin. Trib. No. 230 (Oct. 14,
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ciples of international civil service law." In Irani,"' the UNAT spoke also
of a "body of rules applicable to the international civil service."" As part
of Application for Review of Judgment No. 158 of the United Nations
Administrative Tribunal,2 4 Judge Ammoun, in a dissenting opinion,
spoke of a "common administrative law" in the course of formation and
"tending towards unity and becoming universal.""
The WBAT, while reaffirming its character as an international tribunal2 s and thereby reaffirming the dictum and implied pronouncements of
the International Court of Justice in its 195627 and 197328 opinions, considered that it was its task "to decide internal disputes between the Bank
and its staff within the organized legal system of the World Bank, and
that it must apply the internal law of the Bank as the law governing the
conditions of employment."2"
The WBAT stated further:
[T]he Tribunal does not overlook the fact that each international organization has its own constituent instrument; its own membership;
its own institutional structure; its own functions; its own measure of
legal personality; its own personnel policy; and that the differences
between one organization and another are so obvious that the notion
of a common law of international organization must be subject to numerous and sometimes significant qualifications. But the fact that
these differences exist does not exclude the possibility that similar
conditions may affect the solution of comparable problems. While the
various international administrative tribunals do not consider themselves bound by each other's decisions and have worked out a sometimes divergent jurisprudence adapted to each organization, it is
equally true that on certain points the solutions reached are not significantly different. It even happens that the judgments of one tribunal may refer to the jurisprudence of another. Some of these judgments even go so far as to speak of general principles of international
civil service law or of a body of rules applicable to the international
civil service. Whether these similar features amount to a true corpus
juris is not a matter on which it is necessary for the Tribunal to express a view. The Tribunal is free to take note of solutions worked out
in sufficiently comparable conditions by other administrative tribunals, particulary those of the United Nations family. In this way the
Tribunal may take account both of the diversity of international orga-

1977).
22. Note 20 supra.
23. Id.
24. Application for Review of Judgement No. 158 of the United Nations Administrative
Tribunal, 1973 I.C.J. 249 (Advisory Opinion of July 12, 1973).
25. Id. See also Fernandez-Lopez v. Secretary-General, Judgements U.N. Admin. Trib.
No. 254 (Apr. 23, 1980).
26. de Merode, WBAT Decision No. 1, World Bank Admin. Trib. Rep. 12, para. 27.
27. 1956 I.C.J. at 97.
28. 1973 I.C.J. at 212.

29. de Merode, WBAT Decision No. 1, World Bank Admin. Trib. Rep. 12, para. 27.
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nizations and the special character of the Bank without neglecting the
30
tendency towards a certain rapprochement.

III. DISCRETIONARY AUTHORITY
Discretionary authority is a term often used but seldom defined in
the context of the relations between international organizations and their
staffs. The discretionary authority of an international organization may
be stated plainly to mean its freedom to act.8 As Akehurst points out,
the use of the expressions "discretionary powers" or "discretionary authority" and the resulting definitions thereof are in fact, however, oversimplifications.3 2 He states:
[T]he Administration may well be bound to do a particular act,
but be free to choose the time or method; conversely, it may be free to
act or not to act, but be obliged to follow a certain procedure if it does

decide to act. It is therefore more accurate to speak, not of discretionary powers, but of discretionary elements in the exercise of powers."3

The holding in de Merode ' allowed the WBAT to state its views
comprehensively in regard to such discretionary "elements" in the exercise of the organization's powers while reflecting on the staff's conditions
of employment. The WBAT stated that "[clertain elements [in their conditions of employment] are fundamental and essential in the balance of
rights and duties of the staff member; they are not open to any change
without the consent of the staff member affected. Others are less fundamental and less essential in this balance."3 These elements may be unilaterally changed in the exercise of the organizations' powers, subject to
limits and conditions, but. even so, "discretionary power is not absolute
power." 36
The organizations' power to amend nonessential terms may be exercised subject to certain limitations:
[F]irst, no retroactive effect may be given to any amendments

adopted by the Bank. The Bank cannot deprive staff members of accrued rights for services already rendered. This well-established principle has been applied in many judgments of other international administrative tribunals. The principle of non-retroactivity is not the
30. Id. at 13, para. 28; See Zihler, Judgements I.L.O. Admin. Trib. 435, and Angelopoulous, O.E.C.D. Appeals Comm. Decision No. 71.
31. See de Merode, WBAT Decision No. 1, World Bank Admin. Trib. Rep. at 14, para.
30; Hoefnagels v. World Health Organization, I.L.O. Admin. Trib. No. 25 (July 12, 1957);
Plissard v. I.L.O., Judgements I.L.O. Admin. Trib. No. 12 (Sept. 3, 1954); Mauch v. Secretary-General, Judgements U.N. Admin. Trib. No. 54 (June 2, 1954).
32. M.B. AKEHURST, supra note 17, at 115.
33. Id.
34. de Merode, WBAT Decision No. 1, World Bank Admin Trib. Rep. 12 at 19.
35. Id. para 42.
36. Id.
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only limitation upon the power to amend the non-fundamental elements of the conditions of employment. The Bank would abuse its
discretion if it were to adopt such changes for reasons alien to the
proper functioning of the organization and to its duty to ensure that it
has a staff possessing "the highest standards of efficiency and of technical competence." Changes must be based on a proper consideration
of relevant facts. They must be reasonably related to the objective
which they are intended to achieve. They must be made in good faith
and must not be prompted by improper motives. They must not discriminate in an unjustifiable manner between individuals or groups
within the staff. Amendments must be made in a reasonable manner
seeking to avoid excessive and unnecessary harm to the staff. In this
respect, the care with which a reform has been studied and the condito a change are to be taken into account by the
tions attached
37
Tribunal.
What is an essential right is difficult to establish. As the WBAT
stated in de Merode:38
The Tribunal recognizes that it is not possible to describe in abstract terms the line between essential and non-essential elements any
more than it is in abstract terms possible to discern what is reasonable
and unreasonable, fair and unfair, equitable and inequitable. Each
distinction turns upon the circumstances of the particular case, and
ultimately upon the possibility of recourse to impartial determination.
However, this difficulty has not prevented distinctions of this kind
from playing a central role in the application of the law generally and
the Tribunal sees no reason for rejecting the relevance of such a distinction in the internal law of the Bank. Sometimes it will be the principle itself of a condition of employment which possesses an essential
and fundamental character while its implementation will possess a
less fundamental and less essential character. In other cases, one or
another element in the legal status of a staff member will belong entirely-both principle and implementation-to one or another of
these categories. In some cases the distinction will rest upon a quantitative criterion; in others, it will rest on qualitative considerations.
Sometimes it is the inclusion of a specific and well-defined undertaking in the letters of appointment and acceptance that may endow such
an undertaking with the quality of being essential.39
Also, with regard to non-essential rights, WBAT stated in de Merode"0 that "the Tribunal must satisfy itself in each case that the Bank's
power to change the non-fundamental elements in the conditions of employment of its employees has not been exercised either retroactively or
in an arbitrary or otherwise improper manner. 41

37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

Id. paras. 46-47.
Id. para. 43.
Id.

Id.
Id. para. 48.
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Paying due respect to the reservation expressed above, what is and is
not within the discretionary authority of an international organization in
its relations with its staff is a matter in which a review of the case law of
international administrative tribunals may give some guidance. Also, if a
matter is within the discretionary authority of an international organization, a review of the case law of international administrative tribunals
may clarify what should be considered "arbitrary," "abusive" or "improper" uses of such authority.
The wide range of executive discretion may be divided into a number
of general areas when studying the case law of international administrative tribunals. A first area concerns the determination of professional
qualifications, often coupled with or accompanied by a decision to terminate, extend or review an appointment.
In Yanez,' 2 appellant contested the non-renewal of his fixed-term appointment with the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO).
Appellant requested, inter alia, the examination of his right to expect the
renewal of his contract, and the rescission of the contested decision which
he alleged constituted a disciplinary measure and was vitiated by procedural defects. The ICAO contended that the appellants' contract carried
no expectancy of renewal, such terms being clearly stated in Field Service
Staff Rule 2.3(c) to which complainant was subject; that there had been
no termination in that complainant's contract expired in accordance with
its terms; that the allegations of procedural defects were unfounded in
view of the fact that appellant suffered no damage from the first confidential report; and that the provisions on which appellant relied were irrelevant. The Tribunal dismissed the appeal.43 It affirmed that appellant
was subject to Field Service Staff Rule 2.3(c)" and declared that the decision not to renew a contract on its expiry. was within the Secretary-General's discretion.45 The Tribunal also rejected the other claims of complainant and, in particular, declined the complainant's request that it
examine the presumed or possible motives for the non-renewal of the contract by stating that, as it had decided in previous cases:
[T]he Tribunal cannot, in principle, undertake an examination of the
reasons or grounds for a decision not to renew a contract where the
administrative decision in question does not affect any right or legitimate expectation, as in the case of a staff member
whose appointment
4
ends simply because its period has expired. "
The Tribunal in Vanhove 4' held that "[the determination of stand-

42. Yanez v. International Civil Aviation Organization, Judgements U.N. Admin. Trib.
No. 112 (Oct. 25, 1967).
43. Id. at 276.
44. Id. at 274.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Vanhove v. Secretary-General, Judgements U.N. Admin. Trib. No. 14 (Jan. 26,
1952).
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ards of qualification is a matter of administration and not one for the
Tribunal."4 International administrative tribunals have been unequivocal
in upholding this principle. It was reaffirmed in Levinson,4" Mohan,"
Wang 1 and Brown." In Brown," UNAT held that "the Secretary-General is entitled to set standards for recruitment to permanent appointments as appear appropriate to him."" In Levinson" and Mohan," the
UNAT held to this principle despite the fact that the appellants' immediate supervisors considered them fully qualified for the posts they occupied. Their supervisor's assessment did not limit the right or responsibility of the Secretary-General to set standards, nor did it establish
improper motivation for the termination of the appointment as the responsibility was the Secretary-General's, not the immediate supervisor's.
The Tribunal held in Zimmet,87 that findings as to the quality of the
work of the appellant and his habits of industry and productivity were
matters "properly left to the sound discretion of the Secretary-General."
ILOAT confirmed the same principle in Sherif," stating that "the
professional values of which he was subject" were "neither within the jurisdiction nor the possibility of this Court.""
It was held in Waghorn" that "the Director-General had the right to
terminate the complainant's employment on the grounds of unsatisfactory services, the evaluation of such services falling within his discretionary powers, subject to review in the event of an abuse of power."6 In
Baracco2 the Tribunal upheld a termination of a probationary appointment on medical grounds as within the discretion of the organization."

48. Id. at 41.
49. Levinson v. Secretary-General, Judgements U.N. Admin. Trib. No. 43 (Dec. 11,
1953).
50. Mohan v. Secretary-General, Judgements U.N. Admin. Trib. No. 45 (Dec. 11, 1953).
51. Wang v. Secretary-General, Judgements U.N. Admin. Trib. No. 48 (Dec. 11, 1953).
52. Brown v. Secretary-General, Judgements U.N. Admin. Trib. No. 50 (Dec. 11, 1953).
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Levinson, Judgements U.N. Admin. Trib. No. 43 at 214.
56. Mohan, Judgements U.N. Admin. Trib. No. 45 at 223.
57. Zimmet v. Secretary-General, Judgements U.N. Admin. Trib. No. 52 (May 29,
1954).
58. Sherif v. I.L.O., Judgements I.L.O. Admin. Trib. No. 29 (July 13, 1957).
59. Id. See Campanella v. UNESCO, Judgements I.L.O. Admin. Trib. No. 34 (Sept. 23,
1958).
60. Waghorn v. I.L.O., Judgements I.L.O. Admin. Trib. No. 28 (July 12, 1957).
61. Id.
62. Baracco v. I.L.O., Judgements I.L.O. Admin. Trib. No. 192.
63. For termination of probationary appointment on grounds of unsatisfactory performance, see Wakley v. WHO, Judgements I.L.O. Admin. Trib. No. 53 (Oct. 6, 1961); Mange v.

WHO, Judgements I.L.O. Admin. Trib. No. 8 (May 16, 1960); Mclntire v. Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, Judgements I.L.O. Admin. Trib. No. 13 (Sept. 3,
1953). For discretionary authority with respect to an evaluation of performance in the process of deciding on the confirmation of a probationary appointment, see Buranavanichkit v.
The World Bank, WBAT Decision No. 7, World Bank Admin. Trib. Rep. (May 25, 1982).
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64
In Corredoira-Filippini,
the Tribunal threw out a complaint against
a decision not to renew a fixed-term appointment despite a recommendation to renew by the Appeals Committee, stating that "there was no reason for the Director-General, who has sole responsibility for the smooth
running of the Organization, not to exercise his authority" 5 in respect of
the non-renewal of Appellant's appointment. 6 In Chadsey 7 and Ballo,es
the Tribunal quashed decisions not to renew a contract, in one case because of the contract's illegal basis, and in the other, because of an incomplete assessment of appellant's performance. The Tribunal in Chadsey
restated its view, however, that such decision-making authority lay properly within the U.P.U.'s Management Committee's discretion.6 9

Roy"0 concerned a staff member of ICAO who held a permanent appointment and was discharged for misconduct. Appellant requested the
Tribunal to order implementation of the recommendations of the Advisory Joint Appeals Board and the rescission of the discharge decision.
This Board recommended that the appellant be granted the indemnity,
payable in case of termination of a permanent appointment by mutual
agreement between the Secretary-General and the staff member. The Tribunal rejected the appellant's first request, on the ground that it had no
competence over matters such as the payment of termination indemnities. The indemnities require certain actions that are within the discretionary powers of the Secretary-General, and therefore it could not give
binding force to the Board's recommendation. Furthermore, the Tribunal,
without deciding the merits of the case, ordered the case remanded on the
ground that respondent had not met the requirements of due process
prior to taking the decision to discharge the appellant. It ordered the correction of the procedural defect and awarded appellant compensation for
the loss caused by the procedural delay and costs.
A request for the rescission of the decision to dismiss appellant was

64. Corredoira-Filippini v. Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations,
Judgements I.L.O. Admin. Trib. No. 312 (June 6, 1977).

65. Id.
66. See Reitan v. International Labor Organization, Judgements I.L.O. Admin. Trib.
No. 316 (Nov. 21, 1977); Magassouba v. International Computing Center (WHO), Judgements I.L.O. Admin. Trib. No. 324 (Nov. 21, 1977).
67. Chadsey, Judgements I.L.O. Admin. Trib. No. 122.
68. Ballo v. United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization, Judgements I.L.O. Admin. Trib. No. 191 (May 15, 1972).
69. See Anciaux v. European Southern Observatory, Judgements U.N. Admin. Trib.
No. 266 (Apr. 12, 1976); De Sanctis v. Food and Agriculture Organization of the United
Nations, Judgements U.N. Admin. Trib. No. 251 (May 5, 1975); Stracey v. Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, Judgements U.N. Admin. Trib. No. 136 (May 6,
1974); Goyal v. United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization, Judgements U.N. Admin. Trib. No. 191 (May 15, 1972). For EEC cases, see Kergall v. E.E.C., II
E.E.C. COURT OF JUSTICE DECISIONS, 23-24 (1955-1956), and Mirossevitch v. E.E.C., II E.E.C.
COURT OF JUSTICE DECISIONS 387 (1955-1956).
70. Roy v. I.C.A.O., Judgements U.N. Admin. Trib. No. 123 (Oct. 31, 1968).
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rejected by the Tribunal in Reid71 on the ground that the Secretary-General enjoyed wide discretion under the Staff Regulations in respect of disciplinary matters, particularly in view of the fact that here the contested
decision was properly taken and did not suffer from lack of due process.
The appellant was a former security guard at the United Nations who
was separated from service following findings of misconduct. He appealed
the Secretary-General's rejection of the recommendations of the Joint
Disciplinary Committee and of the Joint Appeals Board, alleging that he
was wrongfully dismissed and claiming either reinstatement or compensation for damages. The Tribunal, however, rejected the complainant's
pleas on the above grounds. Additionally, it found that the SecretaryGeneral, in deciding not to accept the Committee's recommendations to
merely censure the complainant, "was acting within the scope of his authority, 7 2 inasmuch as such recommendations were merely advisory in
character. As to the recommendations of the Joint Appeals Board to treat
the separation as an agreed termination and to pay an enhanced termination indemnity to the appellant, the Tribunal held that such matters involved the exercise of discretion vested in the Secretary-General. As it
had decided in Roy, 7 3 the Tribunal also held here that "in the absence of

it has no competence to
legal obligations on the part of the Respondent,
7' 4
give binding force to such a recommendation. "
s
and Gausi (No. 1),7 the Tribunal recognized the discreIn Plissard&

tionary nature of the power of the Director-General to retain an official in
the service beyond normal retirement age. The facts were similar in both
cases: appellants had reached the normal retirement age and had appealed to the Tribunal to rescind the decisions of the Director-General
refusing an extension of their appointments. The Tribunal upheld the decision in the first case. 77 It found that the Staff Regulations conferred
unlimited discretionary powers on the Director-General to decide on exceptions to the general rule on retirement age. Furthermore, the Tribunal
found that the decision not to grant an extension had properly been
taken, and consequently, declared the Director-General's decision "final
and not subject in law to any rule which has not been observed. 7 8 In the
second case, however, the Tribunal reached the opposite conclusion on
71. Reid v. Secretary-General, Judgements U.N. Admin. Trib. No. 210 (Apr. 12, 1976).
72. Id. at 410.
73. Roy, Judgements U.N. Admin. Trib. No. 123.
74. Id. See also X, O.E.C.D. Appeals Comm. Decision No. 2 (Apr. 25, 1950): "Considerant qu'il n'appartient pas A la commission, juge de droit, de comparer la valeur professionnelle et les qualifications techniques des agents de l'Organisation, ainsi que leurs titres
respectifs a Atre affecths ou maintenus dans un service"; similar language is used in Bessoles,
O.E.C.D. Appeals Comm. Decision No. 30 (May 13, 1959), at 56; see Angelopoulous,
O.E.C.D. Appeals Comm. Decision No. 49 (Dec. 17, 1974), at 63.
75. Plissard, Judgements I.L.O. Admin. Trib. No. 12.
76. Gausi v. Int'l Centre for Advanced Technical and Vocational Training (Gausi No.
1), Judgements I.L.O. Adr'in. Trib. No. 223.
77. Plissard, Judgements I.L.O. Admin. Trib. No. 12.
78. Id.
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the latter point. 9 It found that the decision not to renew the complainant's appointment had no basis in substance, that the decision had not
properly been taken and that it was tainted. 80
1
Appellant in Molina"
complained of the non-confirmation of a permanent appointment. Concerning the discretionary power not to confirm,
ILOAT stated:

[Tihe Tribunal emphasizes again the exceptional character of the Director-General's discretion in refusing to confirm probationary service.
Perhaps the most important object of probation is to enable the Director-General to ascertain whether the probationer fits in with the
Organization; this is something that can never be completely ascertained from his record or from interviews. Yet the work of a group
may be ruined by incompatibility and the Director-General has to
bear the heavy burden of seeing that it is not.
In this case he has concluded in effect that there is sufficient evidence to show that the complainant was incompatible. If he had based
this solely upon the complainant's inability to achieve an harmonious
working relationship with the first-level supervisor, there is ample evidence to show that in this respect the complainant would not have
been exceptional. But there is other evidence of incompatibility. In a
case in which the Director-General has personally and after the exercise of great care concluded that there is sufficient evidence to show
that the complainant has 'not satisfactorily adjusted to WHO service'
it is virtually impossible for the Tribunal to intervene."2
Additional areas of executive discretion concerned the grading,
reclassification and regrouping of staff. The Tribunal in Cardena8s held
that a complaint relying in substance on an individual appreciation of the
relative merits of one official against another must fail, the Tribunal not
having jurisdiction in the absence of evidence showing that the complaint
was the subject of arbitrary or improper treatment amounting to an illegality under the regulations. The determination of the salary scale of the
International Telecommunications Union (I.T.U.) and the classification of
officials within those scales were deemed "matters falling within the sovereign authority"'" of the Plenipotentiary Conference, the Administrative
Council and the Secretary-General:
[I]n the absence of any evidence that a particular decision taken in
virtue of such authority was arbitrary or in bad faith, the Tribunal
c

,t ......
a
competent to scrutinize the cossifi-

cation of officials and thus to assume a hierarchical authority over the

79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
Admin.
84.

Gausi (No. 1), Judgements I.L.O. Admin. Trib. No. 223.
Id.
In re Molina, Judgements I.L.O. Admin. Trib. No. 440 (Dec. 11, 1980).
Id. at 9, 10.
Cardena v. International Telecommunications Union (I.T.U.), Judgements I.L.O.
Trib. No. 39 (Sept. 29, 1958).
Id.
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organization and its executive head."'
In Opinion Given by the Members of the Administrative Tribunal of
the International Labour Organisation on the Questions put to Them
Jointly in Accordance with the Decision of the Governing Body of the
International Labour Office Taken at its 205th Session,6 ILOAT stated
that "it would no doubt be an abuse of his discretion for the DirectorGeneral to direct a new survey merely for the purpose of getting rid of a
salary scale which he disliked. 8 7 But ILOAT found that "the DirectorGeneral, having acted properly within his discretion in accepting the recommendations of the ICSC, would not infringe the acquired rights of existing officials by imposing the new scales.""M
The WBAT in de Merode89 reviewed the World Bank management's
powers to change the existing tax reimbursement policy for those staff
members whose salaries are subject to national taxation (mostly U.S. staff
members). The WBAT confirmed that the Bank did not "have the power
unilaterally to abolish the tax reimbursement system or to repay a lesser
amount than the the taxes which each of the Applicants is required to
pay.. ." as this was deemed to be an essential element in the conditions
of employment.90 It did note, however, that the method of computation of
the tax reimbursement could be changed by the Bank at its discretion,
albeit that such discretion should not be abused. 91 The WBAT also decided that, while the World Bank is obliged to carry out periodic reviews
of salaries, taking into account various relevant factors, it "is under no
duty to adjust salaries automatically to increases in the cost of living [as
applicants had argued] and it retains a measure of discretion in this regard.""2 It then found that the World Bank did not fail to observe the
contracts of employment or terms of appointment of applicants by exer9
cising its discretion with regard to general salary increases.
Champoury," Coffinet," Ducret," Fath7 and Snape,"s in which the

85. Id.
86. I.L.O. Admin. Trib. Opinion (May 16, 1978).

87. Id.
88. Id. See Bernard and Coffino v. I.L.O., Judgements I.L.O. Admin. Trib. No. 380
(June 4, 1979); Hatt and Leuba v. I.L.O., Judgements I.L.O. Admin. Trib. No. 382 (June 4,
1979); See also Maupain, Une nouvelle dimension jurisprudentielledu droit de La fonction
publique dans la famille des Nations Unies, in R.G.D.I.P. 794 (1980).

89. de Merode, WBAT Decision No. 1, World Bank Admin. Trib. Rep. 12 at 40.
90. Id. at 40, para. 82.

91. Id. at 41, pares. 82-83. See also paras. 47 & 88.
92. Id. at 56, para. 112.

93. Id. at 57, para. 113.
94. Champoury v. Secretary-General, Judgements U.N. Admin. Trib. No. 76 (Aug. 17,
1959).
95. Coffinet v. Secretary-General, Judgements U.N. Admin. Trib. No. 77 (Aug. 17,

1959).
96. Ducret v. Secretar.-General, Judgements U.N. Admin. Trib. No. 78 (Aug. 17, 1959).
97. Fath v. Secretary-General, Judgements U.N. Admin. Trib. No. 79 (Aug. 17, 1959).
98. Snape v. Secretary-General, Judgements U.N. Admin. Trib. No. 80 (Aug. 17, 1959).
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U.N. Administrative Tribunal upheld claims by U.N. proofreaders at Geneva to be reclassified on the same basis as proofreaders in New York,
appear at first to represent an exception to the general principle that the
classification of staff is a matter within the discretion of the SecretaryGeneral. But it is an apparent exception only and can be explained by the
terms and confusion over the scope of the applicable General Assembly
decisions. Appellants in these cases were employed as proofreaders at the
P-1 level in the Geneva office of the United Nations and appealed the
Secretary-General's decision not to reclassify them. The Secretary-General had agreed with appellants and had submitted a budget to the U.N.
General Assembly, including funds specifically allocated to pay for the
upgrading of six positions in Geneva. The U.N. General Assembly struck
out such funds when approving the budget and the Secretary-General informed appellants that their request must be denied. Appellants went
before the U.N. Joint Appeals Board, which recommended that the Secretary-General upgrade the appellants pursuant to their request. The Secretary-General rejected such advice, saying he had to conform to the decision of the General Assembly. Before the Tribunal appellants argued that
equal pay for equal work mandated regrading, pointing to various staff
regulations adopted by the General Assembly.
Appellants also argued that, as the International Court of Justice had
held in the 1954 Effects of Awards of Compensation case,9' the power to
approve the budget does not mean that the General Assembly had the
power to avoid honoring obligations already incurred by the organization.
Instead, the power of the General Assembly must be limited by obligations under the Staff Regulations, promulgated by the General Assembly,
to adopt post-classification rules which call for equal pay for equal work.
The Secretary-General responded by arguing that equal pay did not require absolute equality and that the Tribunal was not competent to overrule the exercise by the General Assembly of its budgetary functions,
which constitute a legislative act under the U.N. Charter, and its functions to classify posts.
The Secretary-General further argued that the Tribunal was a judicial body of limited jurisdiction and would be exceeding its powers if it
ruled on the validity of an action of the General Assembly dealing with
the budget or the Staff Regulations.
The response to this by the Tribunal was stated as follows:
[T]he Tribunal notes that under its Statute it is competent to hear
and pass judgment upon applications alleging non-observance of the
Staff Regulations. The application alleges non-observance of Staff
Regulation 2.1. Consequently the Tribunal is competent to interpret
and apply Regulation 2.1. Under this Regulation, the General Assembly expressly reserved for itself, in respect to general principles affect99. Effects of Awards of Compensation made by the United Nations Administrative
Tribunal, 1954 I.C.J. Pleadings 242 (Advisory Opinion of July 13, 1954).
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ing classification, certain powers which, to the extent to which they
are exercised, limit the power of the Secretary-General. In interpreting this provision with reference to a particular decision, the Tribunal
must consider whether or not, in the case in question, the Assembly
exercised its power under Staff Regulation 2.1 and, consequently,
whether or not the Secretary-General's freedom of action was reduced
by such exercise. As in the case of the other provisions of the Staff
Regulations, the Tribunal, in applying this provision, is competent to
say whether Respondent's interpretation is legally valid.100
It then held that the General Assembly's action did not modify generally the application of the Staff Regulations on classification of posts
and that, the action still being in effect, the Secretary-General would be
required to comply with it. Since the Tribunal felt the Regulation required regrading in this case, it quashed the decision of the SecretaryGeneral refusing to regrade the appellants. The Tribunal indicated that
the Secretary-General had misinterpreted such Regulation and that
regrading would not be inconsistent with the actions of the General Assembly in rejecting a specific budget item, since that action did not in
itself change the underlying principle on post classification adopted by
the same General Assembly. The decision, in an awkward way, stresses
the authority which the Secretary-General might-must-exercise to
avoid arbitrariness.10 ' Walther,'0 2 Boyle,' 0 3 Joshi " Dadivas and Callanta,0 5 and Routier'0 6 have amply confirmed the principles of
nonreviewability of (re-)grading decisions, which are subject to review by
an international administrative tribunal only when flawed.
07
ILOAT held "that there can be non-acquired rights as
In Sharma1
regards the relative position of an official within the administrative hierarchy, nor any right to promotion, the latter being within the exclusive
authority of the official's supervisors.' 0 1

The discretionary authority of the organization in this field has been

100. Id.
101. Compare Pouros v. Food and Agriculture Organization, Judgements I.L.O. Admin.
Trib. No. 138 (Nov. 3, 1969), in which the non-exercise of a discretionary power by the
Director General of UNESCO was treated by the I.L.O. Administrative Tribunal as the consequence of an error of law and the challenged decision was quashed.
102. Walther v. United International Bureau for Protection of Industrial Property,
Judgements I.L.O. Admin. Trib. No. 106 (May 9, 1967).
103. Boyle v. I.T.U., Judgements I.L.O. Admin. Trib. No. 178 (May 3, 1971).
104. Joshi v. Universal Postal Union, Judgements I.L.O. Admin. Trib. No. 208 (May 14,
1973).
105. Dadivas and Collanta v. World Health Organization, Judgements I.L.O. Admin.
Trib. No. 153 (May 26, 1970).
106. Routier v. World Health Organization, Judgements I.L.O. Admin. Trib. No. 252
(May 5, 1975).
107. Sharma v. International Labour Organization, Judgements I.L.O. Admin. Trib. No.
30 (July 14, 1957).
108. Id.
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upheld in Lamadie'0 9 and Andary,110 in which the Tribunal reasserted
the primacy of the organization's discretionary powers as to promotion,
and added that the organization may amend its criteria for promotion
(e.g., by adding criteria) even if such action would "deprive any particular
category of officials of their benefits"'1' or even when such action is contrary to the recommendations of an advisory body, such as a Careers
Committee. " '
In Tranter (No. 1),3 ILOAT held that the comparative evaluation
of the services of two individuals on the occasion of a reduction of staff "is
a matter within the discretion of the organization. The Tranter (No. 1) 14
Judgment has been reaffirmed in Hermann,' 5 despite its quashing of a
UNESCO decision for failure to follow certain procedural requirements.
The right of an organization to regroup its forces to meet new situations
has also been recognized by the European Economic Community Court of
Justice in the Kergall decision 116 and in Aubert," 7 in which the Tribunal
held that "the organization has the right. . . to effect reduction of posts
. . .to abolish either individual posts or categories of posts and [to] substitute others more suitable for the carrying out of necessary duties in the
1 9
changed circumstances. "1' 8 Howrani'
expressed the same necessity to
preserve, in general, the organization's flexibility and adaptability in the
120
face of new demands.
A third area of executive discretion concerns what may be termed
matters of staff organization and personnel procedure. The Tribunal in
Hoefnagels212 held that the Director-General of WHO "enjoys discretionary powers in respect of the transfer of staff members to posts other than

109. Lamadie v. International Patent Institute, Judgements I.L.O. Admin. Trib. No.
262 (Oct. 27, 1975).
110. Andary v. International Patent Institute, Judgements I.L.O. Admin. Trib. No. 263
(Oct. 27, 1975).
111. Id.
112. Id. See also Brisson v. International Patent Institute, Judgements I.L.O. Admin.
Trib. No. 303 (June 6, 1977); Karkens v. International Patent Institute, Judgements I.L.O.
Admin. Trib. No. 304 (June 6, 1977); Ledrut and Biggio v. International Patent Institute,
Judgements I.L.O. Admin. Trib. No. 300 (June 6, 1977).
113. Tranter (No. 1), Judgements I.L.O. Admin. Trib. No. 14 (Sept. 3, 1954).
114. Id.
115. Hermann v. United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization,
dudgm
UUClTI.fLC.J..

Adl1.

T. .

..

1

.-

a.

17

10A

116. Goyal, Judgements U.N. Admin. Trib. No. 191. See also Borgeaux v. E.E.C., II
E.E.C. COURT OF JUSTiCE DECISIONS 457 (1955-1956).
117. Aubert v. Secretary-General, Judgements U.N. Admin. Trib. No. 2 (June 30, 1950).
118. Id. at 5. See also Chuinard v. European Organization for Nuclear Research, Judgements I.L.O. Admin. Trib. No. 139 (Nov. 3, 1969), and Glatz-Cavin v. United Nations Educational, Cultural, and Scientific Organization, Judgements I.L.O. Admin. Trib. No. 127
(Oct. 15, 1968).
119. Howrani v. Secretary-General, Judgements U.N. Admin. Trib. No. 4 (Aug. 25,
1951).
120. Id. at para. 47.
121. Hoefnagels, Judgements I.L.O. Admin. Trib. No. 25.
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those to which they are initially assigned. 12 ' Reynolds1 2 3 held that the
Director-General of the FAO may assign an official to any one of the duty
stations of the organization and that, while a refusal of the complainant
to comply with a decision to transfer her from Washington to Rome did
not constitute a voluntary resignation or provide grounds for her summary dismissal for serious misconduct, it did nonetheless constitute a
breach of her statutory obligations. It was then open to the organization
to initiate proceedings for the termination of her appointment. This principle was subsequently reaffirmed. 2 4
In Campanella12 5 the Tribunal held that it had no authority to supervise or to state the terms of a certificate containing any evaluation
whatsoever of the services of a person whose engagement had been terminated. Appellant contested, inter alia, UNESCO which set forth the manner in which the Director-General proposed to appraise the quality of appellant's past service with UNESCO. Appellant had been employed under
a fixed-term contract to serve in a mission to Guatemala, and had been
separated from the service following a request by Guatemalan officials to
terminate appellant's mission. The appraisal which the Director-General
would have given would have taken into account the unfavorable opinions
of these officials, to which appellant objected. The Tribunal dismissed the
complaint for failure to file in due time. The Tribunal observed, however,
that even had the complaint been receivable, it had "no authority to supervise or to state the terms of a certificate containing any evaluation
whatsoever of the services of the person concerned, this being a prerogative of the Director-General."I 2 6
The Tribunal held in Coutsis, 2 7 that it was not competent "to express views on the accuracy of the diagnosis or conclusions of the medical
profession.'" 28 Appellant had not been renewed in a fixed-term appointment on medical grounds. He had contracted dysentery during an assignment in Haiti, whereupon, following a number of medical examinations,
the Medical Director of the United Nations Health Services recommended that appellant not be re-employed in tropical areas. Appellant
alleged, inter alia, that the Secretary-General of the United Nations

122. Id.
123. Reynolds, Judgements I.L.O. Admin. Trib. No. 138.
124. See Bidali v. Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, Judgements I.L.O. Admin. Trib. No. 166 (Nov. 17, 1970); Frank v. International Labor Organization, Judgements I.L.O. Admin. Trib. No. 154 (May 26, 1970); Silow v. Food and Agriculture
Organization of the United Nations, Judgements I.L.O. Admin. Trib. No. 151 (May 26,
1970); Douwes v. Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, Judgements
I.L.O. Admin. Trib. No. 129 (Mar. 17, 1969); Tarrab v. International Labor Organization,
Judgements I.L.O. Admin. Trib. No. 132 (Mar. 17, 1969); Nowakowska v. World Meterological Organization, Judgements I.L.O. Admin. Trib. No. 115 (Oct. 18, 1967).
125. Campanella, Judgements I.L.O. Admin. Trib. No. 34.
126. Id.
127. Coutsis v. Secretary-General, Judgements U.N. Admin. Trib. No. 69 (Aug. 22,
1957).
128. Id. at 418.
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based his decision contrary to an opinion issued by appellant's private
physician. The Secretary-General asserted, inter alia, that his decision
could not be deemed to be arbitrary merely because he accepted the
Medical Director's recommendation, and refused a review of his decision
as being inconsistent with his authority, under Staff Regulation 4.6, to
establish and apply medical standards. The Tribunal found that the decision under review had been taken without prejudice or improper motivation, and refused to rescind the Secretary-General's decision. The Tribunal rejected appellant's claims and held, inter alia, that, in view of the
absence of any express provision for a reference in cases of conflict of
medical opinions, it must be considered "the normal course for the Secretary-General under Staff Regulation 4.6 to follow the Medical Director's
recommendations as to which staff members should be deemed fit for appointment."1 " The Tribunal concluded that it "cannot proceed to a review on medical grounds of the Secretary-General's decision based upon
the Medical Director's recommendation merely because of the applicant's
contention that the Medical Director's findings were erroneous and conflicting with the opinions of other doctors."' 0
The Tribunal in Roux"' held that annual leave was subject to the
requirements of the service. Appellant, in this case, went on sick leave on
the strength of a medical certificate after his request for annual leave was
refused due to the requirements of the service. A complaint was filed after appellant's annual review. The Tribunal observed that the actions
taken by appellant's supervisor had not resulted in injury to appellant-in effect appellant's annual leave remained intact and an increment
was even granted. It held that the decision had been taken in accordance
with the Staff Regulations and, furthermore, that these actions were
within the discretionary power of the supervisor and did not constitute an
abuse of power as alleged by appellant. It held, finally, that the discretion
exercised by the supervisor was not subject to review by the Tribunal.
The appellant in Bang-Jensen1 3 2 filed a protest against the proceedings of the Joint Disciplinary Committee which had led to a recommendation for his dismissal. Appellant had been charged with grave misconduct
because of his behavior as a member of the Secretariat for the Special
Committee for Hungary, and, in particular, because of his failure to comply with instructions to return to the Secretariat confidential papers
which were in his possession. The Tribunal rejected the appellant's claim
of lack of due pro.... -ce.and fllalitv ript.ing, also, intp.r alia, the appellant's contention that inadequate security arrangements existed in the
UN for the safeguarding of confidential papers. The Tribunal held that a
statement by the Executive Assistant to the Secretary-General of the UN

129.
130.
131.
132.
1958).

Id.
Id.
Roux v. I.L.O., Judgements I.L.O. Admin. Trib. No. 36 (Sept. 29, 1958).
Bang-Jensen v. Secretary-General, Judgements U.N. Admin. Trib. No. 74 (Dec. 5,
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that adequate security arrangements and procedures for the preservation
of secret and confidential papers existed within the Secretariat of the UN
"must be taken as conclusive of the matter."
33
In the De PojidaefP
case the Tribunal held it inappropriate "to intervene in what are administrative matters as to the method and manner
of presentation of periodic reports," indicating that it "would at any time
be cautious about passing any comment which discouraged the development of the best possible annual reporting system."" 4 The Tribunal in
Roux " 5 held that an evaluation by a supervisor contained in an annual
report is made within the exercise of discretion and constituted only an
opinion prior to a decision by the Director-General. It held that there
could be no recourse to the Tribunal in relation to such an evaluation.

Failure to follow prescribed procedure may be grounds for judicial
relief, but whether a prescribed administrative procedure is appropriate
appears not (unless the procedure appears to be tainted) to be a matter
for consideration by international administrative tribunals. For example,
in the De Pojidaeff8 6 case the Tribunal stated that it was not part of its
functions to indicate views on alleged weaknesses in internal administrative procedures and that if a recommendation of the Appeals Board revealed weaknesses in the machinery of the Secretariat it was for the Secretary-General to deal with the matter. In Levinson,1 3 7 Bergh,'"
14 2
Mohan,13 9 White,"1 0 Carter,"1 and Carruthers,
the Tribunal rejected
allegations that there had been an absence of due process before a Selection Committee entrusted with the selection of members of the staff to be
offered permanent appointments; it noted that "the Committee was an
internal administrative body, established by and functioning in the way
approved by the Secretary-General in order to tender him advice"14 and
that "it is not for the Tribunal to express an opinion on internal administrative practices adopted by the Secretary-General."1 4 4 However, in

133. DePojidaeff v. Secretary-General, Judgements U.N. Admin. Trib. No. 17 (Dec. 16,
1952).
134. Id. at 64.
135. Roux, Judgements I.L.O. Admin. Trib. No. 36.
136. DePojidaeff, Judgements U.N. Admin. Trib. No. 17 at 63.
137. Levinson, Judgements U.N. Admin. Trib. No. 43.
138. Bergh v. Secretary-General, Judgements U.N. Admin. Trib. No. 44 (Dec. 11, 1953).
139. Mohan, Judgements U.N. Admin. Trib. No. 50.
140. White v. Secretary-General, Judgements U.N. Admin. Trib. No. 46 (Dec. 11, 1953).
141. Carter v. Secretary-General, Judgements U.N. Admin. Trib. No. 47 (Dec. 11,
1953).
142. Carruthers v. Secretary-General, Judgements U.N. Admin. Trib. No. 49 (Dec. 11,
1953).
143. Bergh, Judgements U.N. Admin. Trib. No. 44 at 210; Carruthers, Judgements U.N.
Admin. Trib. No. 49 at 242; Carter, Judgements U.N. Admin. Trib. No. 47 at 232; Levinson,
Judgements U.N. Admin. Trib. No. 43 at 213; Mohan, Judgements U.N. Admin. Trib. No.
50 at 223; White, Judgements U.N. Admin. Trib. No. 46 at 228.
144. Carruthers, U.N. Admin. Trib. No. 49 at 242.
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Newton,1 4 the Tribunal stated that it "is not precluded from making observations if it considers that legislative acts of the Organization appear
contrary to the general principle of nondiscrimination. . . and such observations can be
considered by the competent authorities as
14 6
recommendations."
IV.

INTERNATIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNALS AND ORGANIZATIONAL
DISCRETION

International administrative tribunals are-as are international organizations themselves-a relatively new phenomenon. The League of Nations first attempted to deal with staff grievances by granting officials
who had been appointed for five years or more a right to appeal their
dismissal to the Council.14 7 When confronted with the first appeal under
this system, however, the Council referred the case-Monod1 48-to

an ad

hoc Committee of Jurists for an advisory opinion which it undertook, in
advance, to accept.14" It was only on September 26, 1927 that the League

Assembly voted to set up an administrative tribunal 50 The Tribunal was
first established on a trial basis.1 51 The International Institute of Agriculture, predecessor of the FAO, set up an ad hoc administrative tribunal on
October 17, 1932 which apparently never rendered any decisions. 8 2 The
League Tribunal was established September 26, 192758 and from 1929 to
1946, it held eight sessions and pronounced judgment in thirty-seven
cases. The League of Nations, upon liquidating itself, transferred the tribunal in 1946, where it was reconstituted under the International Labour
Organisation (ILO).'" The reconstituted administrative tribunal exists to
this day as the International Labor Organisation Administrative Tribunal
(ILOAT) 155
Other international organizations may recognize the jurisdiction of
ILOAT, subject to approval by the Governing Body of the ILO. To date

145.
1979).
146.
147.
Sessions
POUR

Newton v. Secretary-General, Judgements U.N. Admin. Trib. No. 240 (May 15,

Id. at 8.
Assembly Resolution of December 17, 1920, Acts of the First Assembly, Plenary
663-64. See also P. GRUNEBAUM-BALLIN, DE L'UTILITRE D'UNE JURIDICTION SP9CIALE
LES R9GLEMENT DES LITIGES INT9RESSANT LES SERVICES DE LA S.D.H. coMPAPAE 67, 1921

REVUE DE DROrr INTERNATIONAL ET DE LAGISLATION.
148. Mono_ v. LeaTue of Natinns. League of Nations Case
149. LEAGUE OF NATIONS O.J. 1441-47 (1925).

No. 1 (1925).

150. LEAGUE OF NATIONS O.J. 751-56 (1928).
151. LEAGUE OF NATIONS O.J. Spec. Supp. No. 93, at 152 (1927).
152. See S. Bastid, note 1 supra; P. SIRAUD, LE TRIBUNAL ADMINISTRATIF

DE LA SOCIt*

(1942).
153. See Statute of the League of Nations Admin. Trib. (Sept. 26, 1927), reprinted in
H. AUFRICHT, GUIDE To LEAGUE OF NATIONS PUBLICATIONS 485 (1966).
154. LEAGUE OF NATIONS O.J. Spec. Supp. No. 194 at 281.
155. Minutes of the 29th Session of the International Labor Conference 341-43 (Oct.
1946); Minutes of the 30th Session of the International Labor Conference 413 (July 11,
1947).
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twenty organizations have done so: (in chronological order) World Health
Organization (WHO), United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), International Telecommunications Union
(ITU), World Meterological Organization (WMO), Food and Agricultural
Organization of the United Nations (FAO), European Council for Nuclear
Research (CERN), ICITO-GATT, IAEA, World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), EUROCONTROL, Universal Postal Union (UPU),
IIB, European Southern Observatory (ESO), CIPEC, EFTA, Inter-Parliamentary Union, European Molecular Biology Laboratory, World Tourism
Organization (WTO), CAFRAD and Central Office for International Railway Transport (OCTI). 1" ILOAT may, by virtue of article II of its Statute, be called upon to act as a panel of arbitrators for ILO originated
cases.1 5 7 It has also heard a claim by a WHO official in similar circumstances even though article II only speaks of arbitration clauses entered
into by the ILO. "
The Preparatory Commission of the United Nations recommended
the creation of an administrative tribunal in 1945. The United States and
the Soviet Union in particular, however, regarded its creation as pointless
and an unwarranted interference with the Secretary-General's control
over the Secretariat, and the establishment of the Tribunal was delayed
until November 24, 1949.159 The tribunal has jurisdiction over the UN,
including inter alia, UNRWA, UNICEF, UNIDO and UNDP, and over
two specialized agencies, ICAO and IMCO. It also hears disputes arising
out of the Regulations of the Joint Pension Fund from participants employed by international organizations participating in the Fund.'10
The Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OECD) set
up an Appeals Board in 1950, which evolved into the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Appeals Board. As in
the case of the NATO, Council of Europe and European Space Agency
Appeals Boards, it is, despite its name, a genuine administrative tribunal.
The European Economic Community (EEC) Court of Justice, through
Article 179 of the EEC Treaty and Article 152 of the Euratom treaty, and

156. See J. BALLALOUD,

LE TRIBUNAL ADMINISTRATIF DE L'ORGANISATION DU TRAVAIL ET

La Jurisprudence du Tribunal Administratif de
l'O.I.T., in M9LANGES COUZINET 449 (1974); Letourneur, Le Tribunal Administratif de
l'OrganisationInternationale du Travail, in I MALANGES WALINE 203 (1974); Wolf, Le Tribunal Administratif de l'O.I.T., in ETUDES ET DOCUMENTS DU CONSEIL D'ETAT 331 (1954);
Wolf, Le Tribunal Administratif de L'O.I.T., in R.G.D.I.P. 279 (1954).
SA JURISPRUDENCE (1967); Letourneur,

157. See Waghorn, Judgements I.L.O. Admin. Trib. No. 28.

158. See Rebeck v. I.L.O., Judgements I.L.O. Admin. Trib. No. 77 (May 11, 1964).
159. G.A. Res. 351 (IV), reprinted in D. DJONOVICH, 2 UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTIONS
329 (1973).
160. See H. WRIGGINS & E.A. BOCK, THE STATUS OF THE UNITED NATIONS SECRETARIAT:.
ROLE OF THE ADMINSTRATIV TRIBUNAL (1964); Bastid, Les Tribunaux Administratifs Internationaux et Leur Jurisprudence,92 RECUEIL DES CouRs 347 (1957); Bastid, Le Tribunal Administratif de Nations Unies, in ETUDES ET DOCUMENTS DU CONSEIL D'ETAT 15 (1969);
Friedman & Fatourous, The United Nations Administrative Tribunal, XI INT'L ORG.
(1957).
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through an interpretation of Article 43 of the ECSC treaty, has jurisdiction over disputes between the Communities and their officials.' 6" There
have been administrative tribunals at the Organization of American
States (OAS) since 1971, and at the Institute for the Unification of Private Law (Unidroit) since 1952. A Joint Appeals Board was created in
1956 at the Western European Union, and there exist appeals boards also
at the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration and the International Institute for the Management of Technology. (Disputes between the International Court of Justice and its staff are, according to its
Staff Regulations, settled in a manner to be decided by the Court.) The
Inter-American Development Bank recently created its own administrative tribunal.
The preoccupation of the drafters of the Statute of the League of
Nations Administrative Tribunal, predecessor of ILOAT, was to define
that Tribunal's jurisdiction in such terms that any interference with the
League's administrative discretionary authority would constitute a transgression of jurisdiction by that Tribunal. 62 The same approach had been
adopted at the time of the establishment of UNAT. Thus, when the General Assembly was considering the establishment of the UNAT at its 4th
session in 1949, the United States proposed an addition to article 2 of the
draft Statute:
Nothing in this Statute shall be construed in any way as a limitation
on the authority of the General Assembly or of the Secretary-General
acting on instructions of the General Assembly to alter at any time
the rules and regulations of the Organization including, but not limited to, the authority to reduce salaries, allowances and other benefits
to which staff members may have been entitled.163
This amendment was eventually withdrawn because, on the basis of
the debate it appeared that article 2(1) of the draft Statute was considered "broad enough to give sufficient scope to the General Assembly, and
to the Secretary-General acting on its behalf, to carry out the necessary
functions of the United Nations, in spite of the fact that such action
might require changes and reductions in the existing benefits granted to
the staff."' 64 This interpretation was reflected in the Fifth Committee's

161. Treaty of Rome, done Mar. 25, 1957, art. 179, 298 U.N.T.S. 11 (entered into force
.lan 1, 1958): Treaty Establishing the European Atomic Energy Community, done Mar. 25,

1957, art. 152, 298 U.N.T.S. 169 (entered into force Jan. 1, 1958); Treaty Instituting the
European Coal and Steel Community, done Apr. 18, 1951, art. 43, 261 U.N.T.S. 140 (entered
into force July 23, 1952).
162. See Statement for UNESCO in 1956 I.C.J. 77, 87-94; Art. 11(1) of the Statute of
the League of Nations Tribunal; LEAGUE OF NATIONS O.J. Spec. Supp. No. 58, at 250-57
(1927). See Application for Review of Judgement No. 273 of the United Nations Administrative Tribunal, 1982 I.C.J. 359-65, paras. 67-79; Wolf, Le Tribunal Administratif de
l'O.I.T., R.G.D.I.P., supra note 156, at 60-61.
163. A/C.5/L.4/Rev. 2, reprinted in G.A.O.R., 4th Sess., 5th Comm., Annexes, a.i. 44, at
165.

164. A/C. 54/S.R., para. 40.
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report to the Plenary Assembly as follows:
(b) That the tribunal would have to respect the authority of the
General Assembly to make such alterations and adjustments in the
staff regulations as circumstances might require. It was understood
that the tribunal would bear in mind the General Assembly's intent
not to allow the creation of any such acquired rights as would frustrate measures which the Assembly considered necessary. It was understood also that the Secretary-General would retain freedom to adjust per diem rates as a result, for example, of currency devaluations
or for other valid reasons. No objection was voiced in the Committee
to those interpretations, subject to the representative of Belgium expressing the view that the text of the statute would be authoritative
and that it would be for the tribunal to make its own
interpretations.168
This interpretation was declared equally valid and important by the
World Bank management when proposing the establishment of the
WBAT.
Despite being characterized as "international" tribunals by the International Court of Justice, administrative tribunals remain courts of limited jurisdiction." 6 The functional limitations placed upon ILOAT and
UNAT are further underscored by the fact that both organizations' statutes provide for a form of appeal, a mechanism for obtaining a binding
advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice. Indeed, article
XII of the ILOAT statute provides that:
1. In any case in which the Governing Body of the International
Labour Office or the Administrative Board of the Pensions Fund challenges a decision of the Tribunal confirming its jurisdiction, or considers that a decision of the Tribunal is vitiated by a fundamental fault
in the procedure followed, the question of the validity of the decision
given by the Tribunal shall be submitted by the Governing Body, for
an advisory opinion, to the International Court of Justice.
2. The opinion given by the Court shall be binding.
Additionally, the Annex to the Statute of the Administrative Tribunal of the International Labour Organisation, under Article XII states:
[I]n any case in which the Executive Board of an international
organization which has made the declaration specified in Article II,
paragraph 5, of the Statute of the Tribunal challenges a decision of
the Tribunal confirming its jurisdiction, or considers that a decision of
the Tribunal is vitiated by a fundamental fault in the procedure followed, the question of the validity of the decision given by the Tribu-

165. A/1127, pars 9, reproducedin G.A.O.R., 4th plenary sess.; Annexes, a.i., 44, at 16768. See Effects of Awards of Compensation made by the United Nations Administrative
Tribunal, 1954 I.C.J. Pleadings 242; see Bastid, Les Tribunaux Administratifs Internationaux et Leur Jurisprudence,supra note 160, at 460.
166. See 1973 I.C.J. 66 at 207-08; 1956 I.C.J. 77 at 90; 1954 I.C.J. 47 at 56.
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nal shall be submitted by the Executive Board concerned, for an advisory opinion to the International Court of Justice. 1 7
Article II of the UNAT statute provides:
1. If a Member State, the Secretary-General or the person in respect of whom a judgment has been rendered by the Tribunal (including any one who has succeeded to that person's rights on his death)
objects to the judgment on the ground that the Tribunal has exceeded
its jurisdiction or competence or that the Tribunal has failed to exercise jurisdiction vested in it, or has erred on a question of law relating
to the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, or has committed a fundamental error in procedure which has occasioned a failure
of justice, such Member State, the Secretary-General or the person
concerned may, within thirty days from the date of the judgment,
make a written application to the Committee established by paragraph 4 of this article asking the Committee to request an advisory
opinion of the International Court of Justice on the matter.
2. Within thirty days from the receipt of an application under
paragraph 1 of this article, the Committee shall decide whether or not
there is a substantial basis for the application. If the Committee decides that such a basis exists, it shall request an advisory opinion of
the Court, and the Secretary-General shall arrange to transmit to the
Court the views of the person referred to in paragraph 1.
3. If no application is made under paragraph 1 of this article, or if
a decision to request an advisory opinion has not been taken by the
Committee, within the periods prescribed in this article, the judgment
of the Tribunal shall become final. In any case in which a request has
been made for an advisory opinion, the Secretary-General shall either
give effect to the opinion of the Court or request the Tribunal to convene specially in order that it shall confirm its original judgment, or
give a new judgment, in conformity with the opinion of the Court. If
not requested to convene specially the Tribunal shall at its next session confirm its judgment or bring it into conformity with the opinion
of the Court.
4. For the purpose of this article, a Committee is established and
authorized under paragraph 2 of Article 96 of the Charter to request
advisory opinions of the Court. The Committee shall be composed of
the Member States the representatives of which have served on the
General Committee of the most recent regular session of the General
Assembly. The Committee shall meet at United Nations Headquarters
and shall establish its own rules.
5. In any case in which award of compensation has been made by
the Tribunal in favour of the person concerned and the Committee
has requested an advisory opinion under paragraph 2 of this article,
the Secretary-General, if satisfied that such person will otherwise be
handicapped in protecting his interests, shall within fifteen days of
the decision to request an advisory opinion make an advance payment
167. See B. DE VUvST, STATUTES AND RULES OF PRoczDuiz OF INTERNATIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNALS (2d. ed. 1981).
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to him of one-third of the total amount of compensation awarded by
the Tribunal less such termination benefits, if any, as have already
been paid. Such advance payment shall be made on condition that,
within thirty days of the action of the Tribunal under paragraph 3 of
this article, such person shall pay back to the United Nations the
money to which he is entitled in accordance with the opinion of the
Court.' 6
The control of the organization's discretionary authority by international administrative tribunals is therefore functionally limited. Such limitation results also from the nature of international organizations themselves. As Jenks stated:
[T]he problem of the relationship of executive discretion to judicial
control does not at the present stage of development of international
administrative law involve in any significant degree the protection of
the liberty of the subject against an all-powerful executive. It is not a
problem of creating effective bulwarks against the new despotism and
bureaucracy triumphant. Until such time as, and except in such cases
as, international organizations are entrusted with executive powers directly applicable to private persons and property, the problem is limited to their relations with persons who have entered the international
public service and assumed the obligations which membership of an
international public service implies.
One of these obligations is that of accepting executive authority
within its proper sphere. While it is proper and important that the
rights which accompany these obligations should be judicially safeguarded, it is no less important that the executive authority of the
administration in respect of matters which are essentially an executive
responsibility should remain unimpaired. 6 '
The UNAT in Howrani,1 70 while emphasizing the importance of procedural safeguards protecting the staff, expressed the essence of this matter thus:

[T]he United Nations Secretariat is a young organization which, since
its establishment, has been almost continuously confronted with new
problems and programmes demanding a high degree of flexibility and
adaptability in deploying its resources. There are no indications of
prospective change in its operating environment. In those circumstances, it is essential that broad powers be vested in the SecretaryGeneral to adapt the operations of the Secretariat to achieve the goals
of efficient and economic operation, and to meet the requirements imposed by the General Assembly with respect to the improvement of
the standards of the Secretariat. The only effective limitation upon
these powers in the present circumstances of the United Nations lies

168. Id.
169. C.W. JENKS, supra note 2, at 99. See also Letourneur, Le Tribunal Administratif
de l'OrganisationInternationale du Travail, supra note 156, at 208-09. See Dreyfus, Les
Limitations du Pouvoir Discretionaire,in REvuE D DRorr PUBLIC 691 (1974).
170. Howrani, Judgements U.N. Admin. Trib. No. 4.
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in the regulation of the manner of their exercise. It is also true that
the exercise of broad powers without adequate procedural safeguards
inevitably produces arbitrary limitation upon the exercise of any
power. The maintenance of the authority of the Secretary-General to
deal effectively and decisively with the work and operation of the Secretariat in conditions of flexibility and adaptability depends, in its exercise, in large measure upon the strict observance of procedural safeguards. In a very real sense, the mode must be the measure of the
power.' 71

International administrative tribunals have, since the Howrani decision, been acknowledging the limitations imposed upon their judicial review capabilities. The Tribunal in Reid 17 2 cited approvingly the report of
the Secretary-General to the General Assembly at its fourth session on
the establishment of the UN Administrative Tribunal17 3 quoting, inter
alia, that the Secretary-General's discretionary authority "could not be
effectively discharged if an independent Administrative Tribunal were
given authority to reconsider the facts in such cases, in the absence of any
reasonable allegation that the terms of an appointment had been violated,
and to reverse the decision of the Secretary-General. 117' The Tribunal
then went on asserting the general rule of recognizing the authority of the
Secretary-General as final, while at the same time asserting "its compe' 17 5
tence to review such decisions under certain conditions.
76
Likewise, in Cardena,'
a case concerning job regrading, the Tribunal considered "the sovereign authority of these legislative organs [the
Administrative Council and the Plenipotentiary Conference] and of the
Secretary-General' ' 7 7 and stated:

[I]n the absence of any evidence that a particular decision taken in
virtue of such authority was arbitrary or in bad faith, the Tribunal
cannot constitute itself as a body competent to scrutinize the classification of officials and thus to assume.
a hierarchical authority over the
178
organization and its executive head.
Nowakowska 79 concerned transfers and reassignments to another
post. The Tribunal stated that it "may not substitute its own judgment
for that of the Secretary-General in regard of work or conduct or qualifications of the persons concerned."' 80

171. Id. at 10.
172. Reid, Judgements U.N. Admin. Trib. No. 210.
173. Report of Secretary-General to the United Nations General Assembly 4th Plenary
Session, U.N. Doc. A/986.
174. Reid, Judgements U.N. Admin. Trib. No. 210 at 406-07.
175. Id. at 407.
176. Cardena, Judgements I.L.O. Admin. Trib. No. 39.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Nowakowska, Judgements I.L.O. Admin. Trib. No. 115.
180. Id.
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In Russell-Cobb'8 ' the Tribunal declared in an abolition-of-post case
that "it is for the Secretary-General, and not for the Tribunal to make
the choice."' 82 Likewise, in De Pojidaeff'8 the Tribunal indicated that it
was not part of its function to indicate views on alleged weaknesses in
internal administrative proceedings and that if a recommendation of the
Appeals Board showed up a weakness in the machinery of the Secretariat
it was for the Secretary-General to deal with the matter.1" The Tribunal
in Ba' 85 did nothing more than confirm a line of case law stating the principle of non-reviewability of discretionary decisions by expressing the
opinion that "by reason of its very nature [the decision taken at its discretion by the international authority] .

.

. is subject to only limited re-

view. ' 86 Additionally, in Lafuma'8 7 the Appeals Board stated emphatically that its function was "to apply the Statute [of the Appeals Board]
and not to amend it by interpreting it broadly."'8 8
Administrative tribunals are not to intervene in the exercise of the
organization's discretion in an affirmative, corrective way except under
certain conditions. Ba'"s illustrates a line of ILOAT Judgments which
give an almost identical definition of what triggers administrative tribunals to intervene. 19 International administrative tribunals will not interfere with decisions of a discretionary nature taken by international organizations unless the decisions were taken without authority, violate rules
of form or procedure, were based on an error of fact or of law, failed to
take essential facts into consideration, are tainted with abuse of authority, or if a clearly mistaken conclusion had been drawn from the facts.'"
181. Russell-Cobb v. Secretary-General, Judgements U.N. Admin. Trib. No. 55 (Dec.
14, 1954).
182. Id. at 280.
183. DePojidaeff, Judgements U.N. Admin. Trib. No. 17.
184. Id. at 63.
185. Ba v. World Health Organization, Judgements I.L.O. Admin. Trib. No. 268 (Apr.
12, 1976).
186. Id. See Carter, Judgements U.N. Admin. Trib. No. 46; Reid, Judgements U.N.
Admin. Trib. No. 210.
187. Lafuma v. Secretary-General, Council of Europe Appeals Board Decision No. 7.
(Oct. 13, 1972).

188. Id.
189. Ba, Judgements I.L.O. Admin. Trib. No. 268.
190. See Vyle v. Food and Agriculture Organization, Judgements I.L.O. Admin. Trib.
No. 462 (May 14, 1981); In re Molina, Judgements I.L.O. Admin. Trib. No. 440; In re
Rosescu, Judgements I.L.O. Admin. Trib. No. 431 (Dec. 11, 1980); Joshi, Judgements I.L.O.
Admin. Trib. No. 208; Frank, Judgements I.L.O. Admin. Trib. No. 154; Hermann, Judgements I.L.O. Admin. Trib. No. 133; Agarwala v. Food and Agriculture Organization, Judgements I.L.O. Admin. Trib. No. 121 (Oct. 15, 1968); Glatz-Cavin, Judgements I.L.O. Admin.
Trib. No. 127; Crapon de Caprona v. World Health Organization, Judgements I.L.O. Admin.
Trib. No. 112 (Oct. 18, 1967); Terrain v. World Health Organization, Judgements I.L.O.
Admin. Trib. No. 109 (May 19, 1967); Garcia, Judgements I.L.O. Admin. Trib. No. 32 (Sept.
23, 1958); Marsch v. I.L.O., Judgements I.L.O. Admin. Trib. No. 10 (Aug. 5, 1954); McIntire,
Judgements I.L.O. Admin. Trib. No. 13.
191. See also Reid, Judgements U.N. Admin. Trib. No. 210 at 407 ("Failure to accord
due process to the effected staff member before reaching a decision or disciplinary measures
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Invalidation of decisions taken in the exercise of a discretionary power
are, relatively speaking, not frequent, which may reflect on the standards
used by international administrative tribunals in this respect.
The Ba case was a termination action based on only one supervisor's
9
report which, it is suggested, was biased against Mrs. Ba. 02 In Ballo,"'
the Director-General of UNESCO refused to extend a contract against
the unanimous advice of Ballo's supervisors, because, during a congress,
he "had seen [Ballo] ... in action."'" In Glatz-Cavin,"9' the reasons for a
revocation of an assignment turned out not to be the genuine motivation
for the revocation, which was effectively caused through actions of a fellow staff member with the authorities of the country of assignment. The
Tribunal found in Gausi (No. 1) 196 that the refusal to review complainant's appointment beyond the normal retirement age was not based on
Mr. Gausi's physical or intellectual capacities-or the lack thereof-but
rather on certain, otherwise unproven, suspicions of irregularities."19 The
Tribunal rightly quashed the decision as a disciplinary measure in
disguise.
In Crawford'"8 the Tribunal stated that the motivation of the contested decision "must have consisted only of [the] knowledge that in 1935
[Crawford] had been, for just over a year, a member of the Communist
Party." 9 The Tribunal held thereupon that "a decision based on such
premises is a violation of an inalienable right of staff members and represents a misuse of power."2 00
Dicancro20' provides a more recent illustration of the problem on
which Crawford touched. Appellant had, in this case, rather actively run
an "election campaign" against the WHO-PAHO director accusing the

attracts the jurisdiction of the Tribunal."); Lindblad v. Secretary-General, Judgements U.N.
Admin. Trib. No. 183 (Apr. 23, 1974); Bhattacharyya, Judgements U.N. Admin. Trib. No.
142; Roy, Judgements U.N. Admin. Trib. No. 123; Yanez, Judgements U.N. Admin. Trib.
No. 112.
192. Ba, Judgements I.L.O. Admin. Trib. No. 268. Cf. the factual setting in Cooperman,
Judgements U.N. Admin. Trib. No. 93 (Sept. 23, 1965).
193. Ballo, Judgements I.L.O. Admin. Trib. No. 191.
194. Id.
195. Glatz-Cavin, Judgements I.L.O. Admin. Trib. No 127.
196. Gausi (No. 1), Judgements I.L.O. Admin. Trib. No. 223.

197. d.

198. Crawford v. Secretary-General, Judgements U.N. Admin. Trib. No. 18 (Aug. 21,
1953).

199. Id. at 69.
200. Id. For similar factual circumstances, see McIntire, Judgements I.L.O. Admin.
Trib. No. 13; Leff, Judgements I.L.O. Admin. Trib. No. 18 (Apr. 26, 1955); Duberg, Judgements I.L.O. Admin. Trib. No. 17 (Apr. 26, 1955); Wilcox, Judgements I.L.O. Admin. Trib.
No. 19 (Apr. 26, 1955); Bernstein, Judgements I.L.O. Admin. Trib. No. 21 (Oct. 29, 1955);
Pankey, Judgements I.L.O. Admin. Trib. No. 23 (Oct. 29, 1955); Van Gelder, Judgements
I.L.O. Admin. Trib. No. 24 (Oct. 29, 1955); Aubert, Judgements U.N. Admin. Trib. No. 2.
201. Dicancro v. World Health Organization, Judgements I.L.O. Admin. Trib. No. 427
(Dec. 11, 1980).
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latter, inter alia, of mismanagement. Unfortunately for Dr. Dicancro, the
PAGI director was reelected. When the time came up for the renewal of
appellant's appointment, appellant was accused by the director of misconduct, and his appointment was not renewed. Upon review, ILOAT
stated:
[Tihe first of them [the decisions taken by the director], the non-renewal, is a decision within the Director's discretion and subject therefore only to a limited power of review by the Tribunal. The reason for
it, given in the letter of 8 December, was that the position which he is
said to have taken 'precludes all possibility of the continuation of a
fruitful working relationship between yourself and the management.'
This reason, on the face of it conclusive, is attacked by the complainant on the ground that the decision resulted from personal prejudice
on the part of the Director or from incomplete consideration by him
of the facts. These grounds, which are taken from Staff Rule 130, fall
within the Tribunal's limited power of review and are such, if they are
established, as to authorize and require the Tribunal to quash the
main decision not to renew. 102
After a review of the facts, ILOAT concluded that the director had effectively disabled himself from making the decision on the renewal or, for
that matter, on appellant's alleged misconduct:
The tribunal concludes that he had so disabled himself. The reasonable inference to be drawn from his acts is that he strongly resented the fact that the complainant had stood against him in an election in which he, the Director, had only quite narrowly escaped
defeat. What was said after the election .

.

. is evidence that his re-

sentment was revealed at the time and noted. The charge of misconduct is so preposterous and the Director's eagerness, before hearing
the defence to the charge, to use it as a ground for dismissal is so
manifest that resentment is the only explanation. Accordingly the Tribunal cannot view the letter of 16 October as that of a man who would
be able to take a detached view of the conduct of the complainant
whether in relation to a disciplinary charge or to an assessment of his
future usefulness to the Organization. The two decisions in the letter
of 8 December are linked and are both defective as vitiated by
prejudice.208
Garcia204 concerned the refusal of an indeterminate appointment,
and the Tribunal declared the Director-General's right to make a decision
to grant or refuse such appointment "sovereign," ' professed that it
could not seek for or judge his reasons for doing so, but quashed the decision because of irregularities of procedure which tainted the otherwise
unreviewable decision and made intervention by the Tribunal necessary.

202.
203.
204.
205.

Id. at 7.
Id. at 12.
Garcia, Judgements I.L.O. Admin. Trib. No. 32 (Sept. 23, 1958).
Id.
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Gale20 6 dealt with erroneous conclusions that were drawn from the documents of the file, which made an intervention by the Tribunal necessary.
In Ferrechia0 7 the Tribunal took a stern look at the disciplinary sanctions handed out, finding an unacceptable unproportionality between the
faults committed and the disciplinary measures taken. 0 8
V.

EVIDENCE OF ABUSE OF DISCRETION

Jenks maintains that "improper motive clearly cannot be presumed"2 09 in international administrative decisions and, with this statement, seems to leave the burden of proof on the applicant. UNAT or
ILOAT judgments reviewed do not, however, always give a clear or express answer as to which party carries the burden of proving that a decision was or was not tainted, entitling an international administrative tribunal to interfere. As Akehurst has stated, there appear to be no strict
rules about onus before international administrative tribunals.

20

Still,

one may squarely put it that it is the plaintiff-staff member who has to
prove a decision to be tainted-or he or she has to furnish the Tribunal
with enough indications of taint to the decision to have the Tribunal reverse the burden of proof.
The Tribunal declared in Brisson"' that "the Director-General had
acted for any purpose but to serve the Institute's interests. 2 12 Likewise,
in Coutsis2" the Tribunal did not wish to proceed to a review of certain

medical grounds for the decision "merely because of the Applicant's contention that the Medical Director's findings were erroneous and conflict-

ing with the opinions of other doctors. ' '2 2 ' Similarly, in the Mauch (No.

case, the Tribunal held in response to a discrimination charge that
there was no evidence to establish improper motivation. The Tribunal in
Kaplan'" held that there was no proof of improper motive on which the
Appellant could rely against the organization. However, in Robinson'"
the Tribunal stated that "it will normally not be possible for the staff
member to produce positive evidence that the reason for the non-renewal
of his contract was his Staff Association activities' '2 8 and it expressly re1)21

206.
207.
208.
209.
210.

Gale v. Secretary-General, Judgements U.N. Admin. Trib. No. 89 (Oct. 9, 1963).
Ferrechio, Judgements I.L.O. Admin. Trib. Nos. 203, 207, 210.
But see Reid, Judgements U.N. Admin. Trib. No. 210.
C.W. JNs.
supra note 2, at 95.
M.B. AKEH RST, supra note 17, at 158.

211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.

Brisson, Judgements I.L.O. Admin. Trib. No. 303.
Id.
Coutsis, Judgements U.N. Admin. Trib. No. 69.
Id. at 418.
Mauch, Judgements U.N. Admin. Trib. No. 54.
Kaplan v. Secretary-General, Judgements U.N. Admin. Trib. No. 19 (Aug. 21,

1953).

217. Robinson v. Secretary-General, Judgements U.N. Admin. Trib. No. 15 (July 3,
1952).
218. Id. at 50.
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versed the burden of proof. As UNAT did in Robinson, so did ILOAT in
1
Mclntire.2
9 The case appears in a peculiar-McCarthy era-background.
The appellant in Mclntire could point to clear indications of misuse of
discretionary authority. Mr. McIntire had been promoted to Chief of Section nine days before his immediate dismissal for unsatisfactory services.
It was proven that the U.S. State Department had, in the interval, written a letter about Mr. McIntire to the organization. The institution refused, however, to disclose its contents, claiming it to be "confidential."
The Tribunal reacted, given the indications received and the refusal to
communicate the contents of the letter, by reversing the burden of proof
because too many indications of a taint to the decision had been brought
1 had the opportunity to clarify its inforward.2 20 The ILOAT in Sacika"2
vestigative powers under its Rules of Procedure. The applicant in this
case had requested the Tribunal to "order an investigation into the circumstances surrounding my employment with the ILO and those leading
up to my premature departure from the Organization. 222 ILOAT replied:
[U]nder Article II.1 the Tribunal is competent to hear complaints alleging non-observance of the terms of appointment of officials of the
International Labour Office, and of such provisions of the staff regulations as are applicable to the case; and if satisfied that the complaint
is well founded to award under Article VIII to the complainant compensation for the injury caused to him. For this purpose the Tribunal
may under Article III of its Rules order such measures of investigation
as it considers desirable. But it will not order an investigation merely
for the sake of ascertaining the facts; the investigation must be in aid
of some relief, such as reinstatement or compensation, which it is
within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to grant."21
Consequently, ILOAT denied Appellant's request.
The ILOAT clarified also, in its Judgment No. 440, Molina, some
aspects of its judgmental powers in regard of the production of documents by the international organization, the review thereof by the Tribunal and their communication to Applicant. In Molina," some time after
Applicant's contract was not extended, the Director-General ordered an
inquiry into staff-management relations in the ISP. The complainant
asked that his counsel should be given a copy of the report of the inquiry
and any decisions based thereon. The Organization objected on the
grounds that such evidence is immaterial."25 The Tribunal's decision
states as follows:

219. McIntire, Judgements I.L.O. Admin. Trib. No. 13.
220. See the facts in Al-Abed v. I.L.O., Judgements I.L.O. Admin. Trib. No. 195, and
see Gausi (No. 1), Judgements I.L.O. Admin. Trib. No. 223.
221. Sacika v. I.L.O., Judgements I.L.O. Admin. Trib. No. 436 (Dec. 11, 1980).
222. Id. at 6.
223. Id.
224. In re Molina, Judgements I.L.O. Admin. Trib. No. 440.
225. Id. at 5, 6.
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On April 2, 1980 ILOAT asked the ILO to supply the report on
the inquiry. The Tribunal examined the report, found it to be confidential, and on 25 April decided not to communicate it to the complainant, at least at that stage. The Tribunal now finally confirms its
decision for the following reasons.
The Tribunal finds that to a large extent and with regard to the
essential issues the report of the inquiry confirms the Obudsman's report which is included in the dossier and which levels serious charges
against the complainant's first-level supervisor. It is therefore unnecessary to add to the dossier the report on the inquiry, drawn up at a
later stage. In accordance with a general principle, the findings in reports of this nature should not be disclosed and, unless they are necessary to judicial redress, the Tribunal abstains from ordering the production of them. "
VI.

CONCLUSION

International administrative tribunals define the relationship in law
between international organizations and their staffs in respect of matters
properly referred to them. Having done so, the international administrative tribunals have fulfilled their task. They have no authority to deal
with the implementation of their decisions, which do not form part of
227
their judicial functions.
It is clear from the above review of the record of certain international
administrative tribunals' decisions that, due to the nature and functions
of international organizations, such organizations enjoy large discretionary powers with respect to treatment of their staffs, so as to enable them
to respond most flexibly to the changing needs of their functional setup
and the calls for action made upon the institutions by their constituent
powers. The international administrative judiciary, while not allowing the
use of discretionary authority for a devious purpose or in an unreasonable
fashion, is rightfully hesitant to actively substitute its decision-making for
that of the international organization. To paraphrase Justice Frankfurter,
it has instinctively and by training been admirably reluctant to cross the

line between adjudication and legislation.2 8

226. Id. at 7, 8.
227. See Artzet, Council of Europe Appeals Board Decision No. 10 (1973), which refers
to the Haya de la Torre Case (Colom. v. Peru), 1951 I.C.J. 834 (Judgment of June 13).
228. See Cardozo Lecture on Reflections on Reading Statutes, reprinted in THF SuPRiMi COUR. VIEws FROM THE INSIDE (A.F. Westin ed. 1961).

DEVELOPMENTS

The United Nations Environment
Programme
After a Decade: the Nairobi Session
of a Special Character, May 1981
I. INTRODUCTION
The spring of 1982 marked the tenth anniversary of what may have
been the most significant global event in environmental history: the
United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, held in Stockholm in June 1972. The passing of a decade was celebrated in May 1982
by another conference, titled Session of a Special Character. This session
was held in Nairobi, Kenya, headquarters for the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), the agency created by the U.N. in response
to the Stockholm Conference.
This Development looks briefly at the creation of UNEP, its purpose
and structure, and then focuses on the Nairobi Conference, its evaluation
of the past decade of UNEP activity, and prospects for the next decade.
II. STOCKHOLM: JUNE 1972
In the late sixties, during the awakening of the environmental movement, the United Nations responded to a Swedish delegate's suggestion
that an international environmental conference be held, and unanimously
adopted a 1968 resolution to that effect.' The immense organizational effort which preceded the Stockholm meeting was headed by Canadian
Maurice Strong, later the first Executive Director of UNEP.
The United Nations Conference on the Human Environment attracted 1,200 delegates representing 113 nations and more than 400 inter1. G.A. Res. 2398, 23 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 18) at 2, U.N. Doc. A/L.553/Add.1-4
(1968).
2. For a description of the overwhelming document preparation and coordination, both
before and during the Stockholm Conference, see Anglemyer, Getting Down to Earth: The
Call of Stockholm Upon the Information Services, in INFORMATION RsouRCEs IN THE ENvIRONMENT SCIENCES 115 (G.S. Bonn ed. 1973). A large number of preliminary meetings were
held to discuss and encourage attendance at Stockholm. See Leonard & Morell, Emergence
of Environmental Concern in Developing Countries: A Political Perspective, 17 STAN. J.
INT'L L. 281, 282 n.3 (1981).
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national agencies.8 Despite the widely divergent views of the parties, a
reasonable compromise emerged as the ultimate product: the 26-principle
Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment (Declaration), the 109-point Action Plan, and a resolution containing suggested institutional arrangements." The General Assembly formally created the United Nations Environment Programme by resolution
in December of the same year. 5

III.

UNEP: PURPOSE AND STRUCTURE

The general purpose of the agency is simply stated: "UNEP was created as a small coordinating body to lead and direct environmental initiatives at the international level and to coordinate and stimulate action,
serving as a catalyst rather than as an executing agency."' Structurally,
the agency consists of 58 nations which comprise the Governing Council.
The agency reports annually to the General Assembly through the Economic and Social Council, after the latter has added comments. Administration of UNEP is the responsibility of the Secretariat, and the Environment Fund constitutes the primary financial source for UNEP. This
financial system is unique among U.N. agencies, for voluntary contributions from UNEP member nations go directly to the Fund and not to the

3. Literature immediately preceding and succeeding the Conference was vast. Only
some of the sources are listed here: Joyner and Joyner, Global Eco-Management and International Organizations: the Stockholm Conference and Problems of Cooperation, 14 NAT.
RESOURCES J. 533 (1974); Knolman, What Happened at Stockholm, 28 INT'L J. 28 (1972);
McDougal & Schneider, The Protectionof the Environment and the World Public Order:
Some Recent Developments, 45 Miss. L.J. 1085 (1974); Sohn, The Stockholm Declaration
on the Human Environment, 14 HARv. INT'L L.J. 423 (1973); Note, The Stockholm Conference: A Synopsis and Analysis, 8 STAN. J. INT'L STUD. 31 (1972). The "unofficial" back-

ground resource book and early inspiration at Stockholm was B. WARD & R. DUsos, ONLY
ONE EARTH (1972). A non-legal description capturing the excitement and drama of the conference is W. ROWLAND, THE PLOT TO SAVE THE WORLD (1973). For a present-day description

of and brief look at the Stockholm Conference, see Stockholm Revisited, UNITERRA, No. 1,
at 2-12, 45-56 (1982). UNITERRA is a periodical published in four languages, several times
each year by the United Nations Environment Programme information service. For another
contemporary look back that is a brief portrayal of Non-governmental organization (NGO)
activity at Stockholm and the unofficial daily tabloid the NGO's published (The Stockholm
Conference Echo), see Brower, Did We Save the Earth?, 10 DEVELOPMENT FORUM, May
1980, at 1. DEVELOPMENT FORUM is a U.N. periodical in the field of economics and social

dPvP1nnment. It is published ten times a year and is supported by nineteen U.N. agencies,
including the Environment Programme.
4. Report of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment (Stockholm,
June 5-16 1972), 1 U.N. GAOR (21st plen. mtg. 0), U.N. Doc. A/Conf.48/14 (1972), reprinted in 11 I.L.M. 1416 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Report].
5. G.A. Res. 2997, 27 U.N. GAOR Supp. 30, U.N. Doc. A/8730 (1972), reprinted in
UNEP, COMPENDIUM OF LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY 1979 [hereinafter cited as COMPENDIUM].
The permanent headquarters of UNEP was established in Nairobi over the United States'

dissenting vote.
6. EVERYONE'S UNITED NATIONS 168, U.N. Sales No. E.79.I.5 (1979). This book and
UNEP, THE UNITED NATIONS ENVIRONMENT PROGRAMME, Na. 78/5921-5000 (1979) [hereinaf-

ter cited as Handbook] provide a layperson's introduction to UNEP.
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U.N. general budget.7
The Action Plan adopted at Stockholm set forth a three-part functional framework to carry out the goals and programs of the agency. The
framework consists of Environmental Assessment, Environmental Management, and Supporting Measures.' Advancing on the premise that
nothing can be done about global environmental problems without accurate, scientific data, the Environmental Assessment component has a
framework consisting of four activities: monitoring, research, information
exchange, and evaluation and review.9 The Earthwatch Program, discussed below, is the primary assessment tool. Environment Management
contemplates goal setting, international coordinating, consultations, and
practical use of data generated by Earthwatch.10 Supporting Measures includes such activities as education and training, organization, financing,
technical cooperation and public information."
Each program of UNEP, then, may involve or be organized around
the general, three-part functional framework described above.1 2 In the
Regional Seas Program,1 3 for example, organized to address common environmental policies surrounding a certain body of water, the framework
would function as follows: the Assessment component would provide data
and research relevant to the problems; the Management component
might provide coordination of member nations and perhaps technical assistance in formulating an agreement; and the Support function may provide some educational and financial assistance to address the problems of
14
the region in question.
The environmental problems debated at Stockholm were many and
of considerable magnitude. They were grouped into several subject mat-

7. The institutional and financial structure is set out in G.A. Res. 2997, supra note 5, at
43. Because almost every United Nations Agency makes decisions and takes actions which
may ultimately affect the environment, a fourth UNEP component, the Environment Coordination Board (ECB) was established by Section IV of Resolution 2997. The ECB was
assigned the task of ensuring environmental coordination, cooperation, and consultation
among the hundreds of U.N., intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations. The
ECB functions were later assumed by the Administrative Committee on Coordination
(ACC), the U.N. body which has overall, system-wide coordination responsibility. See Restructuring of the Economic and Social Sectors of the United Nations System, G.A. Res. 32/
197 Annex (9 January 1978), reprinted in 17 I.L.M. 235, 246 (1978).
8. Report, supra note 4, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 48/14, at 59.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 60.
11. Id. at 61.
12. Diagram adapted from Handbook, supra note 6, at 25, and COMPENDIUM, supra
note 5, at 13.
13. The Regional Seas Program is one of the most successful areas of UNEP activity.
See notes 50-53 infra, and accompanying text.
14. See also J. SCHNEIDER, WORLD PUBLIC ORDER OF THE ENVIRONMENT: TowARDs AN
INTERNATIONAL ECOLOGICAL LAW AND ORGANIZATION 76 (1979); Wakefield, Is UNEP Still a
Good Investment? 24 ENVIRONMENT, May 1982, at 6, 8; Note, The Challenge of International Environmental Management: A Critique of the United Nations Environment Programme, 18 VA. J. INT'L L. 269, 271 (1978).
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ters, which were reflected in the Action Plan recommendations."' Some of
these subjects were the Atmosphere, Marine Environment and Living
Marine Resources, Terrestrial Living Resources, Human Settlements, and
Energy.' UNEP Programs were created to address these areas.
IV. NAIROBI: MAY 1982
A.

The Participants

The 1982 Nairobi Session of a Special Character took place in a period of continued world turbulence: there existed worldwide economic recession, poverty which affected most of the global population, and few
positive signs for the global environment. Nonetheless, delegations from
105 governments, more than 35 intergovernmental organizations and U.N.
agencies and representatives of more than one hundred international and
other nongovernmental organizations (from the Sierra Club to the Ghana
Young Farmers) were represented.1 7 The tasks of the delegates fell into
three logical areas: to assess the state of the environment for the past
decade, to examine the accomplishments of UNEP and its failures during
the same period and to formulate an informal response for the future.'"
B. The Decade in Review: The Environment
Two of the most important documents forming the background of
the Nairobi Session were a book entitled The World Environment, 19721982's and the official UNEP report, based largely upon the book titled
The State of the World Environment.2 0 In reaching their conclusions,
15. For a listing of all these general categories, with their corresponding Stockholm
Declaration principles and Action Plan recommendation number, see Review of the Major
Achievements in the Implementation of the Action Plan for the Human Environment: Report of the Executive Director 9-44, U.N. Doc. UNEP/GC(SCC)/INF.1. (26 Jan. 1982) [hereinafter cited as Review of Major Achievements].
16. The remainder were Inland Waters, Natural Disasters, Bio-productive Systems,
Population, Human Health, and Industry and Trade. Id. The number of categories was increased since Stockholm to the present number, according to perceived needs.
17. For delegates' names, see List of Participants, U.N. Doc. UNEP/GC (SSC)/INF. 4
(1982); for a listing of nations and agencies, see Report of the Governing Council at its
Session of a Special Character 4-6, U.N. Doc. UNEP/GC(SSC)/4 (28 June 1982) [hereinafter
cited as Report of the Governing Council].
18. Re.port nf the Governing Council, id. at 6-7.
19. THE WORLD ENVIRONMENT, 1972-1982: A REPORT BY THE UNITED NATIONS ENVIRONMENr PROGRAMME (M. Holdgate, M. Kassas, & G. White, eds. 1982). For a summary of the
report, see Holdgate, Kassas & White, World Environmental Trends Between 1972 and
1982, 9 ENvTL. CONSERVATION, at 11 [hereinafter cited as Trends.] For a short book review,
see Miller, Immense Hope in the UNEP Report, a Canberra Times article, reprinted in
UNrrEEA No. 2, 1982, at 51.
20. The State of the World Environment 1972-1982: Report of the Executive Director,
U.N. Doc. UNEP/GC(SSC)/INF.2 (29 January 1982) [hereinafter cited as Report of the Executive]. For a list of official printed matter before the Governing Council in Nairobi, see
Documents Before the Governing Council at its Session of a Special Character, Report of
the Governing Council, supra note 17, at 61.
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evaluations

relied heavily

upon the UNEP

Earthwatch has three active components for assessment and monitoring. The first of these is the Global Environment Monitoring System
(GEMS); it represents an intensive effort to acquire data necessary for
intelligent environmental decisions.2 ' The International Register of Potentially Toxic Chemicals (IRPTC) has been started as the second part of
Earthwatch with data for over 300 chemicals collected and stored at the
Geneva Headquarters of IRPTC." Infoterra (the International Environmental Information Network) constitutes the third part of UNEP's assessment programme and facilitates the flow of environmental data
within and among nations. Although limited in personnel and financial
resources, Earthwatch received a positive evaluation from the delegates at
Nairobi."8
Based on data provided by Earthwatch and other sources, the assessment of the environment during the decade is rather grim. The official
UNEP document reporting on the environment is entitled The State of
the World Environment, 1972-1982: Report of the Executive Director."
It utilized a two-part analytic framework: (1) the natural environment
and (2) man and the environment. These two categories are summarized
below, each with the same subcategories (i.e. Atmosphere, Oceans,
Human Settlements, etc.) which were used in the Report of the Executive
before the Nairobi delegates.

21. Four major areas are monitored: 1) Health-related, such as air and water quality; 2)
Climate-related, such as CO,, glacier, long-range pollution transport, and acid rain monitoring; 3) Renewable natural resources, such as forest, soil and rangeland; and 4) Oceans, carried out mostly through the Regional Seas Programme. See Gwynne, The Global Environment Monitoring System (GEMS) of UNEP, 9 ENVTL. CONSERVATION, Spring 1982, at 35;
see also Note, supra note 14, at 272.
22. See Kucherenko & Huismans, The InternationalRegister of Potentially Toxic
Chemicals (IRPTC) of UNEP, 9 ENVTL. CONSERVATION, Spring 1982, at 59. While the need
to identify and warn about toxic chemicals was included in the Stockholm Action Plan, the
reality of the task may prove an impossible obstacle, considering the number of chemicals
marketed and the length of time required for complete data acquisition on each. Hall, Institutionalizing Chemical Contamination of the Environment, 5 MAZINGIRA, No. 5, 1981, at
28, presents a critical view of the American Environmental Protection Agency's attempt to
assemble a chemical data bank. Over 100,000 chemicals are manufactured, with perhaps a
thousand new ones formulated each year. MAZINGIRA is an "international journal for environment and development" supported by UNEP and published quarterly by Tycooly International Ltd., Dublin. See also In-depth Evaluation of the InternationalRegister of Potentially Toxic Chemicals, FP/1304-78-0, in UNEP: REPORT TO GOVERNMENTS No. 37, May
1982, and Programme Performance Report: List of Dangerous Chemical Substances and
Processes, U.N. Doc. EP/GC 10/5/Add.3 (23 Mar. 1982).
23. For the agency conclusions concerning Earthwatch, see Review of the Major
Achievements in the Implementation of the Stockholm Action Plan: Evaluation of the Implementation of the 1982 Goals, Addendum 3-6, U.N. Doc. UNEP/GC(SSC)/INF.1/Add.1
(13 Mar. 1982).
24. Report of the Executive, note 20 supra.
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1. The Natural Environment
A much greater concentration of sulphur oxides (SO x ) and acid rain
phenomena, with a slow but steady increase in carbon dioxides (CO.) has
occurred in the atmosphere.' 5 The oceans received substantial concentrations of pollutants from sewage, agricultural chemicals, oil and metals,
transmitted from both the rivers and the atmosphere.'s Pesticides and
polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) were found to be widely distributed in
marine life, but there was little evidence that marine productivity or fish
stocks had been reduced. Offshore oil and gas drilling, and coastal zone
.dredging and development have all increased.27 Overall, world fishing
yields actually rose during the period.
Access to fresh and adequate supplies of water was a major problem
for millions of people worldwide." In the developing countries, the proportion of the population with access to safe water supplies increased
only slightly and the relative proportion of those served by sewage and
sanitary facilities actually declined during the decade. Recurrent floods
and droughts stimulated some progress in structural and nonstructural
flood management, and some advances in augmentation of water supplies
took place. Inland water bodies continued to suffer overenrichment (eutrophication) from human sources, but many encouraging reversals in
pollution trends took place as a result of a variety of antidegradation
technology and discharge regulations. Unfortunately, the deleterious effects of acid rain to life in North American
and Scandinavian lakes con9
tinued to increase at an alarming rate.'
Progress was made in data accumulation and interpretation of the
lithosphere and in appreciation for the economic, social and political consequences of the uneven geographical distribution and production of mineral resources.8 0 Production of most nonmetallic and metallic ores increased slightly during the last ten years. Some advances were made in
counteracting the negative environmental and health effects of mining,
transportation and milling, and some progress was made in recycling mineral raw materials.' 1

25. Id. at 12-15; Symposium: Global Climatic Change, 10 DEN.J. Iw'L L. & POL'Y 463

(1981); Note, Carbon Dioxide's Threat to Global Climate: An InternationalSolution, 17
STAN. J. iNTL L. 389 (i982).
26. Report of the Executive, supra note 20, at 15-22. In addition to a narrative summary, this report contains many charts and graphs effectively portraying the environmental

trends of the decade.
27. Id. at 19.
28. Id. at 22. Groundwater, itsdepletion, contamination and important place in the
hydrologic cycle, is discussed in Tolba, The State of the World Environment: 1981, 11
ENv'T INDx 81, at 10 (1981).
29. Report of the Executive, supra note 20, at 23.

30. Id. at 24-28. The lithosphere refers to the earth's crust, its mineral content, movement, etc.
31. Id. at 26.
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The condition of the terrestrial biota was cause for serious concern,
especially the rapid rate of deforestation occurring in the tropical forests
(estimated at eleven million hectares per year) and the salient problem of
desertification-the annual, human-caused destruction of millions of formerly productive acres. 82 Temperate zone forests remained relatively stable and fertile, often the result of intensive management.
2. Man and the Environment
Concerning population, the estimated global figure passed 4.4 billion
in 1980; the report also recorded a slight increase in the rate of population growth.88 Life expectancy increased during the decade, but there remains a significant difference between developing countries (57.5 years)
and developed countries (71.9 years)." Despite the "moderation" in population growth, the rate of increase still outpaced health, sanitation and
public services in most developing nations. In the area of human settlements, urban migration continued to increase and a significant transformation also occurred: the number of cities having more than four million
people was greater in developing nations (twenty-two cities) than in developed regions (sixteen cities). 88 Previously, the opposite had been the
case.
Human health was also affected by the heightened environmental
awareness of the 1970's, but major diseases continued to kill and cripple
millions of children in developing countries." Onchocerciasis, schistosomiasis and smallpox showed downward trends, with the latter totally
eradicated by 1980. While environmental and economic factors contributed to the resurgence of several major diseases, an additional factor contributing to disease was increasing use of insecticide, which led to drug
resistance in insects and parasites. With regard to the bioproductive systems, a general increase in grain, meat, dairy and poultry production was
noted, but a grossly unequal distribution of food among nations accounted for nearly half a billion people being undernourished during the
decade. 87 Soil degradation, desertification and conversion of land to settlements and roads all added to intense competition for land, a trend
which will continue. Finally, concern was expressed for post-harvest agricultural losses, which reached from ten to over thirty percent of the crop
in developing nations."
Industrial growth decreased during the 1970's, largely due to eco-

32. Id. at 28-29.
33. Id. at 29-32.
34. Id. at 30. The disparity was largely attributed to variations in the infant mortality
rate.
35.
36.
37.
38.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

32-34.
35-37.
37-41.
38.
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nomic reasons."' There was also the growing recognition that economic
development and environmental considerations must be balanced, especially in the developing nations. Energy consumption patterns and awareness changed during the decade, largely influenced by the 1973 oil crisis. 0
Petroleum products were still the most widely used fuel, but new perceptions and assessments of non-renewable fossil fuel supplies were accompanied by increasing attention to renewable sources and simple conservation. Developing nations experienced yet another crisis in this decade: a
shortage of fuelwood, which is the source of 30 to 95 percent of the total
energy used on those nations.
In reaching its conclusion, The Report of the Executive Director
noted that the dominant feature of the world transport systems was the
continuing growth in the use of motor vehicles and the accompanying
high percentage of fuel consumption and pollution." The Report also
summarized developments in tourism and environmental education and
public awareness,' and finally, in peace, security and the environment,
the Report commented upon the extraordinary cost of the ceaseless preparation, waging and aftermath of war."
3.

General Conclusions

Although the environmental assessment was negative and humankind's proportionate influence on global environmental cycles has increased, scientists could find no substantial evidence that the system is in
danger of imminent collapse. 4 4 Short-term productivity of the biosphere
has not been seriously reduced, but an assessment of the long-term implications is far from clear. Three features of the decade are noted: 1) technological and organizational means exist to address problems in the developed nations, but implementation is needed; 2) the decade has
fostered a much greater understanding of the environmental systems, including the recognition that environmental and economic systems are inseparable; and 3) it is acknowledged that many of the great environmental developments have political roots.' 5 The Stockholm assumption that

39. Id. at 41-43.
40. Id. at 43-46.
41. Id. at 46-50.
42. Id". at W-53. The number of interetional tourists -ncrensed worldwde, butths
cial and environmental consequences were both negative and positive. Education and public
awareness of environmental issues increased greatly since Stockholm, in both developing
and developed nations. The challenge, of course, is to translate these gains into action.
43. Id. at 53-56. A graphic analysis of major arms exporters and importers is found in
this section.
44. See Trends, supra note 19, at 27.
45. Report of the Executive, supra note 20, at 65. One critical author comments that
UNEP "is limited to four politically innocuous activities: [data assessment, quiet diplomacy,
support services, and advisory management functions) ... and is primarily a reactive agency
with very limited powers of independent investigation .... T. RIORDAN, ENVtRONMENTALism 295 (1976).
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governments and international bodies are limited in their environmental
actions only by scientific and economic factors is now severely
challenged."
C. The Decade in Review: Activities of the United Nations Environment Programme
UNEP ran countless projects and cooperative ventures during the
past decade; a comprehensive review of each is beyond the scope of this
development. 47 Some of the highlights of UNEP successes were presented
to the participants at Nairobi in The Environment in 1982: Retrospect
and Prospect.4 A brief review of UNEP activities as they appeared in the
report is summarized in this section.
Addressing the problems of the atmosphere, UNEP cited its major
achievement as the approval in 1979 of a World Climate Programme to
be executed by the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) in cooperation with UNEP and several other agencies. Significant strides were also
made by WMO and the World Health Organization (WHO) in the areas
of pollution and air-quality monitoring
as part of the Global Environmen49
tal Monitoring System (GEMS). '

Some of the greatest UNEP accomplishments occurred in the oceans
area, implemented through the Regional Seas Programme.5 0 As of Janu-

46. During recent years, several major works, conferences and hearings have assessed
the state of the environment. Two influential authorities renewed the call for international

action to avoid global environmental crisis. See INDEPENDENT COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL
DEVELOPMENT ISSUES, NORTH-SOUTH: A PROGRAMME FOR SURVIVAL (1980) (a study chaired by
former West German Chancellor Willy Brandt); COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QuALrlT &
U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, THE GLOBAL 2000 REPORT TO THE PREsmEN ENTERING THE TwENTrFIRST CENTURY (1980) (a three-volume work produced for former President Jimmy Carter).

See also Council on Environmental Quality & Dep't of State, Global Future: Time to Act, 9
ENVTL. AFF. 261 (1980) (an edited version of a 250 page report to the President on global
resources, environment, and population).
47. For example, a sampling of meetings in 1982 included: Conference on the Human
Environment in the South Pacific, 8-11 Mar., Cook Islands; Government Expert Group on
Health-Related Monitoring, 8-12 Mar., Geneva; Sixth Meeting on the Intra-agency Working
Group on Desertification, 10-11 Mar., Rome; Symposium on Tropical Rain Forest Ecology
and Resource Management, 14-18 Apr., Leeds. A cross-section of some projects include: Fellowship Programme at the College of African Wildlife Management, Mweka, Tanzania; Integrated Water Supply Demonstration Project, Swaziland; Assistance to the Mongolian People's Republic in the Establishment of the Great Gobi National Park; and Feasibility of
Harnessing Renewable Sources of Energy in the Philippines.
48. The Environment in 1982 Retrospect and Prospect, U.N. Doc. UNEP/GC(SSC)/2
and Corr. 1 and Corr. 2 (29 Jan. 1982) [hereinafter cited as Retrospect]. All the textual
summaries by topic designation, e.g. atmosphere, are taken from this document at 7-18. For
a lengthier discussion of each topic, see Review of Major Achievements, note 15 supra.
49. Retrospect, supra note 48, at 7.
50. This UNEP activity involves the cooperative, multilateral formulation and implementation of an action plan defining the problems and then the protection, research and
management needed for the marine environment of a shared body of water. At present,
there are ten regions involving 120 coastal states: the Mediterranean Sea, the Red Sea, the
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ary, 1982, action plans had been developed for seven regional seas, with
three more in preparation. The Mediterranean Sea Programme is by far
the most successful to date. The states bordering the Mediterranean have
cooperated to an unprecedented degree in attempting to halt the huge
inflow of pollution from land-based sources. 1 Among other accomplishments, this Programme involves more than eighty laboratories from
fifteen coastal nations sharing data for baseline studies, pollution source
determination, and research." In the related topic area of water, the major U.N. Water Conference at Mar del Plata in 1977 resulted in an action
plan whose purpose is to enhance governmental water quality monitoring
and management." Recognizing that poor water quality is the source of
an exceptional number of human problems in developing countries,
UNEP helped to influence the General Assembly, by Resolution 35/18 of
10 Nov. 1980, to declare 1981-1990 as the Drinking Water Supply and
Sanitation Decade.
A large number of UNEP projects have addressed the terrestrial biota, including the Man and the Biosphere (MAB) Programme of the
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
(UNESCO)." Many of the projects have targeted the diminishing tropical
and rain forest biosystems. Another major achievement of the decade was
the 1980 publication of the World Conservation Strategy (WCS), which
was a collaborative effort of UNEP, the World Wildlife Fund (WWF), the
International Union for the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources (IUCN), the U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and
UNESCO. The WCS was a comprehensive statement of global conservation objectives integrated into a recommendation for sustained economic
development."
Several conferences addressed the perceived needs of the bioproductive systems, including those on World Food (1974), Agrarian Reform and
Rural Development (1979) and Desertification (1977)."' To understand
better the problems of population, UNEP participated in the World Population Conference in Bucharest (1974).5' The Agency has successfully ac-

Kuwait Region, the West and Central African Coast seas, the Caribbean, the East Asian
seas, the South East Pacific seas, the Southwest Pacific seas, the East African seas, and the
South West Atlantic. Five regional protocols have come into force and four more have been
signed and are in the process of ratification. Retrospect, supra note 48, at 8.
51. See Bliss-Guest, The Protocol Against Pollution from Land-Based Sources: A
Turning Point in the Rising Tide of Pollution, 17 STAN. J. INT'L L. 261 (1981); Bliss-Guest
& Keckes, The Regional Seas Programme of UNEP, 9 ENvTL. CONSERVATION, Spring 1982,
at 3; Wakefield, Is UNEP Still a Good Investment?, 24 ENV'T., May 1982, at 9.
52. J. SCHNEIDER, WORLD PUBLIC ORDER OF THE ENVIRONMENT 77 (1979).

53. Report of the United Nations Water Conference, U.N. Sales No. E.77.II.A.12
(1977).
54. Retrospect, supra note 48, at 9-10.
55. See Review of Major Achievements, supra note 15, at 22. For an extended discussion of the WCS, see World Conservation Strategy, 7 DEVELOPMENT FORUM, Mar. 1980, at 1.
56. Retrospect, supra note 48, at 10-11.
57. Retrospect, supra note 48, at 12.
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quired data on population characteristics and has assisted with the
promulagation of family planning programme assistance. The U.N. Conference on Human Settlements was held in Vancouver in 1976 and covered the issue of the improvement of living conditions in human habitations.5 8 Following the Conference, the U.N. Centre for Human
Settlements was established. The Centre absorbed relevant sections of
other U.N. bodies and carried on research, information dissemination,
training in building materials, waste disposal, energy and planned development, inter alia. The primary progress in the human health subject
area was the monitoring of air pollution, food contamination, water quality, and toxic chemicals through GEMS." A number of technical assistance and training activities were offered in these fields.
D.

The Session of a Special Character
1.

The Session of a Special Character,May 10-18

The Non-Government Organization (NGO) Symposium on Environment and the Future preceded the official UNEP activities.10 The Session
of a Special Character was held next, followed immediately by the regular
annual meeting of the UNEP Governing Council. The work of the Session
of a Special Character was published in Report of the Governing Council
at Its Session of a Special Character (SSC Report). 1 The SSC structure
was designed so that work would be accomplished by three bodies: the
Plenary, where general debate was heard from all delegations; the Committee of the Whole, which formulated the Action Plan; and the Working
Group, which prepared the draft Nairobi Declaration. The Plenary reassembled on the final day to act on the Action Plan, the Declaration and
resolutions."2
No U.N. meeting would be complete without political wrangling,6 3
and the SSC was no exception." However, there was little disagreement

58. Id. For a summary of the Conference, see Report of Habitat: United Nations Conference on Human Settlements, U.N. Sales No. E.76, IV 7 and Corriegendum (1976). For a
discussion of the U.N. Conferences on Water, Desertification, Science & Technology and
Human Settlements, see MAZINGIRA, No. 2, 1982 at 2-57.
59. Retrospect, supra note 48, at 12.
60. For a discussion of the NGO role in UNEP's activities, see Gallon, Assessing the
Impact, id. at 14. The NGO statement, A Message of Support for Life, with its bleak environmental assessment and strongly worded suggestions for action, is reported at The NGO
Statement: 'We Have a Duty to Hope,' UNTERRA No. 2, 1982, at 38. See also Scharlin,
Nairobi Remembers the Stockholm Conference, 67 SIERRA, Sept./Oct. 1982, at 26; and Introductory Report of the Executive Director: Relationships with Non-Governmental Organizations, U.N. Doc. UNEP/G.C.10/2/Add.4 (25 Jan. 1982.)
61. Report of the Governing Council at Its Session of a Special Character, U.N. Doc.
UNEP/GC(SSC)/4 (28 June 1982) [hereinafter cited as SSC Report].
62. Id. at 7.
63. Id. at 10-25, General Debate section.
64. The Soviets protested the presence of a Berlin official in the West German delegation, see letters exchanged, id. at 56. Argentina talked about introducing a resolution on the
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about the negative trend of the global environment, and that UNEP had
been reasonably effective given the extraordinary limitations in terms of
the time and money with which the agency had to work." While there
was considerable pressure from several developing nations to expand the
primary role of UNEP from that of catalyst to one of active implementer
and financier of country-specific projects, the SSC did not recommend
such a departure from the traditional role of the agency."
The delegates generally agreed that poverty and war formed the
greatest obstacle to improving environmental conditions. However, a significant change has taken place since Stockholm regarding the relative
positions taken by the developed and developing nations. At Stockholm,
the developed nations (including the United States) were strong advocates of reform and pollution abatement. But at Nairobi, these same nations were viewed as "reducing their commitment to [UNEP] ' 67and other
cooperative efforts to cope with the environmental problems.
In stark contrast was the position of the developing nations. At
Stockholm, these nations tended to view the call to end pollution as an
attempt on the part of industrial powers to curtail development. For example, Brazil's policy regarding pollution was to accept its adverse affects
as an incident of attracting industry. The Brazilian delegate at Stockholm
said that "his country had no interest whatever in the subject of pollution
control

. .

. [because it is] a rich man's problem.""a Prime Minister Indira

Falklands (Malvinas). A resolution was passed on the Israeli Mediterranean-to-Dead Sea
canal, Resolution IV, id. at 46. Debates and incidents also took place over Kampuchea, the
India-Bangladesh diversion of water from the Ganges, P.L.O. land and water rights and the
island of Cyprus. Similar politicization had taken place at Stockholm. See Donohue,
Earthwatch, 46 AMERICA 453 (1982).
65. Several authors in recent years have addressed the effectiveness of UNEP. See, e.g.,
Brower, Did We Save the Earth?, 10 DEVELOPMENT FORUM, May 1980, at 1; Robinson, Introduction: Emerging InternationalEnvironmental Law, 17 STAN. J. INT'L L. 229, 244 (1981);
Wakefield, note 52 supra; Note, The Challenge of InternationalEnvironmental Management: A Critique of the United Nations Environment Programme, 18 VA. J. INT'L L. 269
(1978). For a discussion of the role of NGO's in the UNEP process, see Burke, From Destruction to Life, Retrospect, note 48 supra; Gallon, note 60 supra. A major Congressional
hearing immediately preceding the Nairobi Conference was reported at Review of the
Global Environment 10 Years After Stockholm: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Foreign
Affairs, House of Representatives, Mar. 30, Apr. 1 and 20, 97th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1982)
[hereinafter cited as Subcommittee Hearings].
66. 0C Report, supra ,- . 52, ..t 1.
67. Shabecoff, U.N. Environmental Conference Opens, N.Y. Times, May 11, 1983, at
Y-6, col. 2. See also Tangley, U.N. Holds Global Environment Meeting, 121 Scl. NEWS, May
29, 1982, at 358; Ward, A Decade of Environmental Action, 24 ENVIRONMENT, May 1982, at
4 ("Now, in the 1980's, some Western leaders are starting to abandon the concept of our
joint voyage on Spaceship Earth, and to dismiss any concern for the environment or for
underdeveloped nations as 'do-goodism.' ").
68. M. ROYSTON, POLLUTION PREVENTION PAYS, 3 (1979). See also W. BAUMOL & W.
OATES, ECONOMICS, ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY, AND THE QUALITY OF LIFE 204 n.39 (1979), quoting the N.Y. Times of Feb. 13, 1972, at 11 ("Brazil has argued . . . that poor unpolluted
countries should have the right to do some polluting of their own for the sake of benefits
that industry has already brought to rich, polluted countries.").
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Gandhi expressed the position of developing nations at Stockholm:
The rich countries may look upon development as the cause of environment destruction, but to us it is one of the primary means of improving the environment of living .... How can we speak to those
who live in villages and in slums about keeping the oceans, rivers and
air clean when their own lives are contaminated at the source?"
In 1982, however, the developing nations are among the ardent supporters of ecological planning and protection, and there seems to be widespread recognition that development and environmental protection are
inseparable and that some long-range restraint on exploitation is essential.70 In 1972 only a few nations had official government agencies for environmental protection; now there are more than eighty nations with en7
vironmental agencies, including a large number in developing countries. '
Recognizing the position of the developing world, the Indonesian Minister
of Development said:
The feeling is strong is my country and in Asia that there must be
harmony between development and enhancement of the environment.
There is no question that the political will to do this exists. I am in
Nairobi
looking for the skill and technology that will enable us to do
7
it. 2

The role reversal of the developing nations has predictably led to increasing demands upon the resources of UNEP at a time when the agency
faces bleak prospects for increased funding.3

69. Quoted in N.Y. Times, June 15, 1972, at 12, col. 3.
70. See Leonard & Morell, Emergence of Environmental Concern in Developing Countries: A Political Perspective, 17 STAN. J. INT'L L. 281 (1981); Ripley, The View from the
Castle, 13 SMITHSONIAN, Aug. 1982, at 8 (S. Dillon Ripley, Secretary of the Smithsonian, was
a member of the U.S. delegation at Stockholm); Shabecoff, Third World Joins Ecology Concerns, N.Y. Times, May 15, 1982, at 6, col. 4.
71. Donohue, note 64 supra.
72. Shabecoff, The Environment Revisited, N.Y. Times, May 23, 1982, at 8, col. 3. See
also Interview: Mrs. Gandhi, 6 UNITERRA, No. 5 1981, at 5. (Mrs. Gandhi, interviewed at the
1981 U.N. Conference on New and Renewable Sources of Energy, said, "We do not attach
priority to the environment. We have to make our people more alive to the fact that conservation is not something extra, but is essential in the counting of costs-social costs and even
basic economic costs.").
73. The U.S. delegation at Nairobi was widely perceived as abdicating its advocacy role.
At Nairobi, the first UNEP executive director, Maurice Strong, said, "It is quite clear that
the United States' role at this meeting is in stark contrast to its leadership role in Stockholm." Donohue, note 64 supra. For an account of the American presence, as perceived by a
Nairobi delegate who was also a U.S. Congressional staff person, see Grunberg, Report on
the United Nations Environment Programme's Session of a Special Character, Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 65, at 492:
Two problems plagued the U.S. delegation: 1) the perception that the present Administration is defensive and even hostile towards multilateral cooperation for resolving global environmental problems; and 2) the EPA [then, Anne
Gorsuch] and Interior [Ass't. Sec. G. Ray Arnett] representatives' lack of
knowledge about UNEP and the U.N. System in general and about the development/environment problems of the Third World. These problems severely
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The Resolutions of the Government Council
at Its Session of a Special Character

The Resolutions 7' which concluded the Session cited the major
achievements in the Environmental Assessment area as the implementation of the Global Environmental Monitoring System (GEMS)7 5 and the
major publishing inspired by GEMS. In the area of Environmental Management, UNEP successes were noted in the various regional programs
and in efforts to combat desertification, to correct water supply deficiencies and to improve human settlements, as well as in the promulgation of
World Conservation Strategy. Success in the Supporting Measures area
included the educational, technical and general reports and data summaries relevant to the environment. 6
The "new perceptions of environmental issues" which the Resolution
notes include the recognition that sustainable economic growth and appropriate conservation planning are inseparable, and that disarmament
and security are as essential to the health of the environment as pollution
and poverty are damaging to it. The delegates at Nairobi listed each of
the topic areas, i.e. Atmosphere, Oceans, Water, etc., and identified projected trends and problems within each for the decade ahead, as well as
the priorities for action
that each should receive from UNEP and the
7
other U.N. agencies.

A section of the Resolutions which received great attention and discussion concerned the fundamental role and orientation of UNEP. Although several developing nations sought to change the agency from catalyst to implementer on a country-specific basis, the United States and
other western countries defeated the initiative. The orientation of UNEP
remains fundamentally the same as its mandate: to "stimulate, coordinate
undermined the Delegation's effectiveness.
Id. at 496. But see Buckley, InternationalEnvironment Issues, 82 DEIT ST. BuLL.,
June 1982, at 57. (A strong pro-environmental leadership speech was given by Mr. Buckley,
Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance, immediately before the SSC. Mr. Buckley
was one of the the co-chairs of the American delegation at Nairobi.) A comparison of the
officially listed U.S. participants is instructive: the Nairobi delegation included fifteen members, with EPA Administrator Gorsuch as the ranking adminstration environmental representative. List of Participants, U.N. Doc. UNEP/GC(SSC)/INF. 4 (18 May 1982), at 45. The
American delegation in 1972 listed sixty participants, with Rogers C.B. Morton, Secretary of
the Interior, heading the American delegation. List of Participants, U.N. DoC. A/OUUf. 48/
INF. 5 Rev. 1 (21 Sept. 1972), at 68.
74. Resolutions of the Governing Council at its Session of a Special Character, Report
of the Governing Council at its Session of a Special Character, at 29, U.N. Doc. UNEP/
GC(SSC)/4 (28 June 1982) [hereinafter cited as Resolutions].
75. See notes 8-12 supra, and accompanying text.
76. Resolutions, supra note 74, at 30-33. Report to Governments, published every two
months by UNEP, is one of the best sources of official UNEP news and information. It
contains, inter alia, sections on recent developments, correspondence to governments,
planned meetings worldwide, and a financial update. Additionally, a major portion of each
edition is devoted to reports and evaluations of UNEP projects past, present and future.
77. Resolutions, supra note 74, at 35.
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and catalyse" the environmental assessment, to "promote and coordinate" appropriate policies in environmental management, and to conduct
the support activities of information, education and training.7 8 Only
"where supplementary funds are available" is UNEP to "assist in the im' '7
plementation of [support] activities. 9

Finally, after urging governments to establish and strengthen their
own environmental programs and conservation planning, the delegates
concluded that the basic institutional arrangements of UNEP were
sound: the Governing Council, the Secretariat and the U.N. coordinating
process were adequate and appropriate so long as the catalytic, coordinating and stimulating role of the agency guided the Governing Council in its
decisions. 80
IV. CONCLUSION
The problems of global environmental degradation are immense, and
the state of the environment in 1982 revealed little that inspired optimism. While it is not difficult to list the accomplishments of UNEP in
terms of projects started, agencies established and conventions signed,
the exact effect that UNEP had on the overall condition of the global
ecological system is more difficult to pinpoint. The dominant human
problems which may transcend the agency's reach, but which may impact
the condition of the environment, include:
1) the astronomical and unending commitment of resources to armaments and the waging of war. "As a matter of record and perspective for
the decade, the nations of the United Nations will in 1982 spend more
money on arms and armies in a mere six hours than they have provided
over the past ten years to implement the United Nations Environment
Programme." (emphasis added); 8
2) the scale of poverty endured by the great bulk of people in developing countries; and
3) the state of the world's economy in general.
UNEP is at its best in the role of catalyst and provider of information; the success of the agency in these roles alone would justify its continuation. As scientific techniques for data acquisition and dissemination
have improved8" greatly since Stockholm, so will the next decade add to
this technical knowledge. Given that the global ecological commons respects no boundaries, nations must come to rely upon accurate, worldwide assessment and monitoring data to make deliberate environmental
management decisions. A second highly successful aspect of the UNEP
78. Id. at 39.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 43.
81. Munro, Twenty Years After Stockholm: Past Achievements and Future Issues, 6
MAZINGiRA, No. 1, 1982, at 46, 48.
82. White, Ten Years After Stockholm, 216 SCIENCE, May 7, 1982, at 569.
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catalytic role is the regional programme which addresses specific and
common problems of nations. The decisions of the Governing Council at
its Tenth Session immediately following the SSC confirm this position
specifically, and the great bulk of the SSC suggestions in general. 83
Finally, the biggest problem within the agency seems to be the maintenance of the Program Fund. In real terms, the amount of money availa-

ble for UNEP activities has actually diminished," and the United States,
which had previously provided about one-third of the UNEP budget, $10
million annually, pledged only $7.85 million in 1982 and may reduce its
contribution to $3 million in 1983.85 The bleak financial picture is compounded by contributions received in non-convertible currencies, which
then limit the location where the funds can be spent." Somehow, new

financing arrangements must be created and old ones strengthened.
V. THE NAIROBI DECLARATION
As the delegates at Stockholm had done before them, the Nairobi
participants concluded their Session of a Special Character with a Declaration. The Nairobi Declaration was an eloquent ten-principle aspirational document, imploring global communities to act rationally and to
take affirmative steps to alter the negative trend of the world's environ-

mental health:
The world community of States solemnly reaffirms its commitment to
the Stockholm Declaration and Action Plan... [and] urges all Governments and peoples of the world to discharge their historical responsibility, collectively and individually, to ensure that our small
planet is passed over to future generations
in a condition which guar87
antees a life in human dignity for all.
David Struthers

83. See Report of the Governing Council on the Work of Its Tenth Session, 20-31 May
1981, U.N. Doc. UNEP/GC10/14 (June 15, 1982).
84. From initial year contributions of $11.8 million in 1973, the fund grew to an annual
level of nearly $32 million in 1979 and 1980, then decreased to about $30.8 million in 1981.
Review of Major Achievements, supra note 15, at 62. For a detailed look at the budget and
its specific components, see the series of documents entitled Fund of the United Nations
Environment Programme: Financial Report and Audited Financial Statements for each
accounting period since UNEP was founded. Id.
85. The Reagan Administration had requested only $2 million for UNEP in 1982, but
Congressional action restored the figure to $7.85 million. Subcommittee Hearings, supra
note 65, at 2. See also Scharlin, NairobiRemembers the Stockholm Conference, 67 StERRA,
Sept./Oct. 1982, at 26, 28.
86. For a discussion of the problem, its political ramifications and possible solutions,
see Non-Convertible Currencies (NCC's): Report of the Executive Director, U.N. Doc.
UNEP/GC.10/10/Add.1 (Feb. 4, 1982).
87. Nairobi Declaration, Principle 10, Report of the Governing Council, supra, note 17,
at 55. For a reproduction of statements made at Nairobi by participants ranging from Mr.
Javier Perez de Cuellar, Secretary General of the U.N., and the current and past executive
directors of UNEP, Messrs. Tolba and Strong, to the King of the Belgians, the King of
Sweden and the Prime Minister of India, among many others, see Special Issue: Selected
Statements made at the Session of a Special Character, 6 MAZINGIRA 1982.
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The Act of State Doctrine:
Ethiopian Spice v. Kalamazoo Spice
I.

INTRODUCTION

From February to September 1974, revolutionary forces in Ethiopia

liquidated the old empire and deposed Emperor Haile Selassie.' The
revolution was the culmination of years of economic hardship, drought,
famine and insurgency.2 It completely altered the economic and political
base of the country. At least one hundred entities were nationalized
under the "Provisional Military Administrative Council Declaration of
Economic Policy" (based on Ethiopian Socialism), which became effective
February 3, 1975.?
Ethiopian Spice Extraction Share Company (ESESCO) was one of
the nationalized companies. After the Ethiopian Government gained control, Kalamazoo Spice Extraction Company (Kal-Spice), an American corporation and major shareholder of ESESCO, reacted to protect its inter-

ests and minimize its losses by refusing to pay ESESCO for goods sold
and delivered and an account stated. Two law suits followed, filed in the
Federal District Court in Michigan.

The Michigan court invoked the act of state doctrine 4 to resolve the
issues presented, and held that the doctrine precluded it from examining

the validity and legality of the Provisional Military Government of Socialist Ethiopia's (PMGSE) actions. Therefore, all of Kal-Spice's claims
were dismissed.' The case is currently on appeal in the United States
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.
II.

THE DISTRICT COURT OPINION

The court addressed the issues from the two cases in Ethiopia Spice
Extraction Share Company v. Kalamazoo Spice Extraction Company.'

1. Skurnik, Revolution and Change in Ethiopia, 68 Current History 206-07 (1975).
2. The upper middle class, consisting of teachers and other government employees, was
striking for higher wages and greater benefits, while the majority of the population was
suffering from lack of food, water and other basic necessities of life. Id. The insurgency
began in 1962, when Eritrea was made a province of Ethiopia. Statement by E.W. Mulcahy,
Acting Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, made before the Subcomm. on International
Political and Military Affairs of the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs (Mar. 5, 1975), reprinted in 72 DEP'T ST. BULL. 38B (1975).

3. Ethiopian Spice Extraction Co. v. Kalamazoo Spice Extraction Co., 543 F. Supp.
1224, 1229 (W.D. Mich. S.D. 1982).
4. "The act of state doctrine in its traditional formulation precluded the courts of this
country from inquiring into the validity of the public acts a recognized foreign sovereign
power committed within its own territory." Banco Nacional De Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S.
398, 401 (1964).
5. ESESCO's motion for summary judgment and PMGSE's motion to dismiss were
granted. 543 F. Supp. at 1233.
6. 543 F. Supp. 1224 (W.D. Mich. S.D. 1982).
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Case one involved claims by ESESCO for goods sold and delivered' to
Kal-Spiceg prior to the expropriation and Kal-Spice's counterclaim alleging injury from the expropriation.9 Case two involved claims by Kal-Spice
for damages from the PMGSE based on the expropriation of the KalSpice shares of ESESCO stock.10
The Michigan Court heard five motions. In case one, ESESCO moved
for partial summary judgment on the amount owed by Kal-Spice, while
Kal-Spice moved" to have the PMGSE declared an indispensible party
plaintiff, or alternatively, to have PMGSE declared already a party plaintiff. In case two, PMGSE moved to dismiss, and Kal-Spice moved to
strike an affidavit filed in support of the motion to dismiss, and to consolidate the two cases.1 '
The court began its discussion by addressing ESESCO's motion for
partial summary judgment. ESESCO supported the motion "with an affidavit and exhibits consisting of a purchase order dated October 18, 1974,
bills of lading, invoices, and a statement of Kal-Spice to its auditors."'"
The purchase of spice, valued at $1,961,980.4811 was completed prior to
the expropriation. Applying the standards set forth in Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(d), 1 5 the court granted partial summary judgment, and set forth an

7. The amended complaint included claims for goods sold and delivered, an account
stated, disregard of separate corporate entitites and "breach of an agreement concerning
oleoresin testing methods." Id. at 1226.
8. Kal-Spice established ESESCO under Ethiopian law in 1966, owned approximately
eighty percent of the ESESCO shares, and contracted with ESESCO to purchase all of the
oleoresin spice produced. Id.
9. Specifically, Kal-Spice claimed: 1) expropriation of all of its shares; 2) wrongful deprivation of shareholder rights; 3) output contract violation; and 4) wrongful appropriation
and conspiracy to appropriate trade secrets. Id.
10. "[Tihe complaint in Case Two is essentially the same as the first Count of the
Counterclaim brought against ESESCO in Case One." Id. at n.2.
11. Id. at 1226.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 1233.
15. Rule 56 (c) and (d) provide:
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon
The motion shall be served at least 10 days before the time fixed for the
hearing. The adverse party prior to the day of hearing may serve opposing
affidaviis. The judgment sought shall bc rendered for.wih ift.hepe_dings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with
the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact
and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. A
summary judgment, interlocutory in character, may be rendered on the issue of
liability alone although there is a genuine issue as to the amount of damages.
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion
If on motion under this rule judgment is not rendered upon the whole case
or for all the relief asked and a trial is necessary, the court at the hearing on
the motion, by examining the pleadings and the evidence before it and by interrogating counsel, shall if practicable ascertain what material facts exist
without substantial controversy and what material facts are actually and in
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Order 16 granting ESESCO judgment for the amount claimed.
After summarily dismissing ESESCO's request that Kal-Spice provide a bond, 17 the court turned to the PMGSE's motion to dismiss. The
PMGSE based its motion on immunity under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, a lack of minimum contacts sufficient to establish personal
jurisdiction, improper venue and the act of state doctrine. 8 Finding the
act of state doctrine dispositive, the court utilized the remainder of the
opinion to discuss and apply the doctrine.
III.

THE ACT OF STATE DOCTRINE

The act of state doctrine has traditionally required that courts refrain from making determinations that could possibly have a negative impact on U.S. relations with foreign sovereigns. " The doctrine purportedly
first appeared in England as early as 1674,"0 and has been applied in the
United States since the turn of the nineteenth century.2 ' The case of Un2
derhill v. Hernandez,"
is often credited with containing the classic American statement of the act of state doctrine. The plaintiff Underhill, a U.S.
citizen, brought suit against defendant Hernandez, a Venezuelan general
of the revolutionary government, alleging that he had been illegally de-

good faith controverted. It shall thereupon make an order specifying the facts
that appear without substantial controversy, including the extent to which the
amount of damages or other relief is not in controversy, and directing such
further proceedings in the action as are just. Upon the trial of the action the
facts so specified shall be deemed established, and the trial shall be conducted
accordingly.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 (c) & (d) (1963). The result reached by the court in granting the motion
for summary judgment is consistent with Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. The Republic of
Cuba, 425 U.S. 682 (1972), where the Supreme Court refused to apply the act of state doctrine to accounts owing prior to the time of the 1960 intervention by the Cuban Government
in the Cuban cigar manufacturing industry.
16. In pertinent part, the Order stated that Kal-Spice received a quantity of spice for
ESESCO, and that the principal amount of $1,961,980.48 was due and owing for such spice,
with interest thereon. 543 F. Supp. at 1233.
17. The court did not feel that there was any real danger of Kal-Spice not paying a
judgment if judgment was rendered in ESESCO's favor. Furthermore, the court noted a lack
of authority in support of such a request. Id. at 1227.
18. Id.
19. The act of state doctrine is not international law, and is not required or restricted
by the U.S. Constitution. It does, however, have constitutional underpinnings.
It arises out of the basic relationships between branches of government in a
system based on the separation of powers. It concerns the competency of dissimilar institutions to work and implement particular kinds of decisions in the
area of international relations. It expresses the view that the engagement of
the judicial branch in the task of passing on the validity of foreign acts of State
may hinder rather than further the country's pursuit of goals both for itself
and for the community of nations as a whole.

J.G.

CASTEL, INTERNATIONAL LAW

1162 (1976).

20. See Blad v. Banfield, 3 Swanst 604 (1674), reprinted in 36 Eng. Rep. 992.
21. Schooner Exchange v. M'Faddon, 7 Cranch 116 (1812).
22. 168 U.S. 250 (1897).
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tained by Hernandez. The Supreme Court acknowledged that Hernandez's acts were governmental acts. As such, they were not the proper
subject of adjudication:
Every sovereign State is bound to respect the independence of every
other sovereign State, and the courts of one country will not sit in
judgment on the acts of the government of another done within its
own territory. Redress of grievances by reason of such acts must be
obtained through the means
open to be availed of by sovereign powers
2
as between themselves.

3

After the Underhill decision, the act of state doctrine remained virtually unchanged for approximately fifty years, and was applied by the
Supreme Court in actions concerning acts of state by the Governments of
Costa Rica, 2 4 Mexico,2 5 and the Soviet Union.2 Had the doctrine remained unchanged, resolution of the conflicts in Ethiopia Spice would
have been straightforward and uncomplicated; Kal-Spice would have
been denied recovery. The doctrine has been modified however, making
application of the doctrine to these facts somewhat more difficult.
In Banco National de Cuba v. Sabbatino,27 the Cuban Government
expropriated the property of a Cuban corporation principally owned by
U.S. residents. To obtain permission to ship its sugar cargo, an American
commodity broker agreed to enter into contracts with the Cuban Government identical to those it entered into with the expropriated corporation.2 When, however, the Cuban Government presented the bill of lading in New York to collect proceeds for the sugar, the broker refused to
pay. Taking their case to the courts, the Cubans were denied recovery in

23. Id. at 252.
24. American Banana Company v. United Fruit Company, 213 U.S. 347 (1909), was an
antitrust action. The Court disposed of the case stating "[a] conspiracy in this country to do
acts in another jurisdiction does not draw to itself those acts and make them unlawful, if
they are permitted by local law." Id. at 359.
25. Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297 (1918) and Ricaud v. American Metal
Co., 246 U.S. 304 (1918), companion cases, both arose out of acts that occurred during the
1913-15 Mexican civil war. In Oetjen, one of the revolutionary forces seized hides to help
finance the military effort. When the hides arrived in the United States, Oetjen unsuccessfully brought suit to regain title. Ricaud involved appropriation of lead bullion. The Court,
denying recovery, concluded that:
American citizen, who was not in or a resident of Mexico at the time it was
seized for military purposes by the legitimate Government of Mexico, does not
affect the rule of law that the act within its own boundaries of one sovereign
State cannot become the subject of reexamination and modification in the
courts of another.
Id. at 310. See also Shapleigh v. Mier, 299 U.S. 468 (1937).
26. In United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1942), the Court dealt with questions
arising from Russian nationalization decrees, and the Lithuanian Agreement, a Soviet Government assignment to the Government to claims owed by American nationals.
27. 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
28. Id. at 404.
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both the district court29 and the court of appeals, 0 ostensibly because the
Cuban Government's act violated customary international law.
The expropriation was the Cuban response to a U.S. decision to reduce the Cuban sugar quota.3 1 The U.S. State Department described the
Cuban action as "manifestly in violation of those principles of international law which have long been accepted by the free countries of the
West. It is in its essence discriminatory, arbitrary and confiscatory."3 2
Recognizing that expropriations "take place for a variety of reasons, political and ideological as well as economic," 3 the Supreme Court, in affirming the court of appeals, invoked the act of state doctrine and refrained from judicial interference. The Court stated that the judicial
branch will not examine the validity of an expropriation "within its own
territory by a foreign sovereign government, extant and recognized by
this country at the time of suit, in the absence of a treaty or other unambiguous agreement regarding controlling legal principles, even if there is a
taking violating international law."" The Court suggested that expropria-

tions could be controlled by extrajudicial means, such as discontinuing
foreign aid, freezing assets, and allowing the marketplace to react.3 5
Sabbatino is important for two reasons. First, the Court recognized
that a treaty or other agreement could modify the act of state doctrine.
Second, Congress reacted to the Sabbatino holding by passing the Hickenlooper Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961.1" This

29. 193 F. Supp. 375 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
30. 307 F.2d 845 (2d Cir. 1962).
31. One day after Congress passed an amendment to the Sugar Act of 1948 permitting a
presidential proclamation of reduction, President Eisenhower reduced the quota. Determination of Cuban Sugar Quota, 25 Fed. Reg. 6414 (1960).
32. Dep't of State Note No. 397 to the Cuban Ministry of Foreign Relations, dated July
16, 1960, relevant part reprinted at 376 U.S. 403 (1964).
33. 376 U.S. at 435.
34. Id. at 428.
35. Id. at 435. Developing countries depend on foreign investments. If companies are
expropriated, the flow of capital into developing countries will naturally cease, making the
actual and long term effect of judicial relief insignificant.
36. The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, 22 U.S.C. §2370 (e)(2) (1961) provides:
(2) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no court in the United
States shall decline on the ground of the federal act of state doctrine to make a
determination on the merits giving effect to the principles of international law
in a case in which a claim of title or other right to property is asserted by any
party including a foreign state (or a party claiming through such state) based
upon (or traced through) a confiscation or other taking after January 1, 1959,
by an act of that state in violation of the principles of international law, including the principles of compensation and other standards set out in this subsection: Provided, that this subparagraph shall not be applicable (1) in any
case in which an act of a foreign state is not contrary to international law or
with respect to a claim of title or other right to property acquired pursuant to
an irrevocable letter of credit of not more that 180 days duration issued in
good faith prior to the time of the confiscation or other taking, or (2) in any
case with respect to which the President determines that application of the act
of state doctrine is required in that particular case by the foreign policy inter-
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amendment, which applies to expropriations that violate international
law, established a presumption that adjudication on the merits will not
embarrass the executive branch in conducting foreign policy. However,
the amendment is limited to cases in which the property has found its

way back into the United States.87

The Supreme Court next addressed the issues surrounding the act of
state doctrine in First National City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba."
The case involved a $15 million First National City Bank loan, in 1958, to
the Banco Nacional's predecessor in interest. One year later, in 1959, Castro seized all of First National City's Cuban branches. In retaliation, First

National sold the collateral securing the $15 million loan, and realized a
profit of $1.8 million on the transaction. Banco Nacional sued to recover

the $1.8 million, and First National, by way of setoff and counter-claim,
asserted its right to the $1.8 million based on the expropriated property.
The district court,8 holding that Sabbatino was overruled by the
Hickenlooper Amendment, ruled in favor of First National. 40 The court of
appeals reversed, stating that the congressional action did not govern the
case." The Supreme Court, in a splintered plurality decision, reversed the
court of appeals and permitted judicial examination of the acts of state.
The Court applied the Bernstein exception, 4 which permits judicial review of an act of state where the executive branch expressly states that
application of the act of state doctrine would not advance the interests of
foreign policy. Justices Rehnquist, Burger and White stated that although

the judicial and executive branches of the government are and should remain separate,

where the executive branch states that application of the

ests of the United States and a suggestion to this effect is filed on his behalf in
that case with the court.
37. 543 F. Supp. at 1229.
38. 406 U.S. 759 (1972), reh. den. 409 U.S. 897 (1972).
39. 270 F. Supp. 1004 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
40. On a motion for summary judgment, the district court ruled in favor of First National on all except "the amounts by which the proceeds of the sale of collateral exceeded
the amount that could properly be applied to the loan by petitioners .... [First National]
then waived any recovery on its counterclaim over and above the amount recoverable by
respondent on its complaint on its merits." 406 U.S. at 761.
41. 431 F.2d 394 (2d Cir. 1970).
42. In Bernstein v. N.V Nederlandsche-Amerikaanische, 173 F.2d 71 (2d Cir. 1949), the
court invoked the act of state doctrine and held that it was restrained from reviewing the
official acts of the Nazi government. Subsequent to that decision, the State Department
issued a release condemning the acts of the Nazi party and relieving "American courts from
any restraint upon the exercise of their jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of the acts of
Nazi officials." Letters from Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal Advisor, Department of State, to
Attorneys for the Plaintiff in Civil Action No. 31-555 in the United States District Court for
the Southern District of New York, dated April 13, 1949, pertinent part reprinted at 210
F.2d 376. In view of the Executive policy, the Second Circuit amended and reversed its
earlier mandate at 210 F.2d 375 (2d Cir. 1954). This exception is commonly referred to as
the Bernstein exception.
43. The Court noted that "juridical acts of state of a foreign power could embarass the
conduct of foreign relations by the political branches of the government. 406 U.S. at 765.
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act of state doctrine would not advance the interests of American foreign
policy:
[ilt would be wholly illogical to insist that such a rule, fashioned because of fear that adjudication would interfere with the conduct of
foreign relations, be applied in the face of an assurance from that
Branch of the Federal Government that conducts foreign relations
that such a result would not obtain."
Justice Douglas, concurring, felt neither the Bernstein exception nor the
act of state doctrine should be invoked. National City Bank v. Republic
of China"5 provided that "a sovereign's claim may be cut down by a counterclaim or setoff,"' 6 and relief could be permitted on that basis alone.
Justice Powell, also concurring, rejected the application of Sabbatino,
stating the decision "was not compelled by the principles as expressed
therein, '47 and believed that federal courts have an obligation to hear
cases dealing with expropriations, unless so doing would interfere with
delicate foreign relations. The four dissenters felt the Bernstein exception
"was an abdication of the judicial function to the Executive Branch," and
8
that Sabbatino dictated the opposite result."

Another exception to the act of state doctrine, the commercial activity exception, was applied by the Supreme Court in Alfred Dunhill of
London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba." After Cuba confiscated the major cigar manufacturing companies, three importers mistakenly paid the Cuban
Government for preconfiscation shipments of cigars. After the former
owners established their right to the sum already paid, Dunhill brought
suit to recover the excess monies paid. In response to Cuba's assertion
that their action was an act of state, the Court stated:
We decline to extend the act of state doctrine to acts committed by
foreign sovereigns in the cause of their purely commercial operations.
Because the act relied on by respondents in this case was an act arising out of the conduct by Cuba's agents in the operation of cigar businesses for profit, the act was not an act of state.

Thus, the commercial activity exception provides another way
around judicial noninterference with acts of state. With the historical
function and recent modifications of the act of state doctrine in mind, the
44. Id. at 769-70.

45. 348 U.S. 356 (1954).
46. 406 U.S. at 771.
47. Id. at 774.
48. 543 F. Supp. 1229. First National City Bank v. Banco Nacional De Cuba could be
the type of case that prompted Erwin Griswold of Washington, former U.S. solicitor general
and Dean of Harvard Law School, to say "[t]he Supreme Court has caused its own
overburdened case load by handing down opinions that provide 'no precedent' for the district courts .

. . ."

Winter, Its Own Fault: Critiquing the Supreme Court, 69 A.B.A.J. 424

(1983). With a 3-1-1-4 split, it is difficult, if not impossible, to state the rule of law decided
in First National City Bank.
49. 425 U.S. 682 (1976).
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district court began its analysis.

IV. ANALYSIS
The district court stated that "there is no dispute that the action of
the PMGSE in nationalizing shares of ESESCO held by Kal-Spice was an
act of state."5 0 Next, the court summarily disposed of the Dunhill commercial activity exception, and stated that the Bernstein exception was
also inapplicable because there had been no statement by the executive
branch. 51
Subsequent to the district court's ruling, the executive branch made
a statement regarding the act of state doctrine in this case. Therefore, the
Bernstein exception may apply to this case. In a November 19, 1982 letter,"2 the Department of State discussed two issues. The Department
stated that where there is a controlling legal standard for compensation,
such as is found in the Treaty of Amity and Economic Relations between
the United States and Ethiopia 3 (Treaty), "we believe that the presumption should be that adjudication would not be inconsistent with foreign
policy interests under the Act of State Doctrine. 5 4 Also, the Department
stated "[i]n general this Department's experience provides little support
for a presumption that adjudication of acts of foreign states in accordance
with relevant principles of international law would embarrass the conduct
of foreign policy."55 The Department of State's letter clearly supports judicial resolution of this case. The Sixth Circuit's decision should reflect
the Department's view, and the Bernstein exception, if it really does exist, should be invoked.
The district court devoted the remainder of its opinion to the resolution of three issues: namely the applicability of the Treaty; the Hickenlooper Amendment; and the significance of the location of the taking.
First, it attempted to invoke the Sabbatino modification to the act of
state doctrine, going to the treaty to find "controlling legal principles" to
resolve the dispute. Article VIII, § 2 of the Treaty provided as follows:
Property of nationals and companies of either High Contracting
Party, including interests in property, shall receive the most constant
protection and security within the territories of the other High Con-

50. 543 F. Supp. at 1229.
51. Id.
52. Dep't of State Letter from Davis R. Robinson, Legal Advisor to The Honorable Rex
E. Lee, Solicitor General of the United States, Nov. 19, 1982, reprinted in 83 DEP'T ST.
BULL. No. 2070, at 70 (1983).
53. Treaty of Amity and Economic Relations Between the United States of America
and Ethiopia, Sept. 7, 1951, 4 U.S.T. 2137, T.I.A.S. No. 2864 [hereinafter cited as Treaty].

54. Id.
55. Id. This sentence was a quote taken from a Department of State letter written in
1975 regarding the Dunhill case. See Dep't of State Letter from Monroe Leigh, Legal Advisor to the Solicitor General of the United States, Nov. 26, 1975, reprinted in Alfred Dunhill
of London, Inc. v. Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 706 (1976).

56. 543 F. Supp. at 1229.
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tracting Party. Such property shall not be taken except for a public
purpose, nor shall it be taken without prompt payment and just and
effective compensation. 57 (emphasis added).

Agreeing with the argument put forth by the PMGSE, the court decided
that the terms "prompt," "just" and "effective" are not defined, and
found the terms to be "inherently general, doubtful, and susceptible of a
multiple interpretation."58 Upon this basis, the court held that the Treaty
did not provide controlling legal principles upon which to render a

decision.59
The district court's holding concerning the Treaty faces two
problems. First, the holding contradicts the basic principle in treaty interpretation which states that the ordinary and usual meaning of the
terms are to be applied. 0 Second, the holding is in conflict with the Department of State's letter which indicates that the Treaty sets forth controlling legal standards."1 The Supreme Court has stated that "[a]lthough
not conclusive, the meaning attributed to Treaty provisions by the government agencies charged with their negotiation and enforcement is entitled to great weight.' 2 Thus, the Sixth Circuit could either reverse the
district court based upon the obvious meaning of the Treaty or in deference to the Department of State's interpretation of the Treaty words.
The second issue that the court discussed was the applicability of the
Hickenlooper Amendment. 63 Quoting extensively from Banco Nacional
de Cuba v. First National City Bank of New York," the court held that
the amendment only applied to confiscated property that was being marketed in the United States. Because the assets in Ethiopian Spice were in
Ethiopia, not the United States, the court ruled that the Hickenlooper

Amendment did not apply.65
57. Treaty, art. VIII, § 2.
58. 543 F. Supp. at 1230.
59. The court did state that the Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations Law of the
United States §§ 187-90 defined these terms. Id. However, the court reasoned that "reliance
on that authority as accurately expressing the meaning intended by the government of Ethiopia in its Treaty agreement, despite the absence of any reference thereto, would be unwarranted." Id.
60. In United States v. D'Auterive, 10 Howard 607, 622 (1850), the Supreme Court
stated "compacts between governments or nations, like those between individuals, should be
interpreted according to the natural, fair, and received acceptation of the terms in which
they are expressed," and in De Geofrey v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258, 270 (1889), the Court stated
that "[i]t
is a rule, in construing treaties as well as laws, to give sensible meaning to all their
provisions if that be practicable. The interpretation, therefore, . . . which would render a
treaty null and inefficient cannot be admitted ... it ought to be interpreted in such a manner as that it may have its effect, and not prove vain and nugatory." See also Santovincenzo
v. Egan, 284 U.S. 30, 40 (1931).
61. See note 52 supra.
62. Kolorat v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 187 (1961).
63. 543 F. Supp. at 1231.
64. 431 F.2d 394 (2d Cir. 1970). For a discussion of the case at the Supreme Court level,
see notes 38-48 supra and accompanying text.
65. 543 F. Supp. at 1231.
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The third and final issue the district court discussed was another exception to the act of state doctrine, which involves the location of the
property taken. This exception was discussed in Republic of Iraq v.
First National City Bank, 7 where the Republic of Iraq, by virtue of an
ordinance, claimed funds that were located in a New York bank." Although the promulgation of the Ordinance was an act of state, the court
refused to invoke the doctrine. The court reasoned:
Under the traditional application of the act of state doctrine, the principle of judicial refusal of examination applies only to a taking by a
foreign sovereign of property within its own territory; when property
confiscated is within the United States at the time of the attempted
confiscation, our courts will give effect to acts of state only if they are
consistent with the policies and law of the United States. (citations
omitted).6 9
Attempting to apply this exception, Kal-Spice argued that because the
stock certificates were located in the state of Michigan, the taking was
outside of the country of Ethiopia, and not subject to the act of state
doctrine.
The court quoted the general rule that "the situs of corporate stock
is deemed to be in the state where the corporation has its domicile, which
is ordinarily the state under whose laws the corporation was created. ..

.,,

Because ESESCO was an Ethiopian corporation, the court

held that the "confiscation of the shares of stock was a taking within its
own territory by the PMGSE which is encompassed by the act of state
doctrine." 71 ' Thus, the court could not apply this or any other exception
to the act of state doctrine.
V.

CONCLUSION

In Ethiopian Spice, the district court resolved issues involving
amounts due for spices sold and delivered and the expropriation of shares
of stock by applying the act of state doctrine. Under the doctrine, the
court held that it could not make a judicial determination concerning an
act of the PMGSE. The many exceptions to the rule, including the Bernstein and Sabbatino exceptions, were deemed inappropriate.
Subsequent to this decision, the Department of State made a statement concerning this case. First, the Department stated that a judicial
abstention would not advance the interests of foreign policy. Next, the
Department said that the U.S.-Ethiopian Treaty provided controlling legal principles to resolve the issues presented. The Sixth Circuit's decision
66.
67.
68.
Faisal's
69.
70.
71.

Id.
353 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied 382 U.S. 1027 (1966).
The funds belonged to King Faisal II of Iraq, who was killed in the 1958 revolution.
estate administrator and the Republic claimed title to the funds. 353 F.2d at 50.
Id. at 51.
543 F. Supp. at 1231-32.
Id. at 1232.
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must acknowledge and reflect the Department's view. The plain words of
the Treaty appear to provide an answer to this dispute. Furthermore, the
Bernstein exception, if it is a recognized exception, can be invoked to provide Kal-Spice relief.
Robert M. Cooper

Humanitarian Intervention:
A Possibility for Northern Ireland
Northern Ireland has been embroiled in conflict throughout this century. Due to the most recent eruptions of political and religious conflict in
Northern Ireland, there have been losses of life and property, and erosion
of the civil liberties of a minority group as well. Human rights involve the
most sensitive areas of an individual's relationship to his society and to
his state. Because most governments are reluctant to surrender their
traditional authority over matters affecting their citizens, a valid question
is raised: Which countries and organizations have the right to intervene in
a situation involving human rights violations? A more specific question
may also be asked: How is it possible for states and international organizations to justify their inaction in Northern Ireland and elsewhere after
claiming to embrace the idea that human rights are to be recognized and
enforced, and not merely conferred? Although this paper will examine the
very recent history of the problem in Northern Ireland, the types of
human rights violations being perpetrated, and international treaties and
organizations dealing with these violations, its main focus will be the possibility of humanitarian intervention.
In 1948 the United Nations adopted the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights (Declaration or Universal Declaration).1 The Declaration
begins: "All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights."'
It continues by naming civil and political rights, such as "life, liberty and
security of person,... freedom from arbitrary arrest, detention or exile,.
. . the right to own property [and] freedom of thought, conscience and
religion." 8 Also included are economic, social and cultural rights, such as
"the right to work, and the right to a standard of living adequate for
health and well being."4 Although the Universal Declaration has been in
existence for nearly thirty years, it was not until President Carter's administration focused upon human rights as an integral component of
American foreign policy that the issue dominated the international arena.

1. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Dec. 10, 1948, G.A. Res. 217A(III) art. 1,
U.N. Doc. A/810, at 71 (1948) [hereinafter cited as Declaration].
2. Id. art. 1.
3. Id. art. 23.
4. Id.
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may also be asked: How is it possible for states and international organizations to justify their inaction in Northern Ireland and elsewhere after
claiming to embrace the idea that human rights are to be recognized and
enforced, and not merely conferred? Although this paper will examine the
very recent history of the problem in Northern Ireland, the types of
human rights violations being perpetrated, and international treaties and
organizations dealing with these violations, its main focus will be the possibility of humanitarian intervention.
In 1948 the United Nations adopted the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights (Declaration or Universal Declaration).1 The Declaration
begins: "All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights."'
It continues by naming civil and political rights, such as "life, liberty and
security of person,... freedom from arbitrary arrest, detention or exile,.
. . the right to own property [and] freedom of thought, conscience and
religion." 8 Also included are economic, social and cultural rights, such as
"the right to work, and the right to a standard of living adequate for
health and well being."4 Although the Universal Declaration has been in
existence for nearly thirty years, it was not until President Carter's administration focused upon human rights as an integral component of
American foreign policy that the issue dominated the international arena.

1. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Dec. 10, 1948, G.A. Res. 217A(III) art. 1,
U.N. Doc. A/810, at 71 (1948) [hereinafter cited as Declaration].
2. Id. art. 1.
3. Id. art. 23.
4. Id.
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President Reagan's administration has promised to continue the use
of human rights as an instrument of American foreign policy. Jeanne
Kirkpatrick, the U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, notes that the
main difference between the Carter and Reagan approaches to human
rights issues is that Carter's approach was ineffective.5 Whereas Carter
stressed the goodwill of his policy rather than the consequences, Reagan's
approach is a "highly principled effort to prevent the establishment of
one-party regimes . .. which would oppress the human rights and the

liberty of its citizens even more than they are normally oppressed."' As
part of the United Kingdom, Northern Ireland is a member of the United
Nations7 and is considered a member of the international community. In
light of the national administration's promises, as well as the treaties and
conventions to which the United States is a party," some form of intervention by the United States to stem human rights abuses is plausible in
this war-torn area.
I.

RECENT HISTORY

The recent social and political history of the conflict in Northern Ireland must be examined in order to justify humanitarian intervention.

During the mid-1960's the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF), a right-wing
Protestant group, began a campaign to prohibit the right-wing Unionist
government of Northern Ireland from establishing harmonious relations
with the Republic of Ireland.9 At the same time, the Northern Ireland
Civil Rights Association, an (allegedly) nonsectarian and nonviolent civil
rights movement, emerged and demanded equality of treatment for
Northern Ireland's Catholic minority.10 Religious intolerance-a constant
irritant to the already dangerous economic and social oppression-divided the population. 1 Although the government of Northern
5. Rehm, Human Rights: Who Defines Them, Who Denies Them, N.Y. Daily News,
May 31, 1981, at 43, col. 3. The author touches on three documented cases in the latest
report of Amnesty International, the London-based organization that received the 1977
Nobel Prize for its work in human rights. Vincent McGee, Amnesty's Chariman of the
Board in the United States, reports that the 1980's will be a time of crucial testing for
human rights. "The right to dissent is under attack in country after country. Torture and
murder, abduction and imprisonment are often sanctioned at the highest levels of government." He estimates that nearly one-half of the 154 member nations of the United Nations
have 50,000 persons imprisoned for their political and religious convictions. Id..
6. Id.

7. See R.

LILLICH

& F.

NEWMAN, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS: PROBLEMS OF LAW AND

POLicy 611 (1979).
8. See infra notes 42-45 and accompanying text.
9. Lowry, Internment: Detention Without Trial in Northern Ireland, 5 HUMAN RIGwrs
261, 263 (1976). See also Cohn, Torture in the InternationalCommunity Problems of Definition and Limitation the Case of Northern Ireland, 11 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 159, 161
(1979); Lowry, Ill Treatment, Brutality and Torture: Some Thoughts Upon the Treatment
of Irish PoliticalPrisoners, 22 DE PAUL L. REV. 553, 558 (1978).

10. Cohn, note 9 supra. See also E.

O'BALLANCE, TERROR IN IRELAND

98, 102 (1981).

11. The Catholic population complained of unfair and unequal allocation of rental
space to Protestants, dissatisfaction with enfranchisement and overall abuse of civil rights.
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Ireland banned civil rights demonstrations, both protestors and police became increasingly violent. With all legitimate routes of protest seemingly
closed, the Irish Republican Army (IRA), a revolutionary group of militant nationalists which was formed in the 1920's, increased in size and
prestige in the 1970's. In an attempt to preserve law and order, the Government introduced a policy of internment 12 as a counterinsurgent tactic.
In August 1971, pursuant to the Special Powers Act, 8 the Northern Irish
Parliament invoked provisions allowing the imprisonment without trial of
those persons suspected of threatening the peace and order in Northern
Ireland. The Special Powers Act had previously been invoked in every
decade since the 1920's to intern suspects." The renewed enforcement of
this Act increased the visibility of the British occupation in Northern
Ireland.
During recent years the British presence and the Government's violation of human rights has been discussed in the world press. For instance,
a highly publicized event occurred in 1981 when IRA members detained
in Northern Ireland's prisons started a hunger strike, and refused food
and medical attention." The hunger strikers had made five demands
which would have abolished their status as criminals. Those demands
consisted of the right to wear one's own clothes, the right to free association, the right to extra visits, the right to parcels and the right to choose
whether or not to do prison work.1s In addition, one of the prisoners,
Bobby Sands, was elected to parliamentary office while on the hunger
strike. Sand's election severely tested the citizens' acceptance of the British Government's actions in Northern Ireland; in fact, some have inter-

See E. O'BALLANCE, supra note 10, at 98, 102. The Civil Rights Association (CRA) sought
and campaigned for the following: (1) A one man, one vote policy in local elections; (2)
removal of gerrymandered boundaries; (3) laws against discrimination by local government
and machinery to deal with complaints; (4) repeal of the Special Powers Act (see note 13
infra); and (5) disbanding of the B Special Police force, a wholly Protestant militia. See
Lowry, supra note 9, at 558, and Cohn, supra note 9, at 161.
12. Internment may be defined as the extra-judicial deprivation of liberty by executive
action. The essence of internment lies in incarceration without charge or trial. Lowry, supra
note 9, at 261.
13. The Civil Authorities Act, 1922, 12 & 13 Geo. 5 [hereinafter cited as Special Powers
Act], cited in Cohn, supra note 9, at 159 n.1. Under this Act, passed by the Northern Ireland Parliament, "the Civil Authority had power in respect of persons, matters and things
within the jurisdiction of the Government of Northern Ireland to take all such steps and
issue all such orders as may be necessary for preserving peace and maintaining order in
accordance with the Act." This section requires that the course of law and avocations of life
and the enjoyment of property should be interfered with as little as possible.
14. Lowry, supra note 9, at 272. Suspects have also been imprisoned for indeterminate
periods of time in the south of Ireland. For example, in 1956 the Prime Minister of the
Republic of Ireland interned suspects without trial in response to IRA terrorist incidents. In
1958, the government in the south began to release those internees. See E. O'BALLANCa,
supra note 10, at 87, 88.
15. Violence Flares in Ulster as Fourth IRA Fast Begins, N.Y. Times, May 10, 1981, at
5, col. 1.
16. Id.; Cohn, supra note 9, at 161.
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preted his election as an endorsement of the prisoners' demand for politi17

cal status.

II.

GREAT BRITAIN LEGITIMIZES ITS ACTIONS IN NORTHERN IRELAND

In coping with the crisis caused by the hunger strikers, the British
Government asserted that the Special Powers Act' s had been passed to
clarify the status of Northern Ireland. However, the Act was originally
passed in 1922 to cope with terrorist attacks. Legal and political authorities in Great Britain have increasingly sought to justify internment and
torture of political detainees by invoking the internment provisions of the
act as "the normal procedure for punishing criminals."19 They also rely
on theories of retribution and deterrence, 0 and on the U.N. Charter,
which "prohibits the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity
or political independence of any state."2 1 Britain has consistently treated
the problems in Northern Ireland involving violations of human rights as
domestic and not within the jurisdiction of outside states. The Prime
Minister of England, Margaret Thatcher, stated that Bobby Sands, the
first hunger striker to die, was a citizen of the United Kindom in a British
prison. As such, his fast was purely the concern of the Northern Irish
administration and of the British Government."
The British Government also justifies its actions as a means of fulfilling a formal promise not to abandon Northern Ireland's one million
Protestants. The pledge, "the guarantee," as it is called, is a section of the
1973 Constitution Act, which reads: "It is hereby affirmed that in no way
will Northern Ireland or any part of it cease to be part of Her Majesty's
dominion and of the United Kingdom without the consent of the majority
of people in Northern Ireland, voting in a poll."28 By giving in to the

17. Britain has recognized political prisoner status in the past with "special" category
status for both Protestant and Catholic guerillas in Northern Ireland. The distinction instituted by the Tory Government was abolished by the Labor Government in 1976 because it
was thought to be unwise. Some 300 prisoners convicted of crimes before 1976 were enjoying
the special status the hunger strikers were seeking. Borders, Britain'sNew Look at the Irish
Question, N.Y. Times, Oct. 11, 1981 § 6 (Magazine) at 94, 97.
18. Special Powers Act, supra note 13, Regs. §§ 11-13. These regulations deal with the
internment provisions of the Act.
19. Prime Minister Thatcher's view was that the protesting inmates could not be
granted special political statues because they are common criminals. "Things like murder
and bombing and arson are not political." Borders, supra note 18, at 96. See also notes 2021 infra, and accompanying text.
20. Deterrent is defined as "anything which impedes or has a tendency to prevent; e.g.,

punishment is a 'deterrent' to crime."

BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY

405 (5th ed. 1979).

21. U.N. CHARTER art. 2; para. 4. "All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United
Nations."
22. See Kelly, How Many More Sacrifices Before Britain Leaves?, Irish Echo, May 16,
1981, at 2, col. 1.
23. Borders, supra note 17, at 99.
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prisoners' demand for political status, the British would be losing a degree of its sovereignty over its subjects."2
Northern Ireland is now a recognized sovereignty of the United Kingdom and consequently, the United Kingdom objects to any external interference. Despite this view, do certain outside states have a moral duty, if
not a legal obligation, to intervene?
III.

A

REBUTTAL OF GREAT BRITAIN'S THEORY

There is wide recognition that certain fundamental human rights are
now guaranteed to individuals as a matter of international law.' 5 International law imposes a duty on a nation not to torture its citizens.2' International law also protects individuals and groups of individuals "in their
own state or within the territory of a state where the governing authority
permits abuses of human rights, or mistreats its subjects in a manner
which shocks the conscience of mankind."'1 7 For example, "government A
is permitted to file an official protest relating to the manner in which
government B treats one of B's nationals, and if it can be shown that the
conduct complained of is characteristic of B's overall human rights policy,
government A can also impose economic sanctions."' 8 Jurisdictional defenses may no longer rest on the proposition that the manner in which a
state treats its citizens is strictly a matter within its domestic jurisdiction. 2 ' That defense may not be applicable to allegations relating to individual human rights violations, if it appears that rather than being isolated instances, they result from the policy of the state."0
Traditionally, Britain has taken an unyielding approach with respect
to Ireland and minority groups. After the British Government carried out
24. Id.
25. See the amicus curiae memorandum at the U.S. Dep't of State, which was solicited
by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in the matter of Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d
876 (2d Cir. 1980), reprinted in 19 I.L.M. 585, 587-89 (1980). See also Note, Filartiga v.
Pena-Irala: Providing FederalJurisdictionfor Human Rights Violation Through the Alien
Tort Statute, 10 DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'y 355 (1981).
26. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, done at Rome, Nov. 4, 1950 (entered into force, Sept. 3, 1953) [hereinafter cited as

European Convention]. Article 3 states, "No one shall be subject to torture or to inhuman or
degrading treatment."
27. Fairley, State Actors, HumanitarianIntervention and InternationalLaw: Reopening Pandora'sBox, 10 GA. J. INT'L L. 29, 32 n.11 (1980). See also L. OPPENHEM, INTMMATIONAL LAW §134, at 312 (8th ed. 1955): "A state must be guilty of cruelties against and
persecution of its nationals in such a way as to deny their fundamental human rights and to
shock the conscience of mankind before intervention is permitted."
28. Buergenthal, Domestic Jurisdiction,Intervention, and Human Rights: The Inter-

national Law Perspective, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND U.S. FORWGN POUCY 11, at 115 (P. Brown
ed. 1979).
29. Id. at 115.
30. Id. "Political violence in Ireland began after acts of government repression, and
internment and subsequent torture were catalysts for further opposition to the government." See Cohn, supra note 9, at 162.
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the execution of the leaders of the 1916 minority uprising in Ireland, the
Irish people became aroused and the fight for freedom gained support.8"
The same fight was commenced once again in Ireland, and sympathy was
aroused elsewhere3 2 by the British Government's reluctance to grant political status to IRA prisoners who are currently in Northern Irish jails
serving sentences for violence which could be characterized as politically
motivated. 8 In response to the arrest of twelve Irish citizens on August 9,
1979, and two in October, 1971, the Government of Northern Ireland filed
an application with the European Commission on Human Rights against
the United Kingdom. The application alleged, inter alia, that the British
Government acquiesced in the use of brutality and torture during the interrogation of the detainees.3' The detainees were apparently subjected to
a form of "interrogation in depth" involving the application of five partic3
ular "disorientation" or "sensory deprivation" techniques. 5
The British Government conceded before the European Court of
Human Rights in February, 1977 that it has used these torture techniques on detainees in Northern Ireland.36 In its final disposition of the
case, the court held that detainees had been treated in an inhumane and

degrading fashion, but held that the detainees were not tortured.37 This
holding may be inconsistent with U.N. human rights covenants which refer to "torture and other cruel, inhumane or degrading treatment of
punishment . . ." without differentiating the legality of the sanction.38

31. Murphy, The Principles of Freedom, Irish Echo, May 16, 1981, at 8, col. 1. In the
spring of 1916, in the first days after the Easter Uprising, the British army court-martialed
and executed fifteen of the leading rebels who sought home rule for Ireland, independence
from Britain. Almost immediately public opinion shifted sharply against Britain. Borders,
supra note 17, at 99.
32. A public opinion poll conducted in 1981 indicated that no more than 29 percent of
the British public wanted to retain British sovereignty in the province of Northern Ireland.
Borders, supra note 17, at 99. The political wing of the IRA (Sinn Fein) made a strong
showing in the recent assembly elections in Northern Ireland by picking up five of the 78
seats. Northern Ireland, Fresh Pain, Time, Nov. 1, 1982, at 57.
33. See Borders, note 17 supra.
34. Ir. v. U.K., 1971 Y.B. EUR. CoNv. ON HUMAN RIGHTS 41 (Eur. Comm. on Human
Rights), cited in Cohn, supra note 9, at 172 n.76.
35. The methods, sometimes termed "disorientation" or "sensory deprivation" techniques, consist of: (1) wall-standing: forcing the detainees to remain for periods of some
hours in a "stress position," described by those who underwent it as being "spreadeagled
against the wall, with their fingers put high above the head against the wall, the legs spread
apart and the feet back, causing them to stand on their toes with the weight of the body
mainly on the fingers"; (2) hooding: putting a black bag over the detainee's head and, at
least initially, keeping it there all the time except during interrogation; (3) subjection to
noise: holding the detainees in a room where there was a continuous loud and hissing tone,
while awaiting interrogation; (4) deprivations of sleep: depriving the detainees of sleep
pending their interrogation; and (5) deprivation of food and drink: subjecting the detainees
to a reduced diet during their stay at the prison and pending interrogation. Lowry, note 9
supra. See also R. LILLICH, supra note 7, at 591.
36. Ir. v. U.K., 1971 Y.B. EuR. CoNY. ON HUMAN RIGHTS, note 34 supra.
37. Cohn, supra note 9, at 184.
38. Declaration, supra note 1, art. 5.
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(emphasis added). Therefore, according to U.N. policy, inhumane and degrading treatment may be considered equal to torture.
The recent hunger strike campaign in Northern Ireland illustrates
that the approach of the British Government with respect to deprivation
of human rights continues."9 Therefore, certain states in particular, and
all states bound by traditional international law, have a legal obligation to
40
intervene.

IV.

TREATIES AND CONVENTIONS LEGITIMIZING INTERVENTION

Humanitarian intervention must be precipitated by intense human
rights deprivations and must conform to the general international legal
regulations governing the use of force.41 Historically, legal and quasi-legal
remedies have existed to defend against the use of physical abuse.
Prohibitions were drafted in 1975 when the U.N. General Assembly
adopted the Declaration on the Protection of all Persons from Being Subjected to Torture.4" Article 5 of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights proclaims that "no one shall be subjected to torture, or to cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment of punishment. ' '4 The International
Covehant on Civil and Political Rights 44 and article 3 of the European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 45 contain this same pro-

39. Violence Flares in Ulster as IRA Fast Continues, N.Y. Times, May 10, 1981, at 5,
col. 1. There were more than twenty-five reported deaths after Bobby Sands began his fast
March 1, 1981, five years after Britain abolished the special prisoner status for IRA inmates.
London refused demands for its restoration on ground that it lent legitimacy to IRA tactics.
40. Intervention by other states is permissible under the European Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, adopted Nov. 4, 1950, 213
U.N.T.S. 221, cited in Nanda, Implementation of Human Rights By the United Nations
and Regional Organizations 21 DE PAUL L. REV. 307, 323 (1971). The thirteen states which
have adopted the procedure of individual petitions before the European Commission are
Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Federal Republic of Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom (including
overseas territories). The remaining five member states who have not yet signed the convention are Cyprus, Greece, France, Malta and Turkey. While articles 1 and 55 reaffirm the
United Nations' commitment to promoting universal respect for an observance of human
rights and fundamental freedoms for all, article 56 states that commitment is a positive
obligation for action by member states in defense of human rights: "All Members pledge
themselves to take joint and separate action in cooperation with the organization for the
achievement of the purposes set forth in Article 55." Nanda, HumanitarianMilitary Intervention, 10 WORLDVIEW 23, 24 (1980).
41. Reisman, HumanitarianIntervention to Protect the Ibos, in HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND THE UNITED NATIONS 167, 177 (R. Lillich ed. 1973).
42. Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Being Subjected to Torture, G.A.
Res. 3452, 30 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 34) at 91, U.N. Doc. A/1034 (1975). See also Nayar,
Human Rights: The United Nations and U.S. Foreign Policy, 19 HAxv. INT'L L. J. 813, 816
n.18 (1978).
43. Declaration, supra note 1, art. 5.
44. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signatureDec. 19,
1966, reprinted in 6 I.L.M. 368 (1967) [hereinafter cited as International Covenant].
45. EUROPEAN CONVENTION, note 26 supra. For the text of the Convention, see 45 Am.J.
INT'L L. Supp. 24 (1957).
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vision. Although certain articles in these conventions provide that a contracting party may derogate from its obligations under the conventions in
certain circumstances, derogation from the articles on torture is not
permitted."
The issue of humanitarian intervention involves two competing principles of international law: the right of a state to be free from outside
interference in its internal affairs, and the individual right to enjoyment
and protection of basic human rights. Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter
prohibits the "threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or
political independence of any state. 4 7 The European Convention attempts to impose a legal obligation on states to enforce the principles
expressed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights to protect
human rights.
While the European Convention does not include all the rights mentioned in the Declaration, it provides for meaningful enforcement machinery to protect the rights it does guarantee." Observers of the European Convention frequently raise the following question: Are decisions by
international tribunals such as the European Cbmmission and European
Court anything more than empty pronouncements in that these trilkunals
lack effective powers of enforcement? While it is true that there is no
international police force ready to enforce decisions directly, the legal
(and moral) obligations of the members of the European human rights
community are clear. 4 ' The parties to the European Convention" have
undertaken the duty to secure for everyone within their jurisdiction the
rights and freedoms set forth in that Convention."1 The only specific remedy mentioned in the Convention is compensation.5" However, in addition
to compensation, two other remedies can be sought through petition to
the Commission. These remedies are (1) permanent injunction against a
certain course of conduct by the state concerned and (2) a declaration
that a state's legislation is incompatible with the Convention, which
would create an obligation on the part of the state to revoke such legislation and to uphold its international obligations.5 3 In the Case of Northern

46. Cohn, supra note 9, at 177.
47. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4.
48. EUROPEAN CONVErION, note 26 supra.See also Hannum, Ireland in Strasbourg:An
o
n,
An/,,-;- nf Wth.o.
;oh P,..oeodi,ngs Rafro the P,-, nnan
Rights, 7 IRIsH JURIST 329 (1972). For a general discussion of the European Convention, see
O'Hanlon, The Brussels Colloquy on Human Rights, 5 IRISH JURIST 252 (1970), and Weil,
The European Convention on Human Rights, 57 AM. J. INT'L L. 804 (1963).
49. Hannum, supra note 48, at 340.
50. There are fifteen members of the Commission and seventeen members of the Court,
even though only eleven states recognize its compulsory jurisdiction. R. BEDDARD, HUMAN
RIGHTS AND EUROPE: A STUDY OF THE MACHINERY OF HUMAN RIGHTS PROTECTIONS OF THE
COUNCIL OF EUROPE 30 (1973).
51. European Convention, note 26 supra.
52. See Hannum, supra note 48, at 341.
53. Id.
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Ireland,5 4 no sanctions have yet been imposed on the United Kingdom.
V.

U.S. FOREIGN POLICY AND HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION

Three multilateral human rights treaties have been signed but not
ratified by the United States. These treaties are the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,5 5 the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights," and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights." These treaties, adopted
by the United Nations, 8 collectively define a series of individual fundamental rights. Significantly, each treaty contains provisions for its enforcement, requiring signatories to report the measures taken to implement the treaties to a committee of independent experts."
From November 14-19, 1979, the Foreign Relations Committee of the
U.S. Senate held hearings to consider ratification of the previously mentioned multilateral human rights treaties. It was generally believed that
any efforts to provide international protection to the fundamental rights
of the individual would be fruitless without U.S. ratification of the treaties.60 Witnesses opposing ratification expressed concern that the U.S. obligation would infringe upon areas of domestic concern that have been
traditionally left to national governments.'1 To date, these treaties have
not been ratified by the U.S. Senate. However, the U.N. Charter, which
outlines one of that organization's major objectives as the elimination of
human rights violations, has been codified. 6 Thus, whether or not the
United States ratifies the treaties, it has a continuing obligation to observe the Charter, including support for the resolutions adopted by the
Security Council.6"
Aside from ratification of treaties, U.S. intervention in Northern Ireland could proceed through diplomatic channels. There exist enough politicians with constituents who possess strong feelings about human rights
54. See note 34 supra.
55. The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, opened
for signature March 7, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 195. This treaty, to which there are 106 parties,
was signed on behalf of the United States on September 28, 1966. See UNrED STATES RATI-

(R. Lillich ed. 1981), and Bennett, U.S. Senate
Hearings on Human Rights Treaties, 74 AM. J. INT'L L. 453 (1980).
56. Opened for signatureDec. 19, 1966, reprinted in 6 I.L.M. 360 (1967) and S. EXEC.
Docs. C, D, E, AND F. This Covenant, to which there are 62 parties, was signed on behalf of
the United States on Oct. 5, 1977, and entered into force on Jan. 3, 1976. See Bennett, note
55 supra.
57. International Covenant, note 44 supra.
58. See Bennett, supra note 55, at 454.
FICATION OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES,

59. Id.

60. Bennett, supra note 55, at 454.
61. Id.
62. U.N. CHARTER, 59 Stat. 1031.
63. The U.N. Charter, a treaty ratified by the United States, is part of the Supreme

Law of the land. United States v. Steinberg, 478 F. Supp. 29 (N.D. IMI.1979); Balfour Guthrie & Co. v. United States, 90 F. Supp. 831, 832 (N.D. Cal. 1950).
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and the situation in Northern Ireland to make diplomatic intervention
desirable and plausible."'
However, there are recognized dilemmas and problems which limit
U.S. implementation of a strong human rights policy. National security
interests may force the United States to continue aiding a country which
may be violating the human rights of its own citizens.65 In addition,
human rights 'oncerns may be too sensitive to raise without imposing too
great a strain on our relations with other countries." Nevertheless, the
Congress has taken a major step toward the sanctioning of human rights
violations by drafting legislation such as the Foreign Assistance Act."
That Act, passed in the early 1970's, established explicit human rights
criteria for decisions on military and economic assistance. Section 502B of
the Act forbids military assistance, arms sales or the transfer of crime
control and police equipment to governments that engage in a consistent
pattern of violations of internationally recognized human rights, unless
extraordinary circumstances justify such a transfer. Section 116 of the
same act forbids economic assistance to such countries unless the aid will
directly benefit needy people."
VI.

CONCLUSION

States may exercise a number of options to make humanitarian support of political prisoners in Northern Ireland meaningful. These include:
1) an increase in their levels of international assistance; 2) the enactment
of statutes such as section 502B of the Foreign Assistance Act and the
adoption of a mechanism for the enforcement of such statutes; 3) the acknowledgement of human rights violations and the expression of tangible
concern for the conditions in Northern Ireland; and 4) the curtailment of
economic and military assistance to the United Kingdom unless the economic aid will directly benefit needy people. A foreign policy based on
these fundamental values may help to prevent additional abuses.
As previously discussed, the European Court of Human Rights has
found that the British Government treated detainees in a cruel, inhuman
and degrading fashion. The British Government also interned persons
without trial in violation of traditional and basic internationally recog-

64. Former New YVrk State Governor Hugh Carey, Senator Daniel Moynih. and 51
members of the U.S. House and Senate, including Senator Lowell Weiker and House
Speaker Thomas P. O'Neill, Jr., called on Americans to reject the path of violence in Northern Ireland. Other New York state legislators criticized the British Government and called
on it to cease its violations, to specify a certain date when it will leave the province and to
begin immediate and meaningful negotiations with all pertinent parties in Northern Ireland
and the Republic. N.Y. Times, March 18, 1982 at 8, col. 1.
65. Human Rights and American Foreign Policy: A Symposium, COMMENTARY 44 (Nov.

1981).
66. Id.
67. Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 §502B, 22 U.S.C. §2304 (amended 1979).
68. Id. at §116.

1983

DEVELOPMENTS

nized civil liberties.69 The denial of basic civil liberties and the recorded
violations which have been perpetrated on certain groups in Northern
Ireland have shocked both the common man and the justices of international tribunals called upon to review such behavior. Given such maltreatment, Professor Claydon, speaking at the Conference of the Procedural
Aspects of the International Law Institute on the Subject of Humanitarian Intervention and the United Nations,7 0 speculated on the legitimacy
of intervention in Northern Ireland. He listed as deprivations which
would act as catalysts for intervention such items as discrimination in
employment and voting, and internment without trial and torture of suspected terrorists. "Although internment, torture and the like might not
be enough to justify intervention, if this category is coupled with regular
loss of life that will certainly continue in the future, it may posaibly be
enough to justify intervention. ' '71 Great Britain's human rights violations
in Northern Ireland, documented in the European Court of Human
Rights and reported in the world media,7 2 establish a pattern of human
rights violations sufficient to justify intervention, if this analysis is applied. Professor Claydon raises another issue related to the Northern
Irish situation: "Is there a likelihood of intervention against a member of
the European Community, namely the United Kingdom?" While it is
clear that international law permits nations to intervene, there are doubts
as to whether any country would intervene in such a situation. Unfortunately, there are no distinct precedents to suggest an answer.7s
Existing rules of international law essentially prohibit military intervention by a nation or group of nations. The U.N. Charter proscribes
member nations "in their international relations from the threat or use of
force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any
state."' 7' However, in certain limited extraordinary situations where gross
and persistent violations of basic human rights prevail in a nation, intervention is warranted. There is no universal solution which can be applied
automatically to each rights violation. While a state may not be able to
assure sufficient health care, food or housing, states such as Northern Ireland and Great Britain can immediately cease acts which violate human
rights. Until they do so voluntarily, however, the existing global mechanisms for implementing the doctrine of humanitarian intervention, trea-

69. See Borders, note 17 supra.
70. HumanitarianIntervention and the United Nations Conference on the Procedural
Aspects of International Law Institute-1972, in HubArrARuN INTERVrNTION AND THE
UNrrED NATIONS 91 (R. Lillich ed. 1973). The conference sought (1) to clarify as much as
possible the status of the doctrine of humanitarian intervention under contemporary international law; and (2) to recommend ways the United Nations might create or adopt institutions to govern the invocation and to regulate the use of coercive measures in humanitarian
situations.
71. Id. at 92.
72. See notes 32-34 supra.
73. See note 72 supra.
74. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4. See also Nanda, supra note 40, at 23.
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ties, conventions and the human rights tribunals are the most appropriate
methods for assuring that human rights are protected in Northern
Ireland.
The doctrine of humanitarian intervention supports a moral and legal argument for the use of force when acts which violate human rights
become patterns of unacceptable conduct. 75 This argument specifically
addresses those actions that are viewed by the international community
as intolerable offenses against basic human dignity and affronts to the
conscience of mankind.76 The precedent of the hunger strikers and the
concommitant violence in Northern Ireland suggest that such inhumane
acts may continue to occur in that region and will continue to shock the
global conscience. States cannot pick and choose which human rights
causes to defend. The persistence and severity of the situation in Northern Ireland warrants that legally-based intervention embodied in sources
of international law such as the European Convention.
Eileen B. Quigley

75. See Fairley, supra note 27, at 60-61.
76. Id.
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Le droit de l'int6gration 6conomique

socialiste
Reviewed by Dominique Carreau*
R.

BYSTRICKY, LE DROIT DE L'INT7tGRATION ACONOMIQUE SOCIALISTM;

Sijthoff &

Noordhoff, Leiden, The Netherlands (1979); available in the United States

from Kluwer Boston, Inc., 190 Old Derby St., Hingham, Mass. 02043; $48.00;
ISBN 90-286-0339-5; xii, 471 pp.; footnotes, appendix, bibliography, index.

In Le droit de l'int~gration 6conomique socialiste Professor Bystricky critically analyzes the theory and practice of the socialist economic
integration. Regional economic integration is a prominent feature of contemporary international relations. Small- or medium-sized nations form
regional groups in order to create a large market for their goods. Producers capable of doing so will expand their production when such a market
is available, and lower costs of production will result because of economies of scale. Therefore, more goods will be available in the regional market at lower prices, and the producers will be more competitive in the
world market as well. Continental-size states such as Brazil, China, India,
the United States, and the U.S.S.R., enjoy a marked advantage over
smaller nations. For small- and medium-sized nations the choice is crystal
clear-either they form regional economic groups with their neighbors or
they will have no economic clout in the world. The framers of the postWorld War II international trade charters fully recognized this choice and
saw the necessity of regional economic groupings. Thus, article XXIV of
the G.A.T.T. 1 expressly legitimizes international economic integrations,
provided they take the form of either free trade areas or customs unions
and that they adhere to certain principles designed to make them trade
2
creating and not trade diverting.
Regional economic integrations are numerous. No continent has remained unaffected by the move toward unification. Regardless of their
* Dominique Carreau is a Professor of Law at the University of Paris I, and a member
of the Board of Advisors of the Denver Journalof InternationalLaw and Policy.
1. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, art. xxiv, 61 Stat. Pts. 5 & 6,
T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187.
2. Id. The distinction between trade creating and trade diverting was made famous by
U.S. economist Jacob Viner in the 1950's. See generally J. ViNmi, THE CUSTOMS UNION ISSUE (1950).
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level of development or their domestic economic or political organization,
most nations are members of some kind of regional economic group. However, not all economic groups are alike. In this respect, a basic distinction
must be drawn between groups formed solely for economic cooperation
and those which reflect true economic integration. True integration implies a surrender of sovereignty on the part of the group's members,
whereas economic cooperation does not imply such a surrender of sovereignty. It is not surprising that relatively few regional groups based on
the concept of strict economic integration between member states have
been formed. Nations are usually reluctant to give up their sovereignty
even if that surrender of power is limited to the economic sphere. Moreover, regional integrations cannot be exclusively circumscribed to economic matters, and the formation of any regional group entails obvious
political consequences. It is no secret that the fathers of the European
economic reconstruction after World War II desired a political integration
of Europe as well as an economic one. In setting up economic integration
institutions' they pursued the goal, some would say the dream, of political integration. They hoped that some sort of "United States of Europe"
would evolve.4 Ever since, within the European Economic Community
(EEC), Member States and theoreticians have been divided over the issue
of integration; some favor a "supranational" Europe, e.g., organized on
the model of a federal state, and some favor a "Europe of States," e.g., an
organization in which each member retains as many sovereign powers as
possible.5
Eastern European socialist countries also formed a regional economic
organization shortly after World War IIs to help solve their economic
problems. The organization, commonly known as COMECON,' was very
inactive during the first two decades or so of its existence. The turning
point for COMECON came with the adoption in 1971 of a voluminous
"Comprehensive Program for the further deepening and perfecting of cooperation and development of the socialist economic integration between
participating members." Professor Bystricky's book, and this constitutes
its principal merit, forcefully demonstrates the uniqueness of the socialist
integration. COMECON is radically different from the EEC despite some
outward similarities.
Professor Bystricky's main line of argument is that political considerations are responsible for the economic integration of socialist countries,
3. Such institutions include EURATOM, the European Coal and Steel Community and
the European Economic Community.
4. See W.F. FELD, TRANSNATIONAL

BUSINESS COLLABORATION AMONG COMMON LAW
COUNTRIES: ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR POLITICAL INTEGRATION (1970); R. PRYCE, THE POLITICS OF
THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY (1973).
5. See W.F. FELD, TRANSNATIONAL BUSIrNSS COLLABORATION AMONG COMMON LAW
CouNTRucs: ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR POLITICAL INTEGRATION (1970).
6. R. BYSTmCKY, LE DROrr DE L'IN TGRATION *CONOMIQUE SOCIALiSTE 7 (1979).

7. This acronym stands for the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance.
8. R.

BySTRICKY,

supra note 6, at 8.
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while the Treaty of Rome9 creating the EEC primarily relies on private
economic forces and interests to achieve a "common market." Whether
the factor responsible for integration is governmental fiat or private economic forces, economic and political factors cannot remain isolated. The
author correctly remarks that the economic achievements of COMECON
countries remain disappointing if compared to those attained in the West,
while the EEC, albeit an economic success, has more or less come to a
halt for lack of political will to achieve a greater degree of integration.
Professor Bystricky attributes the impressive political achievements of
the socialist community to the leadership of the Communist Party in each
country. The Communist Party represents a real "supranational power"
that is presently missing within the ten-nation EEC.
Among the main sources of COMECON regional law are the general
laws of socialist construction which provide for the collective ownership
of all means of production, strict economic planning, democratic centralism, state monopoly of foreign trade, and the dominant role of the Communist Party.10 However, it is the Soviet Union's interpretation of socialism which is considered to be the true embodiment of these general
principles. Thus, Professor Bystricky maintains that the COMECON
structure is imposed on its member states by the Soviet Union in order to
foster its own political and military interests, and that COMECON's general underlying principles conveniently aid the Soviet Union in dominating its smaller socialist partners. All deviations from the Soviet view of
socialism may be crushed by relying on the omnipresent and pervading
principle of "socialist internationalism." According to this principle, all
national interests must be subordinated to those of the workers' international revolutionary movement." Thus, when the so-called socialist
"achievements" are threatened in a given COMECON member state, the
socialist community has the right, if not the obligation, to intervene even
by military means to protect such gains.1 2 Hence, the Soviet interventions
in Berlin in 1953, in Hungary in 1956, and in Czechoslovakia in 1968.
COMECON members possess only a limited sovereignty which must bow
in case of conflict to the general laws of socialist construction as these
laws are superior to the national laws within the countries of the Communist bloc. 8 This position is maintained notwithstanding the recognized
principle of international law of the sovereign equality of states. One can
agree with the author when he points out that such a position is entirely
incompatible with the present state of international law. However, it

9. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, opened for signature Nov.
23, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11.

10. R.

BYSTRICKY,

supra note 6, at 44-45.

11. Id. at 96-97.
12. Id. at 98.
13. Id. at 112. The substance of this doctrine was contained in a remark made by Leonid Brezhnev in 1968. Alluding to the Soviet invasion of Hungary, he stated: "The U.S.S.R.
cannot be and will never be indifferent to the destiny of the socialist construction in other
countries or to the cause of world communism." Id.
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would have been interesting to raise the question of whether the limited
sovereignty concept could be viewed as a norm of jus cogens. This would
most likely be the socialist defense of this concept, but, in the mind of
this reviewer, such an assertion cannot be legally argued with persuasion.
Finally, it is sometimes difficult to agree with all the conclusions
reached by Professor Bystricky about the political and systemic aspects
of COMECON. For instance, he states that "the law of the mightiest is
' and implies that,
the rule within the socialist community" 14
in the years
to come, COMECON's smaller members will actually have a status analogous to that of federated republics within the U.S.S.R. 15 These statements constitute unwarranted conclusions that cannot be accepted.
Professor Bystricky is more perceptive when he draws attention to
the double-talk phenomenon which so puzzles Westerners and which
mars their comprehension of socialist institutions. For instance, when one
reads COMECON's constitutive instruments, one has the impression that
what the framers had in mind was to create an institution based simply
on cooperation among members rather than an institution with supranational organs whose purpose is economic and political integration. The
author aptly demonstrates that the way COMECON actually operates is
entirely different from the way its organizational instruments indicate it
should operate, and that one should not be confused by the official terminology. Thus, a true integration is the purpose of COMECON, and its
policies are founded on supranationality principles even though this concept was officially rejected by the Comprehensive Program of 1971.' To
illustrate his thesis, Bystricky points out the fact that COMECON-created law is supreme over national law and sometimes becomes part of
national law with no other action on the part of the country, that some
important economic sectors are jointly planned, and that the unanimity
required in the COMECON decisionmaking process progressively became
fictitious and was phased out by the Comprehensive Program of 1971.17
Furthermore, as noted above, the leading role of the Communist Parties
and the common ideology in the COMECON nations together with the
"socialist internationalism" principle are instrumental in developing a socialist community which does not recognize national boundaries, which is
truly supranational. Thus, the author reaches the paradoxical, albeit accurate, conclusion that the Treaty of Rome creating the EEC enshrines a
supranationality principle, but its working has consistently been blocked
for lack of political will. On the other hand, COMECON's Comprehensive
Program of 1971 officially rejects all supranational references, but, in reality, COMECON's evolution clearly shows that the socialist integration is
guided by the principle of supranationality.

14. Id. at 334.

15. Id. at 324.
16. Id. at 89.
17. Id. at 41-44.
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Equally puzzling for a Western lawyer is the legal nature of recommendations adopted by COMECON organs. In theory, and in conformity
with the commonly accepted rules of international law, they are not binding on member states. According to Bystricky, they are similar to international treaties or EEC regulations. To this reviewer, it would seem preferable to equate them to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development council decisions that bind interested members only. The
fact is that COMECON recommendations constitute obligatory legal
norms for participating Member States. 18
Professor Bystricky's book provides interested readers with a precise
and concise description of COMECON organs and accomplishments. Unfortunately, Professor Bystricky's treatment of East-West joint ventures
is brief and superficial, particularly in view of the fact that these joint
ventures represent one of the most promising modes of transideological
cooperation. Perhaps this treatment of the subject reflects the author's
deep-rooted feeling that economic integrations between socialist and capitalist nations are an impossible dream.
Finally, in his concluding remarks, Professor Bystricky touches upon
a controversial topic. He states that the COMECON nations have not
achieved true socialism but have only copied the Soviet Union's version
of socialism which would be described by some as state capitalism and by
others, including this reviewer, as the kind of oriental despotism analyzed
by Karl Marx. 9 Bystricky's further criticisms of the socialist system and
COMECON are equally unflattering. The tone is set, and it is not
dispassionate.

18. Id. at 34-40.
19. Id. at 338.
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SIMONS,

W.B.,

THE CONSTITUTIONS

OF THE COMMUNIST

WORLD;

Sijthoff and Noordhoff, Alphen aan den Rijn, The Netherlands (1980);
Germantown, Md. U.S.A.; ISBN 90-286-00701, LC 80-65005; xvii, 644 pp.;
appendix, sytematic index to text of all constitutions.
This volume collects the complete texts of the current constitutions
of sixteen communist-party states and provides a brief outline of each. A
systematic index at the end provides a comprehensive listing of the location of relevant text provisions for all these constitutions under nineteen
different subject headings. These headings cover political systems, economic systems, social development and culture, foreign affairs, national
defense, citizenship equality, citizens' rights and freedoms, citizens' obligations, territorial structure, electoral systems, organs of state power, and
courts.
This project was sponsored by the Documentation Office for East European Law of the University of Leyden Faculty of Law; this book is intended as a followup to Professor Jan R. Triska's The Constitutions of
the Communist-Party States (Stanford, 1968). Many communist constitutions have been rewritten or newly issued since that time and appear in
their current form in this volume, including those of the Soviet Union,
Pol Pot's Kampuchea, and the People's Republic of China. Since this
work is intended primarily for reference, the introduction to each constitution is an outline of the text, rather than an analysis of its content or
background.
The following countries' constitutions are reproduced: Albania, Bulgaria, China, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary,
Kampuchea, North Korea, Mongolia, Poland, Rumania, the Soviet Union,
Viet Nam, and Yugoslavia. Each text and its accompanying outline were
provided by individual scholars from some dozen different law faculties in
Western Europe, Yugoslavia, or the United States.
William B. Simons is with the University of Leyden Documentation
Office for East European Law.
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ORGANISATION FOR EcONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, Nu-
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CLEAR ENERGY AGENCY, NUCLEAR LEGISLATION ANALYTICAL STUDY; REGULATIONS GOVERNING THE TRANSPORT OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS; OECD,

75775 PARIS CEDEX 16, France (1981); available in United States from
OECD Publications and Information Center, Suite 1207, 1750 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W. Washington, D.C. 20006; ISBN 92-64-12158-7; 201 pp.
Last in a series of four analytical studies of nuclear energy legislation in
OECD member countries.
This is a concise and authoritative reference work for anyone investigating the legal aspects of the transport of radioactive materials in any
one of twenty-three OECD member countries. Rather than being a simple
reproduction of legislative acts, this book in outline format summarizes
and analyzes all existing law country by country, and provides citations to
the source of every rule of law covered. The same organization is used in
each country's outline so as to facilitate retrieval and comparison of provisions and authorities of any research problem in the area.
The analytic headings for the outline format include introductory
analysis, provisions of general application, and particular modes of transport. The final heading encompasses five modes of transport: rail, road,
inland waterway, sea, and air. Each of these modes is in turn broken
down according to competent authorities and licensing and safety
requirements.
Legislation for the following countries is treated: Australia, Austria,
Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain,
Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom, the United States and
West Germany.
There is a separate chapter on international regulation. It is broken
down according to introductory considerations of the hazards associated
with transport of radioactive materials, International Atomic Energy
Agency regulations and specific requirements, and international
agreements.
The contributing editors and authors are Patrick Reyners, Colin McIntosh, Liane Saad, Ha Vinh Phuong, and Gerald Swindell.
International Economic Law
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND BUSINESS;
EMERGING FINANCIAL CENTERS; LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAME&WORK;

(R.C. Effros ed. Washington, D.C. 1982); $35 cloth; ISBN 0-939934-20-5,
LC 82-84226; xvi, 1150 pp. Foreword by G.P. Nicoletopoulos, Director Legal Department, International Monetary Fund.

This is primarily a reference work providing complete reproductions
of the key national banking laws for seven newly recognized important
financial centers. The centers included are the following: the Bahamas,
Hong Kong, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Panama, Singapore, and Kuwait. The

number of currently effective statutes and decrees reported for each
country varies from five to twenty-six. Each set of national laws is intro-
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duced by a ten to twenty-page outline of the history and current structure of that country and its financial practices. These brief introductions
treat different individual sub-topics such as local monetary authorities,
currency boards, past exchange policies, credit control, reserve requirements, financial intermediaries, stock exchanges, capital markets, and
government procedures.
The editor, a tax and banking specialist, is the Assistant General
Counsel to the International Monetary Fund. He has published widely on
financial matters and now lectures on these topics at the American University Washington College of Law.

t
GOLD, J., THE FUND AGREEMENT IN THE COURTS: VOLUME II; International Monetary Fund, Washington, D.C. (1982); cloth $17.50; ISBN 0939934-17-5; xii, 499 pp.; footnotes, bibliography, table of cases, indices of
authors, subjects, principles and conclusions, and legislation and cases.
This is a revision and expansion of a first volume, published in 1962
under the same title.

This volume collects fifteen articles written over the last twenty
years, during the author's service as General Counsel and, later, as Senior
Consultant to the IMF. Ten articles have appeared in the Fund's periodical Staff Papers, while five are previously unpublished.
The ten previously published articles, all entitled The Fund Agreement in the Courts and enumerated sequentially, are contemporaneously
written summaries of interpretations of the Fund Agreement and Amendments by courts and commentators from various Fund member countries.
The abundance of such national interpretations reflects the Fund's own
policy of avoiding numerous authoritative interpretations of its own statutes. This volume's introduction discusses the reasons for and significance
of this policy of deliberate omission.
The five previously unpublished articles treat a variety of more recent issues, including President Carter's 1979 freezing of Iranian assets,
gold units of account, the monetary effect of the G.A.T.T., and exchange
control and arbitration. Also reproduced here is a Fund pamphlet on the
post-Castro Cuban insurance cases and the extraterritoriality of exchange
control regulations. Within these articles numerous miscellaneous topics
are treated, including contracts unenforceable under the Articles,
Eurodollar loans, letters of credit, and unjust enrichment in exchange
transactions.
Sir Joseph Gold has been, in turn, a staff attorney, General Counsel,
and Senior Consultant to the IMF since 1946. He has published prolifically, in both book and article form, within and outside the IMF throughout this period. He is a law graduate of the University of London and of
Harvard University.
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t
TOWNSEND,

J.B.,

EXTRATERRITORIAL ANTITRUST: THE SHERMAN ANTI-

TRUST ACT AND U.S. BUSINESS ABROAD; Westview Press, 5500 Central

Ave., Boulder, Co. 80301 (1980); ISBN 0-89158-483-8, LC 79-18802, xiii,
308 pp.; footnotes, bibliography, tables, appendices, table of cases, index.
One in the series of Westview Special Studies in InternationalEconomics and Business.
This work is an exhaustive legal and market analysis of the tradi-

tional claim by U.S. business that the Sherman Act inhibits and injures
the competitive position of U.S. business abroad.
The author begins by reciting the historical background and theoretical basis of domestic antitrust law. He then examines the extraterritorial
application of this body of law in both theory and in actual experience.
Next, he compares the practical results of this experience with American
public interest. The author concludes that extraterritorial application of
the Sherman Act adversely affects that portion of U.S. foreign investment
which is involved in manufacturing. He does not, however, recommend
any particular changes in current U.S. antitrust policy.
The first chapters provide a detailed introduction to the field of antitrust. Following chapters detail the application of judicial precedent to
particular foreign investment topics such as licensing, export, ownership,
marketing, and modes of competition. All topics are thoroughly footnoted
to both secondary and primary sources.
James B. Townsend is assistant professor of business administration
at Kansas State University.
Problems in the Law of the Sea
HARTMANN, G.K., WEAPONS THAT WAIT: MINE WARFARE IN THE U.S.
NAVY; Naval Inst. Press, Annapolis, Md. (1979); ISBN 0-87021-753-4, LC

78-71766; xi, 294 pp.; bibliography, tables, illustrations, index, appendices, preface.
This book is about the historical development and current status of
mine warfare. It could be used as a starting point for developing the legal
and policy problems in this area of warfare. Written from the viewpoint
of Western military planners, it is a purely technical treatment of these
topics and contains no extensive legal or political analysis. However, because it is a comprehensive account of the strategy and application of
mine weapons, it is an appropriate place for the nonexpert to begin.
Especially important in this regard is the author's analysis of the
strategic implications for the West of the new technological capacity of
modern submarines and mines. He persuasively argues that the speed and
relative invulnerability of modern submarines will tend to magnify the
importance of mine warfare. During times of international tension or war,
mining may not be limited to key harbors and narrow straits, but may
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well include extensive areas in coastal waters and even shipping lanes on
the high seas. Accompanying the new wartime doctrines may be contingency planning and measures involving a degree of peacetime execution.
The book's opening chapters outline the development and past applications of naval mines. The middle chapters relate present mine technology and doctrine. The author concludes with an extensive analysis of the
unused potential of this technology, a criticism of the bureaucracy now
controlling its employment and a projection of the probable further development of doctrine and tactics.

t
McLEOD, G.C. & PRESCOTT, J.H. (eds.), GEORGES BANK: PAST, PREWestview Press, 5500 Central Ave., Boulder, Co. 80301 (1982); ISBN 0-86531-199-4, LC 81-11534;
xvi, 196 pp.; tables, illustrations, bibliography, index, introduction by the
editors. Part of the series Westuiew Special Studies In Ocean Science
and Policy.
SENT, AND FUTURE OF A MARINE ENVIRONMENT;

This slim volume is a collection of lectures summarizing the historical, political, and scientific backgrounds of the controversy over proposed
offshore drilling on Georges Bank. The Bank is a famous and highly
productive fishing ground off the coasts of New England and Nova Scotia.
Numerous major oil companies have already acquired exploration rights.
The ensuing protests by fishery interests and by environmentalists
prompted the U.S. Government in 1980 to enact the Fishery Conservation
Management Act as a means of evaluating and arbitrating conflicting
claims. An additional controversy over the Bank arises in Canada's claim
to a greater share of the existing fishing and exploration area. This claim
arises as both the United States and Canada extend their claims out to
the new 200-mile limit. Analysis of Canada's claim in this work rests both
on legal arguments as well as on the political capital accumulated in her
work on behalf of the U.S. hostages in Iran.
Most of the contributors pay primary attention to the question of the
proposed energy development. However, Francis Cameron does treat in
detail the 1979 U.S.-Canadian East Coast Fishery Treaty, the principal
negotiating instrument in the current boundary dispute. The other contributors, both Canadian and American, are opponents of oil and gas development on the Bank. Most of their presentations, however, are balanced and give fair analyses of the operative political considerations and
of the probable future course of the dispute. They are most valuable for
their concise, nontechnical summaries of current knowledge of the geology, oceanography, natural resources, and fisheries management of
Georges Bank.
Each contribution represents one or more lectures from the series
given on Georges Bank at the New England Aquarium during 1980.
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Guy C. McLeod is director of research at the Edgerton Laboratory of
the New England Aquarium. John H. Prescott is the executive director of
the Aquarium.

SMITH, G.P. II, RESTRICTING THE CONCEPT OF FREE SEAS: MODERN
MARITIME LAW RE-EVALUATED; Krieger Publishing Co., 645 New York

Ave., Huntington, N.Y. 11743 (1980); ISBN 0-88275-998-1, LC 79-15020;
242 pp.; footnotes, appendices. Foreword by William E. Butler, University
of London.

This book is a brief summary of the history of the development and
application of the principle of freedom of the seas. It is written to provide
a background to the attempts in the U.N. Conference on the Law of the
Sea (UNCLOS) negotiations to limit the absolute nature of this traditional principle.

The opening chapter traces the ancient and early modern development of freedom of the seas. Two following chapters describe the limitations placed on the principle between 1900 and the beginning of the U.N.
talks, in 1970 in Malta. The main themes for this period are the introduction of the concept of innocent passage and the first attempt at a general

maritime convention, at Geneva in 1958. In his three final chapters, the
author gives a jurist's analysis of the political forces and conflicts which
compelled both the convention as well as the current tone and substance
of the UNCLOS conference. The issues of military security and of national economic zones are treated specifically. Although the account of
the progress of the UNCLOS talks ends at the 1979 New York meeting,
the analytic mode is broad and historical. Thus, the book's general projections about the probable future legal division of maritime rights and

resources still apply.
The entire second half of the book consists of appendices containing
selected excerpts, with analysis, from the 1958 Geneva treaty and from
successive drafts of the UNCLOS negotiating text.
The author is a professor of law at the Catholic University in Washington, D.C. Besides an extensive background with both governmental
and private entities concerned with ocean policies, he was twice the ABA
Journal reporter at the UNCLOS Conference.
International Taxation.
GIFFORD, W.C. & OWENS,

E.A.,

INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF U.S. IN-

COME TAXATION; PART THREE: TAXATION OF U.S. CITIZENS AND RESIDENTS
ON FOREIGN SOURCE INCOME; International Tax Program, Harvard Law

School, Cambridge, Mass. (1982); paper; ISBN 0-915506-26-2, LC 8018605; xxv, 733 pp.; footnotes, table of cases, summary outline of
contents.
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This is the second volume of a three-volume casebook. It is for a
four-hour law school course on international aspects of American tax law
developed by Harvard's International Tax Program. The complementary
Volumes I and II, both authored by Ms. Owens, appeared in 1980 and
covered the following topics: introduction to international income taxation, taxation of nonresident aliens and foreign corporations on U.S.
source income, U.S. income tax treaties, and international tax evasion.
Each topic is designed to be self-contained, so that each can stand alone
as the basis for a seminar or short course restricted to that area.
Organization of the volume is along standard casebook lines. The following topics are given comprehensive treatment in sections from fifty to
200 pages long: foreign currency transactions, IRS Code provisions affecting individuals, forms of doing business abroad, deferral, and foreign tax
credits. This casebook is extensively footnoted to the 1954 Code and to
Treasury Department Regulations.
William C. Gifford is a member of the New York and District of Columbia bars. Elisabeth Owens is Research Director of the Harvard International Tax Program.

t
JEHLE,

E.,

INVESTMENT AND TAXATION IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF

International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation, Att. Mr. E. Jehle,
P.O. Box 20237, 1000 H E Amsterdam, Telex No. 13 217 intax nl, Tel.(0)
20-26 77 26 (1981) paper; i, 150 pp.; appendices of treaties, bibliography.
This is the third edition of a chapter on the People's Republic of China
from loose-leaf service publication Taxes and Investment in Asia and the
Pacific.
Even though many original sources are unavailable, this is as comprehensive and authoritative a service as is available on this area of Chinese
law. Updating in all areas is done through the IBFD's Tax News Service.
CHINA;

Under the heading of investment the following areas are treated in
separate sections, each containing its own detailed topic outline: forms of
business, exchange control, banking and insurance facilities, licensing, investment laws, taxes, individual income tax, taxation of entities, taxation

of property and capital, license duties, tax administration, and tax avoidance sanctions. Forthcoming are sections on economic analysis and other
topics. The appendices include information on and reproductions of miscellaneous PRC trade and import legislation. Also useful is the inclusion
of information on important addresses and procedures for interested investors and importers.
is

Eugen Jehle, who prepared the chapter represented by this volume,
a research associate at the International Bureau of Fiscal

Documentation.
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POSTLEWAITE, P.F., COLLINS, M.P., INTERNATIONAL INDIVIDUAL TAXATION; Shepard's/McGraw-Hill, Inc., P.O. Box 1235, Colorado Springs, Co.

80901 (1982); ISBN 0-0705-0544-6, LC 81-14468; xxv, 507 pp.; footnotes,
index, tables, appendices, and provision for pocket part.
In the introduction the author states that there are two goals which
the book is designed to meet. One is to provide the novice with an intelligible explanation of international individual taxation; the other is to provide the experienced user a complete and thorough resource material in
the field. The extensive use of footnotes allows the authors to present a
readable text as well as a thorough treatment of the topics.
The treatise covers the international tax consequences, from a U.S.
perspective, of transactions carried out by individuals and partnerships as
well as those occurring between partnerships and their owners. Part One
deals with U.S. taxation of nonresident aliens. Thus, issues of residency,
income source, effectively connected income, and the rate structure for
nonresident aliens are examined in Part One.
In Part Two, important provisions for domestic residents and citizens
are discussed. This part is oriented toward encouraging expansion of
American business abroad. Part Two includes chapters on the taxation of
Americans abroad, expatriation as a method of tax avoidance, operations
in U.S. possessions, and the foreign tax credit.
Part Three focuses on tax treaties and the efforts of the United
States and other countries to avoid the problem of double taxation
through the use of tax treaties. The concept and effect of passive income
is also discussed. Part Four deals with the foreign aspects of partnership
taxation, touching upon the issues of whether an enterprise is a partnership or corporation and the effects of the dissolution of the partnership.
Philip F. Postlewaite is associate professor of law at Northwestern
University School of Law. Michael P. Collins is an associate with Coudert
Brothers in New York City.
Human Rights
KAVASS, I.I., GRANIER, J.P., & DOMINICK, M.F., HUMAN RIGHTS, EUROPEAN POLITICS, AND THE HELSINKI ACCORD: THE DOCUMENTARY EVOLUTION
OF THE CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE, 1973-1975,
VOL. I: STAGE ONE: HELSINKI, 1973; William S. Hein and Co., Inc., 1285

Main Street, Buffalo, N.Y. 14209 (1981); cloth, six vols., $285.00; ISBN 0-

89941-107-x, LC 81-84030; xix, 419 pp.; First of a six-volume collection.
This volume opens a six-volume collection of selected working papers
from the 1973-1975 Helsinki Conference on Security and Cooperation in
Europe. This is the only currently available public source for these documents. This volume covers the 1973 negotiations in Helsinki, the "Stage
I" negotiations. Volumes II through V cover "Stage II," the extended Ge-
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neva negotiations of September, 1973 to July, 1975. Volume VI covers
"Stage III," the final session, where the Heads of State from thirty-five
participant countries adopted the Final Act.
Volume I contains the final recommendation of the 1973 conference
and the extensive verbatim records of the negotiating sessions.
Volume II concentrates on the journals of five of the many different
subcommittees at the Geneva talks.
Volume III presents the documents finally agreed on and issued by
the committee working on European security questions, one of the three
main areas of the Helsinki Final Act.
Volume IV presents the committee findings on economic, scientific,
and environmental cooperation.
Volume V provides the final work of the committee for cooperation
in humanitarian and other fields.
Volume VI presents the verbatim records of the proceedings on the
Final Act, as well as the Final Act itself.
Igor I. Kavass is law library director and law professor at Vanderbilt
University, where Jaqueline P. Granier is Legal Documents Librarian.
Mary F. Dominick, a recent Vanderbilt law graduate, clerks for the Honorable James Hancock in U.S. District Court in Birmingham, Ala.
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MIKAELSEN,

L.,

EUROPEAN PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS: THE PRAC-

TICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS ON

Sijthoff
and Noordhoff, Alphen aan den Rijn, The Netherlands (1980); available
at publisher's U.S. address, Germantown, Md.; ISBN 90-286-0409-x, LC
80-65006; 273 pp., bibliography, table of cases, appendices, footnotes.
This volume is the author's own independent and exhaustive study of
the procedural action taken by the European Commission on Human
Rights on a cross-section of all the applications made to it between 1959
and 1979. The Commission is the bureaucracy through which both governmental and individual applicants must proceed before a petition will
be heard by the European Court of Human Rights. The theory and
mechanics of this procedure are especially significant in light of the fact
that 98 percent of the 8,500 cases registered since the Court's founding in
1959 have been rejected by the Commission on one ground or another.
The author is limited somewhat by the fact that only 10 per cent of
such decisions are ever published. The study is nevertheless a comprehensive one. There are introductory chapters on the historical background of
the Court and the Commission and on the theory underlying govermental
and individual rights of petition. Six following chapters analyze the procedure of the Commission and the criteria for and the administrative deTHE ADMISSIBILITY OF APPLICATIONS FROM INDIVIDUALS AND STATES;
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termination of a petition's admissibility. This entire administrative analysis is thoroughly referenced to cases indexed in the appendices, including
many unpublished cases.
The author's philosophical approach posits three fundamental questions: (1) the definition of which rights and freedoms are fundamental to
the extent that they should be regarded as human rights; (2) the conflict
between national sovereignty and the Court's international jurisdiction;
and (3) how properly defined rights can be protected, both at the national
and supranational levels. The limited conclusions of the study suggest
that, given the robust functioning of the Court since 1974, the Commission should loosen its admissibility procedures. The purpose would be to
allow the newly effective Court to play a larger role in developing the
theoretical aspects of what is in effect its own substantive law.
The author has been a fellow and Head of Section in international
law at the Aarbus School of Economics and Business Administration
since 1973. He is also the Legal Advisor at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Copenhagen, as well as a lecturer at the University of Copenhagen.
He has published widely in Danish on public international law.
Problems of Development
RITTBERGER, V. (ed.), SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY IN A CHANGING INTERNATIONAL ORDER: THE UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON SCIENCE AND

TECHNOLOGY FOR DEVELOPMENT; Westview Press, 5500 Central Ave., Boulder, Co. 80301 (1982); $27.50 cloth; ISBN 0-86531-146-3, LC 81-11375; xv,
263 pp.; footnotes, index, tables. This book is part of the Westview Special Studies in Social, Political, and Economic Development.
This volume is a collection of working papers commissioned by the
United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR) as a
preparation for the 1979 U.N. Conference on Science and Technology for
Development (UNCSTD). The papers are by scholars from various countries writing in their private capacities at the prompting of UNITAR.
The general topic is the role of science and technology in world development. All the contributors share the underlying assumption of the
editor and of the UNCSTD conference that developing countries are at
an inherent disadvantage in their desire to use new technical knowledge
in aid of their own development. This disadvantage consists in their situation of dependence and underdevelopment within the world trade and
podJutL u I 'yt1fl,
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if theIIf are no
deliberate policy countermeasures.
The six working papers come under the following topics: science and
technology as an issue in the larger development debate; technological autonomy as an alternative strategy of national development; Third World
cooperation in science and technology; financing for Third World research
and development; and the role of U.N. policy and of UNCSTD in Third
World development prospects.
Volker Rittberger, the UNITAR representative at UNCSTD, is a
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at the University of Tubingen, West
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SABOT,

R.H. (ed.),

MIGRATION AND THE LABOR MARKET IN DEVELOPING

Westview Press, 5500 Central Ave., Boulder, Co. 80301 (1982);
$31.25 cloth; ISBN 0-89158-763-2, LC 80-16050; xiv, 254 pp.; footnotes,
bibliographies, tables, charts, graphs, appendices. The book is part of the
Westview Special Studies in Social, Political, and Economic Development series.
COUNTRIES;

This very academic volume collects seven papers by economists on
labor migration in developing countries. The papers were written for a
1976 World Bank conference on that topic. The papers as they appear in
this volume have been substantially revised to incorporate criticisms and
suggestions made by conference participants.
The chapters are concerned with three issues. The first is the implication of different key characteristics of labor markets for the response of
migration to the hiring of additional urban workers-in other words, the
social opportunity cost of urban labor. Second, the chapters review models of unemployment, attempting to show why models in which urban migration is of tantamount importance are currently commanding excessive
attention. Third, the chapters discuss the difficulty of estimating migration decision-making and the use of alternative labor market models, as
well as the problems of comparing income and prices in differing
localities.
The first chapter provides a basic overview of the various labor market models, with an emphasis on the concept of social opportunity costs
in an urban labor market. Chapter Two deals with urban unemployment
in the less developed countries, focusing on the relationship between migration and urban unemployment. The authors review the various models
of unemployment, presenting a simple taxonomy of the various models.
Chapters Three and Four address the methodology of research on the determinants-of migration. Special attention is given to the migration function which is a principal research tool of economists analyzing migrant
behavior.
Chapter Five is a macroperspective of the consequences of migration
for rural productivity and income distribution. The various effects of outmigration are examined as well as an assessment of the implications for
nonmigrants. Chapter Six seeks to identify the rural residents most and
least able to migrate to exploit the income differentials created by the
structural changes. Chapter Seven is the conclusion.
Paul Collier is a fellow of Keble College and on the staff of the Institute of Economics and Statistics, Oxford. John R. Harris is professor of
economics and director of the African Studies Center at Boston Univer-
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sity. Michael Lipton is a fellow of the Institute of Development Studies
and professor of economics at the University of Sussex. Richard H. Sabot
is a member of the Development Economics Department of the World
Bank. J. Edward Schuh is professor and head, Department of Agricultural and Applied Economics, University of Minnesota. T. Paul Schultz is
the Malcolm K. Brachman Professor of Economics, Yale University. Joseph E. Stiglitz is currently professor of economics at Princeton
University.

